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TO THE HONOURABLE

The Directors of the East-India Company,

FROM

Major General JAMES STUART.

[July 3, 1787.]

EAST-INDIA COMPANY

TO THE HONOURABLE

The Directors of the East-India Company,



GENTLEMEN,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th inst. in relation to the claim for the sum of Rs. 1000, which was paid by me to the late Mr. James Stuart, in the year 1782, and which was at that time, and is now, the property of the Company. I have also the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st inst. in relation to the same claim. I have the honor to inform you that the sum of Rs. 1000, which was paid by me to the late Mr. James Stuart, in the year 1782, and which was at that time, and is now, the property of the Company, has been paid to the late Mr. James Stuart, in the year 1782, and which was at that time, and is now, the property of the Company.

The Company's records, in the year 1782, and for a very considerable space of time, show to what

TO THE
HONOURABLE THE DIRECTORS
OF THE
EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

GENTLEMEN,

IN consequence of a considerable sum of money already paid by me to the heirs of the late Major Lyfaght, in your service, and of a law-suit lately brought against me for the balance of a debt due to him, and originally contracted on the public account for provisions to the army while I had the honour of commanding your forces in the Carnatic, I am under the necessity of taking this method of submitting to your consideration the true circumstances of the case; and as the claim for relief which I am entitled to apply for, must depend on an accurate statement of the facts on which that claim is founded, I shall beg leave, in the course of the following narrative, to appeal to the evidence, and generally to the precise terms of the records, or other authentic papers in your possession, at the India-House, in support of every material fact necessary to be brought under your view.

The Company's records, in the months of September and October 1782, and for a very considerable space of time thereafter, shew to

what extremity of distress the settlement of Madras was reduced by the want of rice and other small grain, and how much that distress was encreased, even to a degree of famine, in consequence of the hurricane which destroyed so many of the grain vessels with their cargoes in the road of Madras in the night of 15th October 1782.

This storm, at the opening of the Monsoon, drove to sea his Majesty's squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, who then sailed for Bombay; so that in the extremity of distress, and in the height of war, from the 15th of October 1782 to the 13th of April following, when the Admiral returned, *M. de Suffrein*, with the French squadron, possessed of *Trincomalee harbour*, were the masters at sea upon the Coast of Coromandel, and every where on that side of the peninsula.

At the same time, from the very critical situation of affairs at that period in your settlements in India, it became an object of the last importance not to disband or disperse the army then assembled in the neighbourhood of Madras, but rather to resort to every expedient that was best calculated for keeping together a respectable force; for there were in the Carnatic two powerful enemies to contend with, a large body of *French* under the command of *Monf. de Haufflisse*, Brigadier General in the French service, and the *Mysores* under the command of the late *Hyder Ally*, and afterwards of his son *Tippoo Sahib* in person: There was reason, therefore, to think that the enemy, possessing such advantages, meant to avail themselves of the opportunity of striking some blow pernicious to your interests in that part of the world, at a time when the situation of your affairs was alarming, from the absence of the British fleet, and from the distress occasioned by the scarcity of provisions.

It was the opinion of Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander in Chief over all India, as well as my own opinion, delivered to the Select Committee

mittee at Madras on repeated occasions, that nothing at that time could be more ill-judged and hurtful to the interests of the Public and of the East-India Company, than the disbanding or dispersing the army then assembled in the neighbourhood of Madras; for on the exertion of that force, *at the proper season for acting*, and on the being able to collect the army at a short notice to take the field in any direction which might be required by the operations of the enemy, depended the preservation of the country.

The alarm and apprehension from the danger of famine had induced Lord Macartney the President, and some of the Members of the Select Committee at Madras, to incline to an opinion for disbanding, dividing, or dispersing the army. This appears in particular from a Letter dated 10th October 1782, from the President and Select Committee of Madras to the Select Committee of Bombay; and as it is materially connected with the present claim, that the situation of affairs upon the Coast at the time when I risked my private fortune and credit for the purpose of encreasing the quantity of provisions in the vicinity of Madras, should be ascertained, it may be proper here to insert the following Extract from the Letter above mentioned, both because it proves the intentions, which I opposed, of disbanding or dispersing the army, and because it gives a strong picture of the distressful state of affairs at that period:

Extract of a Letter from the President and Select Committee of Madras to the Select Committee of Bombay, 10th October 1782.

“ Sir Edward Hughes informed us that he should proceed with the squadron to Bombay about the 15th of this month. Should he execute that determination, we shall have nothing less to apprehend than the loss of all the Company’s possessions on this side of India.

“ This port will be immediately blocked up, and the vessels coming to it with provisions either captured on the passage, or destroyed
“ after

October 10,
1782.

“ after their arrival, and before it can be possible to land any part of
 “ their cargoes.

“ From this melancholy view of our situation, you will plainly
 “ perceive that it is not in our power to afford you any hope of aiding
 “ your invasion of Hyder Ally's possessions on the Malabar Coast, by
 “ attacking him on *this* side.

“ On the contrary, we have every reason to fear that we shall be
 “ driven to the necessity of *dividing if not disbanding the army, and*
 “ *of confining our intentions and our hopes to the single object of keeping*
 “ *possession of this fortress.*”

Against that idea of disbanding or dividing the army, I took the liberty of remonstrating in the most earnest and anxious manner upon every occasion, and particularly as the situation of our affairs at Madras, though critical at that period, did not appear to me so desperate as was represented in the above-mentioned Letter from Lord Macartney, and the other Members of the Committee, I thought it my duty to enter my dissent by a Minute, dated 10th October, in the following terms :

Extract from General STUART'S Minute, 10th October 1782, upon the proposed Letter from the Select Committee of Madras to the Select Committee of Bombay.

“ Another part of this letter I think exceptionable, because in my
 “ opinion there is nothing even in the most dismal prospect, that can
 “ from probable incidents be pointed out at present, which in earnest
 “ *can justify the position of disbanding this army, and giving up every*
 “ *thing but Madras*; and as I think the case not probable, so I must
 “ confess that in my opinion it does more harm than good to the
 “ cause, to state it in such a point of view.

“ I agree

“ I agree in the necessity to press the Admiral to the utmost to
 “ remain beyond the 15th instant; and even to the last hour of fair
 “ weather; and I am persuaded he will stay.

“ I agree also that we cannot spare troops from hence more than
 “ are now on board the squadron, and yet I think it in the chapter of
 “ very possible events, to be able to act against Hyder from *this side*
 “ of India.”

Upon the 11th of October 1782, I gave in to the Members of the October 11,
1782.
 Select Committee a Plan of Precautions as necessary to be adopted
 during the absence of his Majesty's squadron at Bombay; the 5th, 6th,
 and 8th Articles of which are in these words:

“ Article 5.—As the movements and even the existence of the army
 “ must depend on the quantity of provisions, I think it in direct con-
 “ sequence of the duties of my station, to recommend a free importation
 “ of all sorts of grain, to be sold or disposed of, at the discretion of the
 “ importers or owners, from the 20th instant to the end of December
 “ next, without limitation or restriction from the Grain Committee,
 “ or any other quarter, but only to ascertain the quantity.

“ Article 6.—That it be recommended to the Government in Bengal
 “ to give a premium of two or even three rupees a bag, on all rice
 “ brought for the use of the Company during the above period, over
 “ and above the highest freight hitherto given; and that a certain
 “ proportion of the Company's ships be employed in bringing rice
 “ during that time.”

“ Article 8.—That the proper people be wrote to at *Pulicat*, Nellore,
 “ Ongole, and dependencies along the Coast to the northward,
 “ giving notice to provide grain of all sorts, and to discover where it
 “ can be found during the monsoon, as it may perhaps be necessary to
 “ canton part of the army in these districts, together with the greater
 “ part

“ part of the followers, until the *acting season* arrives, and thus to save
 “ the provisions of the garrison.”

October 15,
 1782.

On the 15th of October I delivered in a Minute to the Select Committee on the subject of the necessity of giving every encouragement to the importation of grain, of which Minute the following is an extract :

Minute of the General in Committee, 15th October 1782.

“ I cannot help persevering in my opinion, that the encouragement
 “ to bring grain here *during the monsoon* is by no means sufficient for
 “ merchants and others to run the risque ; I mean from the present
 “ hour to the end of December ; and I also think that every possible
 “ encouragement should likewise be given to the northern boats coming
 “ close in shore with grain of all sorts to *Pulicat*, during that period ;
 “ being convinced that a quantity sufficient might thereby be had to
 “ maintain a very great proportion of the *necessary* followers of this
 “ army, *which ought not to be separated* to any great distance from the
 “ Presidency, but in the last possible necessity.

“ I have given my opinion in my letter of the 11th October (and
 “ now made a Minute of) as to the necessity to keep no other fa-
 “ milies in the Black Town than can feed themselves. I refer to that
 “ letter or minute for my ideas on other precautions which I thought
 “ my duty to state, especially as the defence of this Fort must fall *to me*
 “ whenever it is attacked.”

The paragraphs above quoted afford some specimen of the efforts made by me for prevailing upon the Select Committee at Madras to give proper and liberal encouragement to the merchants and others to bring grain for the use of the army ; but as these efforts were not successful, the strong impression upon my mind of the immense importance of having the army and their followers properly subsisted, made me think it a duty on my part, as Commander of that army in the absence of Sir Eyre Coote, to make every separate exertion in my
 power,

power, and even at the risk of my fortune, for acquiring a competent provision of rice, and other grain, in a central situation, as absolutely necessary for the support of the army, whether in their cantonments in the monsoon season, or in the event of a movement to the north of the Presidency.

One great object of my exertions in that respect was to prevent the dispersion of the army, which at that time had every disadvantage to struggle with, both on account of a large arrear of pay due to them, and on account of a very limited allowance of rice, which was reduced from 500 bags, the usual allowance *per* day for the army and followers in the Company's pay, to 350 bags, with an intimation to me from the Select Committee, that it must be reduced even to 250 bags *per* day, for the whole army and followers under every denomination, and for the out-garrisons, &c. and when at that time there was neither rice nor other small grain to be had for money at the Presidency, there being no public bazar or market to afford the native troops an opportunity of purchasing grain to support their families, or the followers of the army.

In this situation, as I could not obtain a direct sanction of the Madras government for the encouragement which appeared to me necessary to encrease the supply of rice and other grain, my zeal for the service made me interpose with my own credit and fortune for the purpose of attaining that public object, as will appear from the particulars which I am now to state, and which laid the foundation of the just though very distressing claim that was afterwards brought against me by Major Lyfaght and his heirs.

On the 15th of October 1782, I wrote a letter in the following terms to Major Lyfaght, then commanding in the district of Masulipatam:

" The army will go into cantonments in this neighbourhood pretty
 " nearly disposed of as last year; if any difference takes place, it will
 " be owing to your exertions to serve the public.

Letter from
 Major General Stuart
 to Major
 Lyfaght.

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" The

“ The vexatious delays and difficulties attending the mode of deli-
 “ vering rice and other grain here, and the higgling about prices,
 “ which is really nothing in comparison to the present and future
 “ probable necessities of the public, is such, that in the present emer-
 “ gency I have taken upon myself to answer, with my private fortune,
 “ to give every reasonable addition to what is here offered, *to encourage*
 “ *the importation of rice and all other sorts of grain into Pulicat, for two*
 “ *months to come.* I mean to say, that if from your information 150
 “ pagodas the garce of rice, the exchange at 400 rupees for bills on
 “ Bengal for the first month, and 200 pagodas the garce for the second
 “ month, is not a sufficient encouragement for the rice vessels of all
 “ sorts to come close in shore from any place in the Circars to Pulicat,
 “ I will myself, at your discretion, give whatever you say ought to be
 “ given in addition to what is now offered by this Government, and I
 “ will employ the Lascars of the army to open the bar at Pulicat, and
 “ to give every assistance by my orders, and under my inspection, to
 “ dispatch the boats, and give satisfaction to the people. This is an
 “ object which I have much at heart, for more reasons than I need
 “ mention to you.

“ The monsoon is likely to set in soon, and if the rice now on board
 “ in these roads should, from weather or the enemy, fail, *the free port*
 “ *at Pulicat will come greatly in aid to the public exigencies and operations,*
 “ *which very possibly may turn upon the success of this experiment.* For
 “ all these reasons I do request of you to assist me with your influence
 “ and credit with all the Black merchants and boat people that your
 “ servant knows of. I should think the small boats of 7 or 8 garce
 “ would be the fittest for the purpose, at least expence, and more
 “ adventurers; pray lose no time; one battalion of Sepoys is already
 “ stationed at Pulicat, and I have been obliged to send twenty-six days
 “ rice in order to save Captain Smith's stores; they will be in the
 “ communication to the northward for the protection of the poor
 “ people,

“ people, who necessarily leave the Black Town, but I cannot send more until you, by your influence, send grain there.”

On the 30th of October I wrote again to Major Lyfaght in the following terms: “ I am hurried with a thousand things that I can’t write to you, yet I can’t forget repeating my earnest request to send rice, gram, and other grain to *Pulicat*, or even to *Madras*; and I will give from my own pocket for rice twenty pagodas the garce, and other grain in proportion, more than this Government, for two months to come.”

In a subsequent letter, dated 2d December 1782, I wrote to Major Lyfaght as follows:

“ I wait with impatience to hear of some vessels coming to *Pulicat*. I have every reason to think that any extraordinary expence, *at the risk of my private fortune, to encourage the Black merchants to bring rice to that place*, will be made good, if not by this Government, at least by the Board of Bengal. My views are to have a free market for the followers of the army to buy rice at that place. The present distress of the followers of the Bengal regiments and of the Black cavalry, who are all forced now to live upon their *single seer of rice*, is inconceivable! I, for my own part, am made answerable for the consequences, as some people think, if I cannot maintain this army upon 250 bags a day, being one half of the quantity that was allowed or consumed about two months ago. Feeling, therefore, as I do, for the sufferings of these poor people, I have *no other resource* than to request your influence to send us rice, as I wrote to you several weeks ago, *to Pulicat*.”

Another Letter from Major General Stuart to Major Lyfaght.

These were the letters which laid on me the obligation to pay to the heirs of Major Lyfaght the price charged for the rice and other grain, which was sent by his influence or credit to *Pulicat*, to relieve the public distress.

As Sir Eyre Coote was the Commander in Chief over all India, had commanded the King’s and Company’s forces in the Carnatic during

the campaign 1782, and proposed to return to the Coast to command the same army at the opening of the campaign 1783, having gone to Bengal in September 1782, merely on account of his health, I reckoned it in every respect highly incumbent on me, who commanded the Carnatic army in his absence, to correspond with him upon every thing which materially concerned that army; accordingly, Sir Eyre Coote was made acquainted with the distresses we suffered from the scarcity of provisions, and with the ideas entertained by the President and Select Committee at Madras about disbanding, dividing, or dispersing the army assembled in the neighbourhood of Madras. He was also particularly informed of the difficulties I had with the Select Committee on the subject of proper encouragement to be given for bringing rice and other grain to market, and of the measure which on account of these difficulties, and from zeal for the service, I had adopted in ordering upon my own credit, rice and other grain to be brought to *Pulicat*, for the sake of establishing a market and magazine there.

Sir Eyre Coote's sentiments on these matters, his intention of returning to the Coast to command the army, his particular anxiety for keeping that army collected and ready to take the field at the *proper season*, and his approbation of my conduct in these respects, as well as of the exertions made by me in obtaining rice and grain, even at the risk of my own fortune and credit, will appear from the following extracts of letters from Sir Eyre Coote, whereof the originals are in my possession, ready to be produced.

From Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE to Major General STUART.

Calcutta, November 1, 1782.

Nov. 1, 1782.

" The account of the *Medea's* safe arrival here, I presume, reached
 " Madras long ere this. I have benefited by the sea voyage. Though
 " yet weak, I am much better than when I left the Coast; and hope
 " to

“ to be able to *return to you before the season arrives for taking the*
 “ *field.*

“ Unable from my late severe indisposition to enter fully into the
 “ general detail of business here, I have notwithstanding already stated
 “ the wants of the army on the Coast in such strong terms to the
 “ Supreme Board, that I am convinced this Government will strain
 “ every nerve for its support. The articles of money, provisions,
 “ horses to mount your cavalry, Sepoy and Lascar drafts, field car-
 “ riages, &c. have been pointedly, and I trust, with effect spoke to.

“ I place the greatest confidence in your able and zealous endeavours
 “ to further the public service. *The safety of India depends on the Army*
 “ *you have at present the honour of commanding*; and I who know them
 “ well, am confident it cannot be placed in safer hands.

“ As our army encreases in number, an additional supply of draught
 “ and carriage bullocks becomes more indispensibly necessary; for if
 “ we cannot move for want of carriage, our very weight of establish-
 “ ment will, instead of forwarding our views, entail certain ruin on us.

“ *I therefore rely on your exertions.* Repeat your representations to
 “ the Government of Fort St. George on this most material subject;
 “ and by every other means within your power, try also to effect
 “ obtaining an adequate number of bullocks. During the rains even it
 “ will be of essential service to forward as much grain as possible to
 “ Chingleput. This I most strongly recommend. In short, my dear
 “ General, I place my every dependence on you; and have not a
 “ doubt but that *the army will be ready for the most active progressive*
 “ *scene as soon as the season renders it possible to be undertaken.*”

From Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE to Major General STUART.

Ghyretty, November 22, 1782.

“ Before I took my departure from Madras I recommended to the
 “ Select Committee *keeping the army under your command together in*
 “ *full*

Nov. 22,
1782.

" full force, as a measure of the utmost consequence, on it depending the
 " very safety of India. I gave you also my instructions to the same
 " purpose.

" My state of health is yet but very indifferent. I have however
 " taken every opportunity of placing in the strongest point of view,
 " before the Supreme Board, the numerous wants of the troops on the
 " Coast; and as far as my power extends, every exertion will be made
 " to get those wants relieved and assisted from hence."

From Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE to Major General STUART.

Calcutta, December 1, 1782.

Dec. 1, 1782.

" What you have set forth in your Minute of the 8th of November
 " are all matters of important public concern; and the earnest terms in
 " which you have introduced them to the consideration and attention
 " of the Committee are highly commendable, and must acquit you of
 " all future blame for any bad consequences which may arise from delay
 " or neglect on their part.

" I am fully convinced that in the several dispositions you have
 " made of his Majesty's troops you have been guided in your judgment
 " by a true regard for the welfare and support of our general interests;
 " but whilst, as appears by your Minute of the 8th November, there
 " is reason to apprehend bad consequences from the murmurs that
 " continue to prevail among the native corps for want of pay and
 " sufficiency of rice, it is an obvious principle of policy, as well as of
 " military conduct, and one which I must strongly recommend to
 " you the observance of, viz. to keep your European force as united as
 " possible, so long as the present circumstances of your situation con-
 " tinue so powerfully to evince both its propriety and necessity.

" I observe with great pleasure and applause the exertions which you
 " yourself are making towards procuring provisions for the army by way
 " of Pulicat; and you shall have my most hearty support for being reim-
 " bursed

“buried any extraordinary charge which you may authorise in a business of such real consequence and essential utility.”

From these particulars which have now been brought under your view, I flatter myself it will appear that I had no reason to apprehend that attempts would be made in any quarter to make me a sufferer on account of a measure which I had adopted purely from motives of zeal for the public service; and I had the less reason to apprehend any bad consequences from such attempts if made, as my conduct in respect to the engagement I had come under for bringing rice to Pulicat had met with approbation and applause from Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander in Chief over all India, and an assurance on his part of his most hearty support for my being reimbursed.

It is a prevailing opinion, and founded on reasons of public utility, that it must be incident to the powers of a Commander in Chief of an army to take upon himself such measures as at a particular crisis appear essential for the support and preservation of the army under his command. If that is admitted, the exercise of such power devolved upon me from the situation I then held, but it was further confirmed by the complete approbation of Sir Eyre Coote, who was not only the Commander in Chief over all India, but was expected soon to resume the command of that very army for whose benefit these exertions were made on my part. It is therefore a fair inference to presume that Sir Eyre Coote, if he had been at Madras at the crisis alluded to, would have done the very thing which I did; and, from the whole tenor of his correspondence, I had reason to rest satisfied that if the Government at Madras should make difficulties about indemnifying me for the risks to which I exposed myself on the public account, such indemnification would be accomplished by the means of the Supreme Council in Bengal.

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It will appear, however, in the sequel, that the President and Select Committee at Madras not only gave me no credit for the exertion thus made for the public service, but after the pressure of distress was over, they refused to give me any indemnification or any assistance for extricating myself from the difficulties in which these exertions had involved me; and it will further appear that the communication which I naturally gave to Sir Eyre Coote, and through him to the Supreme Council at Bengal, of the measure I had taken for the public service in providing a proper supply of rice for the army and its followers, was by the Madras Government turned against me, as an argument that I must not look to them but to the Bengal Government for any relief or hopes of indemnification that might be entertained by me.

In the months of November and December 1782, and January 1783, considerable quantities of rice and other grain were, by the very active exertions of Major Lyfaght, sent to *Pulicat*, in consequence of the letters he received from me, and great benefit accrued either to the army or to the followers of the army from the supply of provisions thus obtained.

The whole of the rice and other grain thus sent to *Pulicat* was committed to the charge or superintendence of Captain Smith, who was the commanding officer at that place, which is situated upon the sea-coast about fifteen miles to the northward of Madras.

For the purpose of relieving the most pressing necessities, and also for that of affording to Major Lyfaght ready payment at least for part of the grain sent by his means, a certain quantity of it was at Major Lyfaght's desire sold for ready money, which was accounted for to him by Captain Smith, with which I never had any concern, neither was any part of the grain so sold, charged to my account by Major Lyfaght, but the charge made against me by Major Lyfaght was for that part of the rice and grain sent to *Pulicat*, whereof only a small part was sold
for

for ready money as *per* account annexed, but which was laid up in store by Captain Smith, and reserved for the purpose of supplying the public exigencies as they might afterwards occur.

On the 18th of December 1782, Captain Smith wrote to me from Pulicat, that Mr. Cox, with a battalion under his command, had arrived there that morning, and that as he stood in great need of rice for the fighting men and followers, &c. he had supplied him with the quantity necessary for the march, though they had no money to pay for it; and Captain Smith mentioned that this rice was furnished out of the quantity which was stated to my private account.

On the 19th of December 1782, Captain Smith wrote to me, that there was about ninety-eight garce of rice then in the road, and on shore, and that one-half of that quantity should be disposed of for Major Lyfaght's account.

In the month of January 1783, intelligence was received that *Monf. de Suffrein*, with the French squadron of ten sail of the line and two frigates, had appeared in the road of *Ganjam*, from whence, after lying at anchor for seven days, they sailed for the southward on the 15th of January 1783. *Monf. de Suffrein*, with the French squadron, had thus taken post to the north both of Madras and of Maffulipatam, in order to favour the original plan of *Monf. de Buffy*, to effect a landing in these parts; and it became a great object of the Madras Government, at this time, to render the enemies schemes abortive in case they should persist in the plan of carrying the seat of war to the northward of Madras. Jan. 1783.

On the 21st of January 1783, Lord Macartney wrote to me a Letter, inclosing a copy of the written intelligence he had just received of the enemies motions and intentions, and desiring to have my sentiments upon it; in which written intelligence there is a paragraph in these words: " One of the prisoners declared to me, that all our settlements Jan. 21, 1783.

“ to the northward of *Pulicat* were to be attacked; and that he believed Mons. Buffy's troops were to be landed at *Massulipatam*.”

Upon this occasion, I delivered in to the Select Committee a plan for the defence of the northern Circars, on the supposition of Mons. de Buffy being to land to the northward of Madras, which plan was sent by me from the camp at Taumarum, to the Select Committee, on the 26th January 1783.

Jan. 26, 1783.

In that plan, delivered to the Select Committee, there were the two following articles :

Article 25th. “ But supposing Mons. Buffy lands to the north or south of *Massulipatam*, there is scarce a doubt but that Tippoo's army will move in that direction, and this army (that is, the army then under my command) must be in readiness to move at the same time, *along the coast northward*, for which purpose I beg leave to recommend the filling of every place on the march, with grain of all sorts, &c.”

Article 27th. “ As to *Pulicat*, I should not be of opinion to blow it up, unless the enemy land at or near Nellore; it is a very convenient halting place for parties or convoys, and of some security in communication from the northward; and there is, by my information, *a quantity of horse gram and rice, at present there, sufficient to serve the army a few days in case it should be needed on the march.*”

The rice and grain thus alluded to, as in store at *Pulicat*, was precisely the rice and grain which had been sent thither by Major Lyfaght, upon my risk and credit, and which Captain Smith had been directed to reserve in store for public emergencies.

The intelligence received in January 1783, concerning the intentions of the French upon our settlements to the northward of Madras, joined with the circumstance, that the French fleet under Mons. de Suffrein

frein were then upon the coast, and completely masters at sea, induced me to give directions to Captain Smith at Pulicat, by letter dated 22d of January 1783, that he should immediately do every thing in his power for securing and putting out of the reach of *Monf. de Suffrein*, all the rice and grain at *Pulicat*; in answer to which, I received from Captain Smith the following letter, dated January 23, 1783.

Pulicat, January 23, 1783.

“Your letter, dated yesterday, half past one, did not reach me till this day at five P. M. I have now lodged in the Fort above fifty garce of rice, four garce of horse gram, and near four garce of paddy; there is yet on the beach, but coming in very fast, above fifty garce more of rice. I have got every thing on shore from the vessels, except some paddy and a little rice, which I have hurried off, in the vessel to Madras, out of harm’s way.”

The intimation given by me to the Select Committee, in the paper above referred to, of the 26th January, concerning the grain at *Pulicat*, proves two things; in the first place, that this provision of rice and grain had been made by me solely for the public service; and secondly, that there existed, at that time, the greatest probability that the whole of it would be wanted for the service of the army in their march northward, where they must have passed near to *Pulicat*; and in that case, the grain in store there would certainly have been made use of by the army, and would have afforded the whole of them sustenance for a few days at least.

The circumstance of such a provision being made by my means, and ready for the public service at this precise crisis, when, on the one hand, the French fleet, under *Monf. de Suffrein*, were upon the coast, and masters at sea; and on the other hand, the *French* and *Mysoreans* were in full force at land, and their united army within two or three days march of the army which I then commanded near to Madras; I say, these circumstances not only justified the measure I had

taken for making a store of rice and grain at *Pulicat*, but of itself ought to have been sufficient for inducing the Select Committee at Madras to take that grain off my hands, for the use of the public, and to relieve me from all risk or responsibility for the price of it.

The conduct of the Select Committee with respect to me, was however very different, as will be seen in the sequel.

From the 26th of January to the 24th of April 1783 I had no further correspondence with the Select Committee about the grain at *Pulicat*, neither did I obtain any knowledge of their intentions with respect to that grain till the month of July 1783;—but lest any inference should be drawn to the prejudice of my claim from the seeming inattention to this business during so many months, while that claim remained unsettled, it will be necessary shortly to lay before you the mere outlines of those important objects, which in preference to all others engaged my time and attention at that singular crisis of your affairs upon the Coast.

This will unavoidably lead me to touch upon the multiplicity of those great events which crowded upon one another during that critical period, from January to July 1783; and while I am thus obliged to account for a degree of inattention with respect to those affairs which regarded myself only, you, Gentlemen, will likewise be enabled to judge whether my time and attention were usefully dedicated to your service.

In January 1783, the demolition of *Vandewash* and *Carangooly*, and the withdrawing of the garrisons from these places, was resolved upon, as a measure then rendered necessary from the situation of affairs upon the Coast, and from the intelligence received of the designs of the French;—at the same time it was foreseen that the execution of the plan for the demolition of these places might lead to an engagement with the *French* and *Mysoreans*, who were then assembled at a small distance from Vandewash, their forces consisting of the late Hyder's army, commanded by Tippoo Sahib in person, joined with all the French

French regulars on the Coast, reported upwards of 1200 men, besides the free corps of *Monf. de Lallée* in the service of *Tippoo*.

On the 5th of February 1783 the army under my command destined for this service encamped on the southern banks of the river *Palar* beyond *Chingleput*, and above forty miles from *Madras*.

On the morning of the 6th we took up our ground at *Carangooly*, and afterwards moved to *Vandewash*, where we encamped the 9th. In a few days the demolition of these places was effected, and the garrisons and stores were retired in sight of the combined force, *French* and *Mysoreans*, under *Monf. de Haufflisse* and *Tippoo Sabib*; and during the interval between the commencement and completion of the total demolition of *Vandewash*, that combined force was dared to battle, which they declined, and afterwards retired precipitately. The particulars of the army's movements on the occasion, also the affair at *Nedingul*, the 13th February, are on your records, more especially in the journal which I transmitted from camp, with a sketch of the ground.

It was the 24th of February 1783 before I returned to *Madras*. The next service was to lay in a sufficient stock of rice at *Vellore* (distant full eight days march of the army, in an opposite direction from *Madras*). That important place, as appears from your records, was then within a few days of being in absolute want; and it became an object of great consequence that a supply of provisions should at this time be safely lodged at *Vellore*,—such as would secure the garrison there against the hazard of any similar distress, whilst the main army was to be employed at *Cuddalore*.

From this service, entered upon, the 3d March, I once more returned to the Presidency, on the 20th of same month.

In a day or two after my return to *Madras*, at this time, intelligence was received that *M. de Buffy* had been some days at *Cuddalore*, and was reported to have brought with him a force of 2200 regular troops of France, besides 1000 *Caffries* from the islands. And on the 25th
of

of March two French ships of the line and frigates had then actually blocked up the port of Madras, with a view to intercept the trade, &c. These facts, and the intelligence above alluded to, are ascertained by Lord Macartney's circular letters of 23d and 25th March, and by his Minute in Select Committee 24th March 1783, printed in the Appendix N^o II.

From this period the sole object that occupied my thoughts was to make the necessary preparations for the army's taking and keeping the field, with a view to the attack and overthrow of the whole body of the French army at *Cuddalore*, and the capture of their train of artillery and stores, so soon as that enterprize could be proceeded on with effect, by the co-operation of his Majesty's squadron, without which there could be no rational hope of accomplishing it.

Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes returned with the squadron from Bombay, and anchored in Madras road the 13th of April 1783. His letter of that date, upon your records, shews the Admiral's determination to co-operate with the army in any measures to distress the enemy.

From various circumstances, and particularly from the time requisite for taking in a sufficient provision of water, it was the 2d of May before the Admiral sailed from Madras to the southward; and on the 17th, according to undoubted information, the British fleet, in consequence of adverse winds and current, was only six leagues south-east of *Conjimeer*. Captain Haliday in the *Isis*, with the provision, artillery, and store-ships, and having on board Major General Bruce with the additional *necessary* reinforcements, destined for the operations at *Cuddalore*, did not leave Madras road until the 14th of May.

The army under my command proceeded on their march from the camp in the neighbourhood of Madras, towards *Cuddalore*, on the 21st day of April 1783; and one of the brigades had moved on two days march in advance.—The minutes and other papers on your records shew the reasons for the army proceeding on their march towards *Cuddalore*, even before either the squadron or the ships with the stores and troops on board had sailed from Madras, though it was not intended that

that the army should reach Cuddalore before these ships had arrived at their stations.

It was of the last importance that the provision and store ships, &c. should be *within our reach, before commencing any operations at Cuddalore*; besides the importance of concealing from the French General as long as possible my intentions with regard to that part of Cuddalore against which these operations were to be directed, which must have been prematurely discovered, had I taken up my ultimate ground before the arrival of the provision and store ships. That these were uniformly my sentiments and objects, appears from your records, and particularly from my correspondence with the Select Committee during the march of the army from Madras to Cuddalore; and one essential part of the plan of co-operation was this, that the Admiral, with the ships of the line, should keep the French squadron in view or pent up in *Trincomalee* harbour, so as the British squadron should be placed between that of the French and Cuddalore, while Captain Haliday, with the *Isis* and a frigate or two, convoyed and covered from insult the provision and store ships, with the reinforcements, &c. The movements of the army by land were to be regulated as near as possible by those of Sir Edward Hughes getting to his station off *Trincomalee*, and by C. Haliday in the *Isis*, with the store-ships and reinforcements, getting to the south of Cuddalore; and it so happened, that the *Isis* having appeared in sight on the 6th, and anchored at her fixed destination on the 7th of June, on that very day the army under my command took up its ultimate ground south of that place.

On the evening of the 8th June, *Major General Bruce* and *Colonel Wangenheim*, with the Hanoverians and other European troops, to the amount of 800 men, destined for our reinforcement in the attack upon the French at Cuddalore, disembarked from Captain Haliday's convoy, and marched to camp; and even after this junction, the French army in possession of *Cuddalore* contained a greater number of effective European regular forces than there were in the army under my command. The

The attack upon the whole body of French, commanded by *M. de Buffy*, covered by the lines and guns of Cuddalore, was made on the morning of the 13th of June, when the French were drove into that place, after having had forty officers and nearly a thousand men killed or wounded, and sixteen pieces of cannon taken in their lines, as appears from the detail of that action upon your records.

The same records shew, that our provision and store ships, with great part of their lading, found it necessary on the 16th to leave their station south of Cuddalore, and that on the 17th of June the French squadron anchored in Cuddalore Roads.

M. de Suffrein having at this time received a reinforcement of men from the French garrison, stood out to sea on the 18th, and after an engagement with the British squadron on the 20th, regained the road of Cuddalore on the 23d of June.

From this period our army was most unfortunately deprived of all manner of assistance or protection from the ships of his Majesty's squadron, which after the action of the 20th (not far from Cuddalore), returned to Madras roads on the 24th of June, whilst *M. de Suffrein* the French Admiral, with fifteen sail of the line besides frigates, were at anchor close to *Cuddalore*, consequently in the best position for co-operation with *Mons. de Buffy*, the French General at that place, and for affording to him material assistance.

Accordingly, *M. de Suffrein* landed upon the 24th a reinforcement of 2200 men, which included 1200 Europeans and natives, that had been lent to him from the garrison at *Cuddalore* on the 18th of June.

In that situation (after the return of *M. de Suffrein's* fleet to *Cuddalore*), so highly favourable for the French, and so very unfavourable for our army, a large body of French regulars and other troops, in a *sortie* from *Cuddalore*, on the morning of the 25th June, attacked the outposts of our army; but the scheme of the French (from which they had

had promised themselves many advantages) was defeated by a *successful repulse*, on which occasion the commanding officer of the *sortie*, Colonel of the regiment *d'Aquitaine*, was taken prisoner.

In a few days after this affair of the 25th of June, the accounts received of the Preliminaries of Peace between Great Britain and France put an end to any further experiments of the force of either army.

From these particulars an idea may be formed of the important objects to which the most earnest and unremitting attention on my part was necessarily dedicated, from the month of January to the end of June 1783—and when thus employed, I flatter myself, Gentlemen, you will be of opinion that even if I had abstained totally from any mention of my claim in relation to the Pulicat rice transactions, such silence, under such circumstances, ought not to be interpreted as a relinquishment of that claim of indemnification.

I shall now beg leave to resume the historical account of what related solely to the grain at *Pulicat*, from which it will appear that although the pressure of events made me neglect writing on that business to the Select Committee, from the end of January till near the end of April 1783, yet that I took occasion at three different periods, in the months of April, May, and June 1783, to do every thing that depended on me for bringing the Select Committee at Madras to a decision upon that matter.

In the progressive movements of the army towards *Cuddalore*, the main body had encamped south of *Chingleput* on the 22d of April 1783; and on the 24th I wrote to the President and Select Committee the following Letter, on the subject of the grain at Pulicat:

“ *Camp South of Palar, April 24, 1783.*

“ This is the first day that for months past I have had it in my power
“ to dedicate to my own private affairs.

“ The most material concern which in that way I find myself engaged
“ in, is the personal obligation by contract which I laid myself under

Letter to the
Select Com-
mittee, 24 h
April 1783.

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“ in

“ in the time of our greatest distress, and with the apprehension of a
 “ famine, before and after the storm in October 1782 (and I believe I
 “ mentioned my intention in this respect to your Lordship, &c. in
 “ Committee, about that time), requesting of Captain Lyfaght to use
 “ his influence and credit to the northward, and by all means possible
 “ to send rice and other grain to Pulicat, or even to Madras, and that I
 “ should answer to him with my private fortune to give twenty pagodas
 “ the garce more if required, above the rate paid by Government, at
 “ the time of landing.

“ The demands are now, and have been for some time made upon me
 “ for the rice and other grain landed at Pulicat in the months of
 “ November and December, and some in January. I desired Captain
 “ Smith commanding there to take charge of it. Part of that rice has
 “ at different times come in aid of the troops passing and repassing at
 “ Pulicat, and was paid for in ready money—sixteen garce, as I think,
 “ by Captain Smith’s letters, appear to have been taken by order of
 “ Government, in the month of February, as three months provision
 “ for the garrison of Pulicat. It seems to have been done without
 “ asking the consent of the persons concerned, only that they were
 “ desired to settle for it at Madras; but as it was for the service, I
 “ desired no further notice to be taken of it. I find that the quantity
 “ of rice or other grain remaining, imported at the times and in the
 “ manner above mentioned, *and now in good condition at Pulicat, is*
 “ *about fifty-eight Madras garce, all which is ready to be delivered for*
 “ *the public service,* to the order of Government, paying to Captain
 “ Lyfaght the rates at the time of importation.

“ At the above period, when the distress of the Settlement, and my
 “ own particular anxiety concerning the army, led me to run the
 “ risk I have done, I did myself the honour to acquaint his Excel-
 “ cellency Sir Eyre Coote, then in Bengal, of what I had done, and
 “ I was favoured with his answer, that he did not doubt my being
 “ held

“ held free from loss, as to my *private fortune*; and that so far as
“ his influence could operate, it would be for that purpose.

“ I have not had an hour's leisure to look over the accounts; but
“ I should suppose that the allowance of Government for the months
“ of *November* and *December*, paid to Captain Lyfaght, or his at-
“ tornies here, for the 16 garce taken in the manner I have men-
“ tioned, and for the 58 garce now remaining at Pulicat (upon the
“ delivery of it to Government), by bills on Bengal, at 200 pagodas
“ the garce, the bazar exchange will almost settle the account. If
“ demands are made upon me for additional payments, in consequence
“ of my offer of 20 pagodas the garce more, I shall state it separately;
“ but none have as yet been made.

“ However, as my fortune is engaged so considerably for the whole
“ amount, I must request your Lordship, &c. will, *in consideration of*
“ *the motives that led me to it*, please to direct the payment to Captain
“ Lyfaght, or his attornies at Madras, for the former 16, and what
“ remains, *viz.* 58 garce (if so much) in the manner as now stated.

“ Having left the papers concerning this business at Madras, I speak
“ from memory, but I think the whole quantity already received by
“ Government, and remaining at Pulicat, does not exceed 74 garce,
“ besides what has been sold for ready money.

(Signed)

“ JAM^S STUART.”

Having received no answer to my letter of the 24th April to the
Select Committee, and as I was then going upon service, wishing to
avoid any future disputes or embarrassments either to myself or to my
heirs, from unsettled pecuniary engagements of considerable magnitude,
I took occasion in a separate letter to the President Lord Macartney,
on the 13th May 1783, to write to him the following paragraph on
the subject of the Pulicat rice.

From Major General STUART to the President Lord MACARTNEY.

Camp, Permacoil, May 13, 1783.

Letter to
Lord Mac-
artney,
May 13,
1783.

“ And now before I send off this (private) letter, will your Lordship
“ allow me to lie under an obligation to you, by attending to the con-
“ tents of my letter wrote ten days ago, concerning the demand made
“ upon me for the rice remaining at *Pulicat*, and commissioned by me
“ in October and November last? It is a very ferious matter with me,
“ even to delay the businefs; however, I may be certain of lofing
“ nothing *ultimately*, by reference to Bengal, and to Sir Eyre Coote’s
“ letters, after communicating what I had done to the Governor
“ General.

“ I say, my Lord, you will oblige me by removing the chance of
“ law-fuit, in taking (on account of the Company) the grain that
“ remains with Captain Smith at *Pulicat*, ordered at my risk, as re-
“ presented in my letter to the Select Committee, south of Palar,
“ 24th April.

“ I am ftill liable, after that, for the 20 pagodas the garce above
“ the Company’s price; it is the only thing of mine unsettled; I got
“ into the fcrapc from *public* motives, and from perhaps too much
“ warmth of temper. I never had a private concern or profit of any
“ fort, on what is called trade or businefs. I never had an advantage
“ from perquisite, or what is called *bazar*, in any ftation; and furely
“ your Lordship would not think it right that I fhould fuffer from this
“ grain businefs being delayed. It is a businefs which I trust to your
“ favour to fettle, fo as no demands may affect my brother and heir
“ univerfal, Andrew Stuart, in whose name I alfo make the request.”

On the 24th of June 1783, full feven days after M. Suffrein and
the French fleet had got into Cuddalore roads, I wrote again to Lord
Macartney, on the fubject of the rice, as follows:

Camp

Camp before Cuddalore, June 24, 1783.

" I have never yet, my Lord, been honoured with your answer to
" the request I made you to have your good offices that Government
" should on their account take Captain Lyfaght's rice, which under
" certain circumstances I commissioned for the public, and is now in
" charge of Captain Smith at *Pulicat*."

Letter to
Lord Macart-
ney, June 24,
1783.

No answer was ever given to me either by the Select Com-
mittee or by Lord Macartney, to any of the three preceding
letters; of this I had reason to complain in every point of view,
but more particularly from this consideration, because if they had
in due course acquainted me that they were resolved not to take
the grain on the public account, and to refuse me any aid for ex-
tricating myself from the engagement I had come under, I should most
undoubtedly have ordered the remains of the rice and grain to have
been sent at my risk from the *Pulicat* magazine to the army at Cudda-
lore, which would have removed the necessity of the present applica-
tion for reimbursement, as the rice and grain then at *Pulicat* would
have bore a much higher value and price with the army in the neigh-
bourhood of Cuddalore; but this opportunity was lost, entirely from the
circumstance of my not receiving any answer to the letters which I had
written in April, May, and June, to Lord Macartney and the Select
Committee.

As no intimation was given to me of any intention on the part of the
Madras Government to decline what had been proposed by me in the
letters respecting the grain, it was natural to conclude that they had
adopted the proposition of receiving the remains of the grain at *Pu-
licat* for the public account; however, as there was a possibility that it
might be otherwise, and as the army under my command at Cuddalore
was then in great distress, from the want of rice, I wrote on the first
of July 1783 to Captain Smith at *Pulicat* as follows:

Camp

Camp before Cuddalore, July 1, 1783.

July 1, 1783.

“ I have wrote repeatedly to Lord Macartney concerning our friend
“ Lyfaght's grain, without receiving any answer. If nothing is done,
“ and the Government have not taken it, I am to desire you will at
“ any rate *immediately* hire vessels to bring here the whole remaining,
“ and as much more as you can procure, by sea, under convoy of the
“ Admiral, or even to follow him.”

In answer to this letter I received the following from Captain Smith,
dated Pulicat, July 9, 1783 :

July, 9.

“ I did not receive your two letters of the first instant before last night.
“ I am extremely sorry that no notice has been taken of your appli-
“ cation concerning the rice, for if it is not soon disposed of, it must
“ *inevitably* spoil. I should most readily comply with your request,
“ but there is not a vessel to be hired at this place, and there is no
“ other way of removing the grain but by sending vessels from Ma-
“ dras to fetch it, and as soon as they arrive here, nothing shall be
“ wanted on my part to expedite the embarkation.”

This letter from Captain Smith, of the 9th of July, did not reach my
hands till after my return to Madras, which was on the 16th of
July; and some days after my return I perused the Minutes
of the Select Committee, which had been entered in the Records
during my absence on service: there I found that the letter I had
written to them on the 24th of April 1783, on the subject of the grain,
had been duly received, and that a resolution had been taken thereupon
in my absence, though no notice was ever sent to me of that resolution,
which was entered in the Minutes at the date of 29th April 1783, in
these words: “ The Committee have only to observe on the transaction
“ relative to the rice at Pulicat, the General had no authority from
“ Government for the part which he relates to have taken in it, nor
“ ever applied for such authority, although he was then at the Pre-
“ fidency;

“ ficiency; and the Committee therefore cannot think themselves warranted to make the Company answerable for the consequences.”

Unfortunately for me, a profound silence was kept with regard to this resolution entered on the Minutes of the 29th of April, and being led into error from that silence, the opportunity was lost of turning the grain to the best account.

It was not till the 24th of July 1783, eight days after my return to Madras, that for the first time I had any idea of the resolution above mentioned.

I took occasion therefore on the 5th of August 1783, to address the following letter to the President and Select Committee :

From Major General STUART to the Select Committee of Fort St. George,
sent in circulation.

August 5, 1783.

“ In the month of November last monsoon, and about the time of
“ the hurricane, in the extreme distress of this Settlement, with the
“ most probable prospect of famine, in the midst of war, and without
“ the protection of our fleet, my personal anxious feelings for the
“ distress of the army and the followers (restricted to half the usual
“ quantity of rice) induced me, at my own personal risk, to com-
“ mission from the northern Circars, at 200 pagodas the garce, and
“ 20 pagodas premium, as much as could be landed at Pulicat, of
“ rice, and other grain in proportion, at a certain time.

“ The person whom I applied to for his credit and influence in the
“ Circars on this occasion, was Captain Lysaght, who has with great
“ justice made a demand upon me for the money. The rice and other
“ grain was landed at Pulicat, and put in charge of Captain Smith,
“ for the use of the army.

“ It appears from Captain Smith’s letters, that in the times of the
“ greatest distress, particularly when the battalions went to Nellore,
“ under

“ under Captain Bishop, during the monsoon, that this rice came
 “ greatly in aid to the Company's troops passing to the northward.

“ Twelve garce of this very rice was taken *by the order of Govern-*
 “ *ment* for the public service, without any authority of the owner, or
 “ the person who had it in charge. Captain Smith had my orders to
 “ consider it for the service of the public, and only hesitated, because
 “ he wished to give previous notice of the demand.

“ On the 24th of April, as appears by the accompanying letter, I
 “ wrote a letter to the Select Committee upon this business, just before
 “ I was going upon the last service, requesting they would, from the
 “ motives of my conduct, receive the rice remaining at Pulicat on the
 “ public account, at the rate allowed at the time of its importation.
 “ The letter was undoubtedly received, because I now see by the
 “ Minutes, some resolution was then come to, *but I never had the*
 “ *honour to receive any answer to that letter wrote from Chingleput ;* and
 “ it is since my return (not many days ago) that I have heard of a
 “ quantity, exceeding 50 garce, remaining at Pulicat at my risk,
 “ *although, during that period, rice has been sent there from the stores*
 “ *here for the use of the troops.*

“ What I have now to ask from the Members of the Committee is,
 “ Whether, *after this loss of time,* they will favour me so far as to
 “ receive the remaining quantity of rice thus imported into the public
 “ stores for the public use, as was my original intention ?

“ Being no merchant or dealer, and too late in life to begin a
 “ trade, I am willing to stand to the whole loss, if the Government of
 “ Bengal does not think it proper, or equitable, or just, to keep me
 “ from loss in any part.

“ The demand now made upon me exceeds 14,000 pagodas. I
 “ ask nothing from this Government, but the *certainty* that rice or
 “ other grain has been received for the public use to a certain extent.
 “ In a word, *their receipts* on this occasion is all the favour I have to
 “ ask,

" ask, and doubtless, whatever may be my fate in this business, it in
" fact becomes in so far an aid to the service here.

(Signed) " JAM^s STUART."

The proceedings of the President and Select Committee, in consequence of this letter, were as follows:

Upon the 15th of August 1783, the Deputy Secretary sent me a note, enclosing a copy of the opinions given by the President Lord Macartney, and the other Members of the Select Committee, on the subject of my claim, and of the resolution then taken by them on that subject.

The opinions given by the several Members were in these words:

Lord MACARTNEY's Opinion.

" I don't see what this Government has to do with the General's Aug. 1783.
" rice transaction. What Captain Smith delivered for the troops at
" Pulicat should be paid for at the price the General charges; but as
" to the remainder, I conceive this Government has nothing to do
" with it.

(Signed) " M."

Mr. SADLEIR's Opinion.

" I am of opinion that General Stuart might direct the disposal of
" the rice remaining, and refer the subject of his letter to the con-
" sideration of those who approved of the proceedings.

(Signed) " A. S."

Mr. DAVIDSON's Opinion.

" I am sorry for the General's embarrassment in this rice transaction,
" but he has brought it on himself; the business was unfashioned by
" Government. The Company's rice is now selling by wholesale and
" retail, at an immense discount. I do not therefore see any remedy,
" but what must be at the expence of the Company.

(Signed) " A. D."

E

Mr.

Mr. WILLIAMS's Opinion.

" As it appears to me that General Stuart could not have been
 " actuated from any other motive than that of serving the public in
 " the time of our distress for want of grain ; and as it also appears
 " that some part of his rice had been taken from Captain Smith, for
 " the use of the Company's troops marching to the northward, I
 " cannot but be of opinion his application for bills on Bengal, for the
 " amount of grain he had imported at Pulicat from the Circars at his
 " own private risk, should be complied with. It is certain (whatever
 " the motives may be) that the General was very irregular in men-
 " tioning this purchase of grain to Sir Eyre Coote, in expectation of
 " his support and influence for its payment, as he was at the date of
 " that letter under the immediate controul of the Select Committee, to
 " whom he ought of right to have applied for the reimbursement of
 " his money. If the other Members of the Committee should en-
 " tertain a different opinion of this transaction, *I think the General*
 " *should be directed to apply to Bengal for redress* ; particularly as he
 " was encouraged in making this demand on the Company by the
 " late Sir Eyre Coote, a member of the Supreme Board.

(Signed) " M. W."

RESOLUTION.

As the rice the Company have in store is now selling to the inhabitants, the Committee cannot consent to receive General Stuart's rice.

A true extract.

(Signed) W. C. JACKSON, Dy Secy.

Having thus traced the progress of the various incidents relating to
 the rice business down to the 15th of August 1783, when the President
 and Select Committee finally refused any aid for extricating me
 from the loss to which I was exposed, I must beg leave, Gentlemen,
 to request your attention for a moment to the very peculiar circum-
 stances of this affair.

The President and Select Committee at Madras could not but be satisfied that the engagement I came under to Major Lyfaght had proceeded entirely from zeal for the public service, without any view of pecuniary profit to myself, and accordingly, it never was alleged or insinuated from any quarter, that any interested views had ever given rise to the undertaking on my part, or that in fact I had ever received, directly or indirectly, one farthing of benefit, or pecuniary advantage, from the transactions relating to the grain. Upon that ground of itself, it might have been expected that the Government at Madras should have been disposed to lend their aid to the Commander of an army, who from anxiety for the proper sustenance and support of that army, had involved himself in difficulties, by pledging his own fortune and credit for provisions to them, even if it were allowed that there had been some degree of rashness and imprudence in this measure on his part, and also supposing that the provision of grain so made under the apprehension of a great scarcity, approaching almost to famine, had from the course of subsequent events been found to be of little or no benefit to those for whose use it was originally intended.

But 2dly, The reasons for the Madras Government affording their aid in this case were greatly increased, from the benefit and utility which accrued to the public from the provision of rice and other grain thus made at Pulicat. The proofs of the benefits derived from it, on several occasions, may be seen in the Appendix, and in addition to these, the events already mentioned, which happened in the month of January 1783, deserve to be considered as affording a material proof of the propriety and utility of the measure, for it has been shewn, that at that period the French fleet were upon the Coast completely masters at sea, and could intercept all provisions destined for Madras, or the adjacent parts of the Coast; and it has also been shown, that intelligence was received of an intention on the part of the French to carry the seat of war to the northward of Madras, in which case, the store of rice and grain at *Pulicat*, both that part reserved at my desire for the

exigency of service, and likewise whatever had been brought by my general encouragement, and in Captain Smith's separate management, must have come materially in aid for supplying the necessities of our army in any movement to the northward.

3dly, The Select Committee at Madras, by their own acts, were precluded from throwing upon me any loss that might arise from the provision of grain made by my means at *Pulicat*; for it appears, that in the month of February 1783, they, by their own authority, and without consulting me, ordered a considerable quantity of the grain which, at my risk, and by my order, had been laid up in store in *Pulicat*, and which makes part of the grain charged by Major Lyfaght to my account, to be delivered out to the garrison then at *Pulicat*, to the amount of three months provisions of rice for that garrison. This is proved by a correspondence on this subject between Captain Smith, under whose charge these stores then were by my appointment, and Mr. Ross, the Company's agent at the Presidency, and Mr. Frith, the Company's paymaster at *Pulicat*, from which correspondence, it appears that Captain Smith on the 1st of February 1783, acquainted Mr. Ross, "That there
 " was not a grain of rice at *Pulicat*, excepting what Captain Lyfaght
 " had sent there by particular desire of General Stuart, who made him-
 " self answerable to pay him 200 pagodas *per garce*."

In answer to this letter, Captain Smith received the following letter from Mr. Ross, dated Fort St. George, February 7, 1783: "I have
 " received your letter, dated the 1st February, and have laid it before
 " the Governor (Lord Macartney), but his Lordship directed me to
 " repeat *his orders to Mr. Frith, namely, to possess himself of three*
 " *months rice for the garrison of Pulicat, and to refer the owners to settle*
 " *with this Government.*"

Accordingly Captain Smith was in a manner compelled by these orders, signified to him from the Governor, to deliver out to the garrison at *Pulicat* three months provision of rice, which was wholly out
 of

of the stores which had been provided by me; and this was done without any application from the Governor or Select Committee to me on the subject.

One of two things must be admitted, either that the Governor and Select Committee at Madras, at that time, understood the stores at Pulicat to be on the public account, or that they understood them to be solely and exclusively my private property. In the first case, they had a good right to do what they did, by ordering three months provision of rice to be taken from these stores for the use of the garrison. In the second case, they had no manner of right whatever to interfere with my private property, without my consent, and I might have been at liberty, if so disposed, to have put any price upon it I pleased, for compensating the loss at one period by the gain at another period; but least of all could the Governor or Select Committee be entitled to interfere with, and make use of those stores at *Pulicat*, as public property, at one time when it suited their convenience, and then to throw it upon me as private property at another time, when it suited their intentions to involve me in every loss that could arise from a change of circumstances.

4thly, The conduct of the President and Select Committee, in abstaining from giving me any answer to the letters before mentioned, written by me in the months of April, May, and June 1783; their abstaining also from any communication of the resolution entered on their minutes on the 29th of April, and various other steps of their conduct towards me, in relation to this business of the grain at Pulicat, ought to make them, rather than me, responsible for any loss that might ultimately arise on it, and should have had the effect of precluding them from the resolution they finally adopted of throwing the loss upon me.

When all these particulars are attended to, I cannot avoid persuading myself, Gentlemen, that you will think I had good reason to be surprised and hurt by the opinions delivered by some of the members of

of the Select Committee in August 1783, when they took their final resolution upon this business of the grain.

The opinion delivered by the President Lord Macartney, upon that occasion, has been already stated, and from the perusal of the terms in which it is expressed, it will not appear extraordinary that the very brief manner his Lordship took of throwing upon me a heavy loss, without taking notice of any one of the favourable circumstances in support of my claim, should have been felt as harsh and unkind both in substance and in form; but waving every circumstance of that sort, I press the consideration of this matter upon you, Gentlemen, only on the ground of the injustice of the determination, after all the incidents which had happened in relation to the grain in question.

From the perusal of the opinions of the four members of the Select Committee, present in August 1783, at the deliberations on my claim for relief, it appears that the opinion of the President for dismissing my claim completely, without affording any prospect or chance of relief, was adopted only by one member of the Committee; two of them were evidently against the measure of rejecting it, and pointed out the propriety of my applying to the Supreme Council at Bengal for relief; and as I was at that time also a member of the Select Committee at Madras, it may be presumed that if it was competent to me to have a voice upon that occasion, my sentiments would have coincided with those of the two members who proposed the reference to the Supreme Council in Bengal.

Accordingly that plan of reference to Bengal was adopted by me; but in the first place I followed the advice given in Mr. Sadleir's opinion, by taking the first opportunity of selling and converting into cash the remainder of the stores of grain at Pulicat. This I did, by ordering that grain to be sent to markets south of the Coleroon river, in the Tanjore country, where it brought a better price than there was any reason to expect at that time, after the

the distresses which existed in the time of war had ceased.—The price thus received, is credited in the account inserted at the end of Appendix N° I. and in so far has considerably diminished the extent of the loss upon the totality of these transactions.

In the months of August, September, and October 1783, Major Lysaght became extremely anxious for settling the grain account, and for receiving immediate payment of the balance due to him.

On the 20th of September 1783 I took occasion to acquaint the President and Select Committee at Madras that a demand had been made upon me by Major Lysaght, for a sum exceeding fourteen thousand pagodas, the value of rice and other grain ordered by me, and at my risk, to be put in store at Pulicat, for the use of the troops; and, from the very peculiar circumstances in which I then stood, I requested to know “Whether I had the permission of the Select Committee to address myself on this particular business to the Government of Bengal for relief, having had assurances from Sir Eyre Coote that what I did was approved of; and that he doubted not of the assistance of Bengal to prevent my suffering any loss?”

Sept. 20,
1783.

The following answer from the Select Committee was intimated to me on that day :

“That they had no objection to General Stuart’s addressing the Governor General of Bengal, provided the letter was sent to them unsealed.”

The letter which was addressed to the Supreme Council on this particular business has been transmitted from Bengal to the Court of Directors. It is dated Fort St. George, October 9, 1783. The following is an extract :

“In the hurry of public employment it was not possible for me to pay the due attention to my private affairs. They are gone into confusion.

Letter to the
Supreme
Council in
Bengal, 9th
Oct. 1783.

“ One

“ One particular very great loss incurred is owing to an act of *public*
 “ exertion on my part, which had the sanction of our late Commander
 “ in Chief, and of which I acquainted Mr. Gregory, in my separate
 “ correspondence ; and I am now, Gentlemen, to apply to you for
 “ your assistance to relieve me from the serious present difficulty which
 “ I was led into from the anxiety of my temper and apprehension of
 “ *famine* last year, about this time, and from a wish at every risk, to
 “ prevent, in fact, the disbanding of that very army, *which by keeping*
 “ *the field* (to say no more of its merit) *has saved this country.*

“ At the time when the rice for the use of the army was reduced
 “ from five hundred to two hundred and fifty bags daily, I saw the
 “ necessity of finding some resource elsewhere than in this place ; so
 “ that I ordered, *on my own credit*, as much as could be had in the
 “ Circars, to be sent to *Pulicat*. It arrived in December 1782 ; and
 “ by the book with extracts of letters you will see how it came in aid
 “ of the public service.

“ The President, as you there see, took from the store by force,
 “ when he essentially wanted it, and what he wanted ; and when the
 “ public exigencies as well as the price fell, the remainder was not
 “ received, though offered for the use of the public.

“ I was *on service*, and could not attend to this business till after those
 “ gentlemen recalled me in July, when, to my utter surprise, I found
 “ a demand made upon me for upwards of sixteen thousand (16,000)
 “ pagodas for the grain sent, and above fifty garce of rice remaining
 “ *at waste and loss at Pulicat* ; and the price reduced nearly half.

“ As I never had any *mercantile* transaction in my life, and did not
 “ know how to turn myself, I put the whole into an honest black
 “ merchant's hands (Nagapah-Chitty) to dispose of to the best
 “ advantage, but not till after this Government had absolutely refused
 “ to receive it (*even upon measurement*), and when I told them I
 “ should trust to payment from Bengal.

“ After

“ After stating this, and referring, as mentioned, to a book, where
 “ it will appear in what way this rice came in aid of the public service
 “ during the last monsoon, I have now only in short to state to you
 “ the facts as in the inclosed account, which I have signed, as being
 “ to the best of my knowledge, and from the papers in my possession,
 “ and the demands upon me, the exact account, as nearly as I can
 “ bring it, in my *present* situation.

“ P. S. As it is an aid of public money that I request, I take this occa-
 “ sion to declare, *that I had no other motive on earth but for the service*
 “ *—that no benefit has accrued directly or indirectly to me,* but, on the
 “ contrary, that the deficiency or loss, as stated, must affect my private
 “ fortune, if not relieved by the Government of Bengal.

(Signed) “ JAM^S STUART.”

Before there was any possibility of my receiving an answer from Bengal to the preceding letter, I had left Madras, as appears from the Records in your possession. In the month of April 1784 I arrived in England; and since my arrival have had intelligence from India of the proceedings of the Governor General and Supreme Council of Bengal, at different periods, on the subject of my claim for redress; from these proceedings I have the satisfaction to find that the Supreme Council in Bengal have shewn every proper disposition on their part to do me justice, as far as in their power, by sending home to the Court of Directors repeated recommendations of my claim. The first of which is contained in their general letter of the 31st December 1783, and is in these words:

Extract from the Bengal general Letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated December 31, 1783.

Par. 15. “ In our consultations, noted on the margin, you will ob-
 “ serve a letter from Major General Stuart, dated 9th of October, in
 “ which the General represents to us the loss which he has sustained
 “ in his private fortune from the resentment of the Madras Govern-
 F “ ment,

Consult.
10th Dec.

“ ment, and especially from their conduct in regard to a large quantity
 “ of grain which he provided on a critical occasion for the public
 “ service in last year. General Stuart declares to us, that he derived
 “ not any personal benefit, directly or indirectly, from this supply ;
 “ but we have it not in our power, nor, if we had, does it belong to
 “ us to relieve him.—It rests, therefore, with your Honourable Court.
 “ *We think that General Stuart's claim on the Company for the reimburse-*
 “ *ment of his losses, is reasonable and just, supposing the facts to be as he has*
 “ *stated them, and beg leave to recommend it in strong terms to your*
 “ *favourable attention.*

“ The correspondence inclosed in General Stuart's letter to us, and
 “ on which he in a great measure founds his pretensions to re-
 “ payment, is transmitted to you a number in this address.”

At a subsequent period in the year 1786, this matter came again under the consideration of the Supreme Council of Bengal, as will be found in the Bengal consultations at the dates of the 5th of April and 28th of August 1786 ; on the first of which dates, the Bengal Council wrote to the Governor and Council at Madras for their opinion on the justice of my claim ; and in consequence of the answer which the Government at Bengal received from that of Madras, dated 14th May 1786, the Supreme Council at Bengal, by a paragraph in their general letter of the 28th August 1786, took occasion again to recommend my claim to the Honourable the Court of Directors in the following terms :

General Letter from Bengal, dated August 28, 1786.

Par. 388. “ On the 1st February 1784, a letter was addressed to
 “ our secretary by Mr. William Balfour of Fort St. George, transmit-
 “ ting, by directions received from Major General Stuart before he
 “ left that Settlement, a book with extracts of letters, explanatory of
 “ a claim which the General had preferred to us before his departure,
 “ for star pagodas 9867 : 19 : 9, being the expence which he had
 “ incurred by laying in a store of rice for the public service at Pulicat,
 “ in

“ in the course of the year 1782, and for which he had the sanction of
 “ the late Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote.”

389. “ We transmitted a copy of those papers to your President
 “ and Council at Fort St. George on the 5th April last, and requested
 “ that we might be favoured with their sentiments on the justice of
 “ General Stuart’s claim, that it might be sent by an early dispatch to
 “ your Honourable Court, to whom we referred the subject very par-
 “ ticularly in our general letter from the Secret Department, bearing
 “ date the 31st December 1783.

390. “ Your President and Council at Fort St. George have in
 “ consequence forwarded to us extracts from their records on the
 “ subject of General Stuart’s demand, and acquainted us, that although
 “ it appears that the General proceeded without authority from that
 “ Government in laying in a store of rice at Pulicat; yet, as they
 “ were unwilling to believe that he was actuated by any other
 “ motives than those of forwarding the public service, they hoped we
 “ would represent his claim in a favourable manner to the Court of
 “ Directors.

391. “ We certainly are of opinion, *that General Stuart’s claim is*
 “ *justly founded; and we think moreover, that he has a considerable share*
 “ *of merit in the provision which he made for the public service from his*
 “ *own funds, and at the hazard of suffering the loss which has hitherto*
 “ *accrued to him from it; we therefore presume to recommend his case to*
 “ *your particular notice, and that the compensation which the General has*
 “ *requested may be granted to him.*”

I have thought it my duty, Gentlemen, thus to bring under your
 view a full, faithful, and accurate state of the foundations of the claim
 which is now submitted to your consideration; and in performing that

duty, it became indispensably necessary that an historical and connected account should be given of all the progressive steps and incidents relating to that claim, from its origin down to the last recommendation from the Supreme Council of Bengal, which arrived in this country only in the month of March in this present year 1787.

In a matter of this sort, I am sensible that it is impossible to form a just judgment upon the merits, without taking into consideration the situation of the country at the time when I was first induced to interpose my credit for the benefit of the public, and without having a complete view also of all the circumstances of my conduct, connected with that transaction, during the period in which these matters were agitated in India.

Any imperfect and abridged account of these matters, must have had the appearance of a partial narration; and if I had merely made a reference in general terms to what might be found on the Company's records in relation to my claim, that mode of presenting the matter to your view, would not only have been unsatisfactory, but might probably have occasioned to you more time and trouble than the perusal of those proofs, when collected and arranged in the order of time, in the manner that has been observed in this address.

It is not merely on account of the pecuniary consideration (though that of itself is a matter of too great consequence for me to relinquish) that I have been thus anxious that the circumstances of the case should be fully understood; but I own that I am happy to embrace the natural opportunity afforded me of submitting to the strictest examination, the particulars of my conduct during the period alluded to in the course of this letter, from which you may be able to judge whether it was such as became a faithful and zealous servant of the East India Company.

With this view the Appendixes hereto annexed contain not only those proofs which have been specially referred to in the course of this letter,

as relating to the rice and grain provided by my means for the public service, but likewise the copies of some official minutes and papers, which may incidentally throw light upon the principles of my general conduct, at that critical period of your affairs.

The several accounts given in to me, either in the life-time of Major Lyfaght, or since his death by his executors, in relation to the Pulicat grain, are inserted in the Appendix, N^o I. where will also be found the correspondence between Major Lyfaght and me, in August, September, and October 1783, when I was very much pressed for the payment of the grain account; and likewise the correspondence between Major Lyfaght's executors and my attornies at Madras, since the time of my leaving India; and in the same Appendix will be found a state of the sums of money which have been paid by me at different times to Major Lyfaght's heirs to account; likewise a state of the cash realised from the sale of the remains of the Pulicat store of grain; and a state of the balance of principal and interest now claimed by Major Lyfaght's heirs, and for which an action has lately been brought against me, now depending in the Court of King's Bench.

On the perusal of the correspondence above referred to (and particularly N^o 15th and 17th of Appendix N^o I.), it will be found that I was obliged to dedicate a large proportion of the *arrears of my pay and of the allowances to me while on service*, for making three partial payments of the grain account to the amount of Star Pagodas 10,314 : 41 : 68.

The same correspondence shews that Major Lyfaght became latterly very urgent with me for payment, and that his executors have continued to be so; but I have never thought myself entitled to complain of him or them on that account, for Major Lyfaght having sent the grain in consequence of directions from me, he had a just right to consider me as responsible for all the consequences of these directions; and further, he had great merit in those personal exertions,
on

on his part, by which the grain was procured and sent to Pulicat, at a period when it was of great importance to have a store of grain there.

But I have uniformly considered myself entitled to complain of those Members of the Select Committee at Madras, who knowing, and not denying the motives of my conduct in ordering a supply of provisions to Pulicat, at a time of great public distress and alarm, and knowing likewise that the risk to which I exposed myself was undertaken without any intention or attempt to derive one sixpence of pecuniary benefit from it to myself, refused to give me any aid for extricating myself from the embarrassment in which I was involved, and first by their conduct occasioned a loss upon the grain transaction, and afterwards by their determination fixed that loss upon me, as has been shewn in the course of the preceding narrative.

I have had the satisfaction indeed to find, that notwithstanding the conduct of the former Government of Madras, the succeeding Government have thought themselves bound to make a favourable report of my claim to the Government at Bengal, and that the Supreme Council there have unanimously, repeatedly, and warmly recommended it to the attention of the Honourable Court of Directors, with an express declaration of their sentiments, that my claim is *justly founded*; adding, that in their opinion, *I had a considerable share of merit* in the transactions which gave rise to it.

From these and all the other circumstances of the case, I am encouraged to hope that you will not only readily excuse the trouble which I have been under the disagreeable necessity of giving you by the present application, but that you will be disposed to embrace, with pleasure, the opportunity it gives of affording me the relief I have desired; which extends merely to indemnification of losses already sustained, and of money which I am still liable to pay on account of the grain transaction;—for to you, Gentlemen, it more peculiarly belongs to protect those in your service who expose themselves to hazards from motives solely of a public nature.

By

By granting the relief prayed for, I beg leave to assure you, Gentlemen, solemnly, and upon my honour, that no pecuniary advantage whatever accrues to me personally, further than the avoiding a heavy loss; and I trust with confidence in the justice and liberality of the East India Company, that it cannot be deemed either necessary for their interest, or consistent with their dignity and credit, that an officer who has had the honour to command their armies in India, and who in the exercise of his duty there has *suffered severely*, should further be obliged to surrender a considerable part of his pay, earned in service, because his zeal for the support of an army so necessary for the preservation of the Carnatic, engaged him in an undertaking, calculated solely for the public benefit, and at a time of acknowledged difficulties and apprehensions, occasioned by great public distress.

I have the honour to be, at all times,

GENTLEMEN,

Your most faithful and obedient humble Servant,

Lower Grosvenor Street, }
July 3, 1787.

JAM^S STUART.

The following Appendix N^o I. relating to matters of calculation which are only interesting to the Parties immediately concerned, it may therefore be passed over, especially as The Court of Directors have agreed to Indemnify Mr. Gen. Stuart for the real Loss incurred.



A P P E N D I X, N° I.

C O N T A I N I N G

The Demands made upon Major General STUART for the Price of the Grain sent by his Orders to *Pulicat*;—The Correspondence on that Subject with Major LYSAGHT, &c.

A N D

The Accounts of Debit and Credit in relation to that Grain.

A P P E N D I X N. I.

A P P E N D I X N. I.

CONTAINING

EXTRACT of a Letter from Major Lysaght to Mr. Balfour
and Robert in the name of the General.

AT General Stuart's request, I have the honor to inform you that in the month of December, 1794, I was directed by the General to forward to you a bill of exchange for the sum of £1000, which the General afterwards directed me to deposit with Captain Smith the Commanding Officer at the General's disposal. I have therefore to request that you will send the bill to him to settle the business, and either to pay the money or to procure the Government bills on the Bank of England, which he will send on the Supreme Council of India, and I will be happy to receive the same. I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant, THUR. LYSAGHT.

A P P E N D I X, N° I.

N° 1.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from Major LYSAGHT to Mess. BALFOUR and ROEBUCK his Attornies, dated Ellore, 2d March 1783.

AT General Stuart's earnest solicitations, I dispatched a quantity of grain in the month of December last to Pulicat for the use of the army, half of which the General afterwards agreed should be disposed of on my account; the other half *being reserved for the public service*, was deposited with Captain Smith the Commanding Officer at Pulicat, agreeable to the General's directions; I have therefore to request that you will apply to him to settle the business, and either to pay the amount into your hands, procure me Government bills on the Court of Directors for it, or grant his own bills on the Supreme Council of Calcutta agreeable to his engagement with me, the nature of which the accompanying extracts of letters from the General to me will explain to you, only adding, that I informed the General that I thought there was no occasion for giving the twenty pagodas *per garce* mentioned in his letter of 30th October. I have written to Captain Smith to send you an account of the quantity of grain reserved by him for the public service.

(Signed) ARTHUR LYSAGHT.

N° 2.

From Major LYSAGHT to Major General STUART.

(E X T R A C T.)

Camp near Cumbum, August 23, 1783.

HAVING just received letters from Ireland, informing me that my deceased brother's estate must be sold to clear off incumbrances, unless I remit home money to prevent it, I am, much against my inclination, induced to the necessity of drawing upon you for twelve thousand (12,000) pagodas, in part payment of the grain delivered to Captain Smith at Pulicat in December last, on your account; which, according to Captain Smith's calculation, amounts to 14,905 pagodas. As it possibly may be more convenient for you to give bills on your agents in London for this amount, than to pay the money at Madras, Mr. Balfour is authorised by me to receive them.

[The following was wrote in Major General Stuart's hand at the bottom of the preceding letter, and sent to be read by the President, Lord Macartney.]

I REQUEST this letter may be shewn to Lord Macartney, and that his Lordship may know that I have no money to make even a beginning to pay Captain Lysaght, unless he pleases to pay to Mr. Balfour, attorney to Major Lysaght*, at least for the rice taken from Pulicat many months ago.

(Signed) J. S.

September 9, 1783.

* Money was paid about six weeks after this, for the twelve garce taken from the Pulicat magazine in February. The sum paid was Pag. 2,499: 7: 16, which was received by Mr. Balfour in part payment of the debt due to Major Lysaght, and is credited in his account.

A P P E N D I X, N° I.

N° 3.

From Major General STUART to Major LYSAGHT.

Fort St. George, September 1, 1783.

I RECEIVED yours of the 23d August, the day before yesterday, and have not for days, I may say months past, had a leisure moment to give to my private friends or affairs. Every thing that I ever wrote to you in the rice business, shall be complied with on my part: However I may be left in the lurch, or hardly used by this Government, you shall not suffer. I have not as yet received the proper account from Captain Smith, such as to ascertain the demands I must make on the Government of Bengal on stating the whole of the transaction, which, by the conduct of *my friends here*, is now become very serious to me.

My intention is, and I consider myself in every sense bound to pay to you the amount of the grain sent by my order; but it will be in this country, and therefore you will excuse me from accepting the bill as mentioned in your letter.

So soon as the account on the whole is drawn out, I shall give you every satisfaction as to the certainty of your payment here; and in case of delay, as I shall claim interest from Government, so justly you will have the same claim.

(Signed) JAM^s STUART.

N° 4.

From Major LYSAGHT to Major General STUART.

(E X T R A C T.)

Camp near Cumbum, September 11, 1783.

I HAVE been honoured with your letter of the first instant, and am much concerned that you should have experienced so much trouble and vexation on account of the grain business. With respect to myself, I never had any idea that I was in the smallest degree concerned with the Government of Madras

Madras in that transaction. It was by your order the grain was sent, delivered to Captain Smith, and afterwards either disposed of, or reshipped by him; consequently, to you sir, and to you only, I looked for my money. Nothing but the urgency of an object which I have very much at heart (the preventing the family estate from going out of it), and my not having been favoured with any reply to the letters I had written you on the subject, could have induced me to draw upon you, and I hope you will pardon my once more soliciting you to assist me in my present emergency. I never had any expectation of being paid but in this country—my bills were payable to Mr. Balfour at Madras, but thinking it possible that it might be more convenient for you to grant an order on your agent in London (which would equally answer my purpose) than to pay the money at Madras, I authorise Mr. Balfour to act agreeably to what suited you best.

N° 5.

COPY of the PAPER wrote at Major General STUART's request by the Officer on Duty in his apartment in Fort St. George, at the time when every other mode of addressing the President and Select Committee was denied to him.

A DEMAND having been made upon me by Captain Lyfaght, and his attorneys, for a sum exceeding *fourteen thousand pagodas*, the value of rice and other grain ordered by me, and at my risk, to be put in store in *Pulicat* in the month of December 1782, for the use of the troops, in the extreme distress of the settlement at that time, with a premium of twenty pagodas* the garce above the market price, nearly one-fifth part of which (twelve garce) has been taken by the order of Government, and the remainder refused to be taken, though offered to be delivered only upon receipt for the quantity, referring the value to the opinion of the Board of Bengal; *and very considerable loss being incurred by the Select Committee's not answering a letter wrote to them on the subject in April last*, until within these last three weeks; I am now to request, that what *Captain Tolson* now writes, may be sent to the Town Major for the information of the Select Committee, and to know whe-

* This was a mistake, as Captain Lyfaght, in his letter to Mr. Balfour, did not insist upon the premium offered.

ther I have their permission to address myself on this particular business to the Government of Bengal for relief, having had assurances from Sir Eyre Coote, that what I did was approved of, and that he doubted not of the assistance of the Board of Bengal to prevent my suffering any loss.

Being urged for the money at present, I am under the necessity to request the permission of the Select Committee to write on the subject.

Fort St. George, 20th September 1783.

Past ten o'clock Forenoon.

Captain TOLSON's certificate
concerning the transmitting
of the preceding paper to
the Select Committee.

The above is a copy of what I wrote to the Town Major, to which I received an answer from the Select Committee, "That they had no objection to General Stuart's addressing the Governor General of Bengal, provided the letter was sent to them unsealed."

(Signed)

RICH^d TOLSON, Captain.

N° 6.

From Major LYSAGHT to WILLIAM BALFOUR, Esquire.

Camp near Cumbum, October 6, 1783.

I DID myself the pleasure of writing to you upwards of a fortnight ago, when I also sent you my account for the grain delivered to General Stuart at Pulicat, but not having been favoured with any reply, I am fearful that you have not received them; I therefore now send you a duplicate of the account, and as a report prevails that Government have thought of obliging the General to embark for Europe, I am to request that you will be so kind as to endeavour to bring him to a settlement before his departure, which should he decline doing, I see no other step for me to take, but applying to the Mayor's Court, which, circumstanced as General Stuart is at present, will, I should imagine, not be altogether disagreeable to him; at all events, when he reflects on the largeness of the sum depending, and the accidents which we are all liable to, I flatter myself that he will allow that I have acted but with common prudence. You will see by the enclosed letter from the

the General, that he makes himself responsible to me for the grain, and I should suppose that upon producing this letter, the account of the grain signed by me, with the power of attorney which I now send you, the court will not hesitate to grant the necessary warrant; but you will please to observe, that this step is not to be taken unless you have reason to believe that the General is about to go, or to be sent on board ship.

N° 7.

From Major General STUART to WILLIAM BALFOUR, Esquire.

Fort St. George, October 13, 1783.

YOU shewed to me Major Lysaght's letter this day, where he is so pressing for a bond, and to say what he is to do in the Mayor's Court. I do not blame Major Lysaght, even though he owns, and I own also, that I think myself answerable for whatever order I have given him to provide rice.

You have heard me say, and so does Captain Smith know, that excepting what has been paid into your hands by this Government very lately, and what Captain Smith has also paid to you, *I never saw a shilling, nor do I know more of it.*

The only remaining fund therefore, is the value of the rice sent* lately to the southward, of which there is yet no certain accounts, but which I do not believe will be equal to one half of the balance of Major Lysaght's demand.

The loss, therefore (it matters not, it seems, where or how), must be to me, if not relieved from Bengal—and it is severe. I blame nobody but myself; and my intention is to pay every thing *in this country*—but I must have time, if not relieved from Bengal.

Upon this ground, and not having the time or the means to ascertain the deficiency betwixt what has been already landed at Pulicat, and what has been brought to account or sent to the southward; yet, to quiet Major Ly-

* So soon as I found that no relief was to be had from Lord Macartney, &c. at Madras, as requested by my letter, August 5, 1783, I ordered the remains of the grain in the Pulicat magazine to be sent to markets south of the Coleroon, where it was sold for more than was originally estimated, and credit for the amount is given in the account at the end of this Appendix.

faght, I have no objection to grant my promissory note for the balance as stated in your account, calculating the interest at eight *per cent.* instead of twelve, payable in three equal payments, the first in six months, which I suppose will be the value of the rice to the southward; the second in twelve months after; and the third in twelve months thereafter; so as the whole be discharged in two years and six months; and the two last payments, in all probability, must be drawn from my own private fortune in this country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) JAM^s STUART.

N° 8.

From Major General STUART to WILLIAM BALFOUR, Esquire.

S I R,

YOU are now witness how I am hurried and fatigued, so as to put it out of my power to be either so exact or so regular in correspondence with Major Lysaght, as I otherways would be; but I request you will communicate to him the contents of the inclosed paper, which, as matters are now constituted, will, I trust, satisfy him; or if the Board of Bengal agrees to relieve me from the *scrape*, I shall do more.

I am, S I R,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) JAM^s STUART.

October 14, 1783.

N° 9.

COPY of the PAPER referred to in the preceding Letter.

IN consequence of a letter this day wrote by me to William Balfour, Esq; to which I beg leave to refer for want of the papers in the present situation in which I am placed, I lay myself under the following obligation, namely,

I acknowledge myself to be indebted to Major Lysaght, for the reasons there stated, in the sum of eleven thousand six hundred pagodas payable to him, or to his order *in this country*; and for the reasons also stated in my letter to Mr. Balfour of this day, I oblige myself to discharge the whole of that sum with interest at ten *per cent.* calculated according to the sums discharged and remaining due, in three payments, as follows, from the present date:

b

1st.

1st. Four thousand six hundred pagodas in six months; three thousand five hundred pagodas in eighteen months; three thousand five hundred pagodas in twenty-four months.

But if, as I expect, I obtain relief in my application to the Board of Bengal for the loss I sustained by the store of rice placed by my order for the public exigencies at Pulicat in the month of December 1782, then I shall instantly discharge the whole of the above debt, principal and interest, to Major Lysaght; and I have every reason to think that I shall have a favourable answer to the letters already sent in triplicate to the Governor General and Council of Bengal on that subject.

(Signed) JAM^s STUART.

Fort St. George, October 13, 1782.

To Major Lysaght.

N° 10.

From the Executors of Major LYSAGHT to Major General STUART's
Attornies at Madras.

GENTLEMEN,

Ellore, February 17, 1784.

AS executors under will of the late Major Arthur Lysaght, we herewith enclose you an account current which appears against your constituent Major General James Stuart, and are to request an early liquidation of the balance.

Amongst the papers of the deceased, we find an obligation under signature of James Stuart, and bearing date the 13th October 1783, by which he binds himself to pay off the sum of eleven thousand six hundred pagodas within the term of twenty-four months, at three specified periods; but unless it shall appear by any papers in your possession that the Major acceded to this protracted mode of payment, we think we are not of ourselves authorised to acquiesce in it. The sum there specified (viz. 11,600 star pagodas) falls short also of the stated demand, which appears to us to be perfectly regular and legal.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) M. LYSAGHT,
THO^s LANE,
ALEXANDER FERRIER.

Addressed To Mess. Cochrane, Roebuck, and Balfour.

N° II.

To the Honourable B. COCHRANE.

S I R,

I HAVE the honour to enclose you copy of a letter from the executors to the estate of the late Major Lyfaght to General Stuart's attornies, on the subject of the debt due by the General to the estate, for grain landed at Pulicat on his account.

General Stuart, before his departure from this, assured Major Lyfaght that a very considerable part of that claim would be remitted soon after by you from the southward; and as the executors to the estate are much in want of cash at present to pay off the bond debts, I am to request you will acquaint me what sum may be expected from you, and at what period, towards the discharge of that debt.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WILLIAM BALFOUR,

Executor to the estate of the
late Major Lyfaght.

Fort St. George, April 26, 1784.

N° 12.

To WILLIAM BALFOUR, Esquire.

S I R,

I AM honoured with your letter of this day's date, and am sorry to inform you, that it is out of my power to pay any part of the amount sale of the grain sent to the southward, as the whole of the money was employed in paying for supplies sent to the grand army, and in advances made to the inhabitants of the Nagore, &c. districts, for the cultivation of the lands, on conditions that it was to be repaid out of the produce of the crops of January 1784; but owing to my being removed from the receipt of the revenues, and their being appropriated to other uses by order of Government, it is out of my power to account to you for the money, nor can I say when I can give you certain information, as my accounts are now before the Honourable Board.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

BASIL COCHRANE.

Fort St. George, April 26, 1784.

N° 13.

TO BASIL COCHRANE, &c. Attornies in India to Major General
JAMES STUART.

GENTLEMEN,

ON the 17th February last, we did ourselves the pleasure of addressing you on the subject of our demand upon your constituent, on the score of sundry grain delivered by the late Major Arthur Lysaght at Pulicat, at the instance and on the sole account of General James Stuart,—we also laid before you an accompt of prime cost and charges of the said grain, and requesting an early liquidation of the balance. This demand we now repeat, and solicit a categorical reply to our claim. Mr. Balfour, attorney to the late Major Lysaght at Madras, and since joined with us in trust as executor to the estate, is possessed of copies of all the correspondence, and with full information of every thing that ever passed upon the subject.

We have the honour to remain, &c.

(Signed)

M. LYSAGHT,
THO^s LANE,
ALEXANDER FERRIER.

Chicacole, July 7, 1784.

N° 14.

TO BASIL COCHRANE, &c.

GENTLEMEN,

WE must again call upon you for a categorical reply to our letters of the 17th February and 18th* July on the subject of our demand upon your constituent General Stuart.

We are, Gentlemen, &c.

(Signed)

M. LYSAGHT,
THO^s LANE,
ALEXANDER FERRIER.

Vizagapatam Districts, August 14, 1784.

* This should be the 7th July.

N° 15.

Mrs. LYSAGHT, Captain LANE, and ALEXANDER FERRIER, Esquire,
Executrix and Executors to the Estate of the late Major LYSAGHT.

MADAM and GENTLEMEN,

WE are now to reply to your sundry favours of the 17th February, 7th July, and 14th ult. on the subject of your demand on Major General Stuart for grain delivered by the late Major Lysaght at Pulicat.

We are extremely concerned that such a delay should have happened, but the situation of General Stuart's estate in India rendered it impossible for us to answer your letters a moment sooner with any degree of certainty.

The funds which General Stuart appropriated for the payment of the demand in question, and which, with a Company's bond, constitute his whole estate in this country, were his arrears of pay and allowances, which amount to considerably more than his debt to the estate of the late Major Lysaght.

At the time of the General's departure, he had every reason to think, from a promise of Lord Macartney, that these arrears would have been paid off in money long before this time. It was in the firm expectation of this promise being fulfilled, that General Stuart came under the obligation mentioned in your letter of the 17th February. Mr. Balfour acquaints us, that the late Major Lysaght did not accede to the proposals; and as circumstances have turned out, the General's attornies could not have acted up to it.

We have only yet been able to procure payment of part of the arrears, by bills on Bengal—Government here objecting to draw so large a sum as the whole amounts to at once. The remainder we are in hopes of obtaining in course of a month.

These bills we transmitted to Calcutta, with positive instructions to discount them so soon as the rate becomes a little moderate, and to remit the produce to us by every opportunity, and we shall dispose of the other bills in the same manner.

We have now candidly made you acquainted with the extent of our powers to discharge your demand. It is the only debt which the General owes in India, and we solemnly assure you, that the money arising from the bills before mentioned, or any other money coming into our hands on his account, shall

shall be applied towards the extinguishing of it, so soon as we receive the means.

We trust you will accede to our proposal; and we have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

BASIL COCHRANE,
WILL^m BALFOUR.

Fort St. George, September 21, 1784.

N° 16.

To BASIL COCHRANE, &c, Esquires, Attornies in India to Major General STUART.

GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE the honour of enclosing you an account between Major General Stuart and the estate of the late Major Lysaght, balance, pagodas 3830:7:38, in favour of the estate, for grain delivered at Pulicat by the deceased, in consequence of urgent letters from the General while commanding the army on the Coast.

As the situation of the estate is such as will not admit of any further delay, I am now to demand immediate payment of the above balance, and in case of your non-compliance, I must apprise you, that instructions have been transmitted me from the other executors (in the necessity of which I perfectly concur) to order a suit at law to be commenced in England against the General for the recovery of the before mentioned debt.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WILLIAM BALFOUR,
Executor to the estate of the
late Major Lysaght.

Fort St. George, December 31, 1785.

N^o 17.

To WILLIAM BALFOUR, Esquire, Joint Executor to the Estate of
Major LYSAGHT.

S I R,

YOUR letter of this date is just now come to hand, enclosing the account current of General Stuart with the estate of Major Lysaght, brought down to this day, and demanding payment of the balance, amounting to pagodas 3830 : 7 : 38, informing us at the same time, that in case of our non-compliance, you have instructions from the other executors to order a suit at law to be commenced in England against General Stuart for the recovery of the before mentioned debt.

Considering that the debt was incurred upon a public account, and with a view of answering a public emergency, while at the head of the army, you must be sensible we have done all that laid in our power, by making over to you bills on Bengal, amounting to pagodas 9314 : 41 : 68, which we received from this Government *on account of arrears due General Stuart*, and on the 27th June last, we paid you a further sum of pagodas 1000 in ready money.

Mr. Cochrane informs us, that it is out of his power to discharge the balance due by him to General Stuart, as the Company have not paid him, nor come to any settlement for the amount advanced by him during his residence at Nagore, as stated in his letter to you dated the 26th April 1784.

We have no other resources in our hands to discharge the balance demanded by you, for the amount sale of General Stuart's effects, and the balance due him by the Company, is to be remitted to England agreeable to positive orders lately received from him, to answer some urgent demands made upon him there. You are therefore at liberty to take such steps as you may think proper to recover the money in England.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

BASIL COCHRANE,

BARRY CLOSE,

Attornies to Major General
James Stuart.

Fort St. George, December 31, 1785.

N° 18.

From THO^s LANE, Esq; acting Trustee to the Estate of the late Major
LYSAGHT.

Major General James Stuart.

SIR,

I HAVE done myself the pleasure of waiting on you twice; but not being so fortunate as to find you at home, I think it necessary to lay before you in this manner copies of some accounts between you and the estate of the late Major Arthur Lysaght, which have been transmitted to me from India by the rest of the executors.

When convenient, I shall esteem myself obliged in being admitted to an interview.

I have the honour to remain,

SIR,

Your very obedient Servant,

(Signed) THO. LANE.

*Gloucester Street, Bloomsbury,
July 5, 1786.*

ACCOUNTS referred to in the preceding Letter, and transmitted by Mr. LANE to Major General STUART on 5th July 1786.

D^r—Major General STUART to WILLIAM BALFOUR, as Attorney to Major LYSAGHT—Rice delivered by his Order to Captain GEORGE SMITH at Pulicat. ACCOUNT, N^o 1.

	Ms Garce.				St. Pag ^s .
Rice	— 66 208	— $\frac{1}{8}$	at P ^s 200	— per Garce	— 13,304 2 —
Paddy	— 2 73	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	— 100	— per D ^o	— 218 13 40
Horfe	} — 1 384	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	— 173 15	per D ^o	— 339 40 60
Gram					
Black	} — 3 345	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	— 173 15	per D ^o	— 669 26 45
Gram					
Green	} — — 146	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	— 173 15	per D ^o	— 63 22 10
Gram					
Red	} — — 287	9	— 173 15	per D ^o	— 124 31 60
Gram					

Interest on the above Sum from the 31st }
M. D. }
December to 7th October, being 9:7, } 1,359 7 —
at 12 per Cent. per Annum — — }

Star Pag^s 16,079 9 55

Fort St. George, 7th October 1783.

E. E. (Signed) WILL^m BALFOUR.

Fort St. George, 13th January 1786.

Attested to be a true Copy,

CHA^s BROMLEY, Notary Public.

A true Copy,

THO. LANE.

ACCOUNT,
N° 2.D^r—Major General STUART, in Account with

		Star Pag ^s .	Fan.	C.
1783.				
October 7.	To amount of Major Lysaght's account of rice delivered at Pulicat	—	—	16,079 9 55
		Star Pag ^s	—	16,079 9 55

A true Copy,
THO. LANE.ACCOUNT,
N° 3.D^r—Major General STUART, in Account Current

		Star Pag ^s .	Fan.	C.
1783.				
October 7.	To balance of account furnished this day by Mr. William Balfour	—	—	12,147 19 9
1785.				
April 15.	To interest on the above, to this day, is 18 months and 8 days, at 10 per Cent. per Annum	—	—	1,849 4 57
		Star Pag ^s	—	13,996 23 66

A true Copy,
THO. LANE.

A P P E N D I X, N° I.

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WILLIAM BALFOUR, as Attorney to Major LYSAGHT—C^r.

		Star	Pags.	Fan.	C.
1783.					
October 2.	By received from the Company for 12 garce of rice taken for the use of the garrison of Pulicat, at 200 pagodas <i>per</i> garce, making P ^s 2,400, with interest — —	2,499	7	16	
7.	By received from Captain Smith — —	1,429	11	30	
	By interest on P ^s 2,499, to 7th October 1783, being 4 days, at 12 <i>per cent.</i> — —	3	14	—	
		3,931	32	46	
	By balance —	12,147	19	9	
	Star Pag ^s —	16,079	9	55	

Fort St. George, 7th October 1783.

E. E. *Per* W^m BALFOUR,
Attorney to Major Lysaght.

with the Estate of the late Major ARTHUR LYSAGHT—C^r.

		Star	Pags.	Fan.	C.
1785.					
February 23.	By a Government bill on Bengal, received from his attorney at Madras, principal and interest — —	3,078	5	10	
	By interest on the above, to the 15th April, 1 month and 23 days, at 10 <i>per cent. per annum</i> — —	45	7	—	
March 1.	By two Government bills received as above, principal and interest — —	6,236	36	58	
	By interest on the above, to the 15th April, 1 month and 15 days — —	79	37	40	
		9,438	2	28	
	By balance due this day —	4,558	21	38	
	Star Pag ^s —	13,996	23	66	

Vizagapatam, 15th April 1785.

E. E. *Per* MARTHA BRIGGS.
ALEX^r FERRIER.
WILL^m BALFOUR.

Fort St. George, 13th January 1786.

Attested to be a true Copy,
CHA^s BROMLEY, Notary Public.

xx

A P P E N D I X, N° I.

Account,
N° 4.D^r—Major General JAMES STUART, in Account Current

		Star Pag ^s . Fan. C.
1785.		
April 15.	To balance of account current of this date, signed by Mrs. Martha Briggs and Alexander Ferrier — —	4,558 21 38
December 31.	To interest on the above, for 8 months and 15 days, at 10 <i>per cent. per annum</i> —	322 32 —
Star Pag ^s —		4,881 11 38

Fort St. George, 13th January 1786.

Attested to be a true Copy,

CHA^s BROMLEY, Notary Public.

A true Copy,

THO. LANE,

with the Estate of the late Major ARTHUR LYSAGHT—C^r.

		Star Pag ^s .	Fan.	C.
1785.				
June 27.	By cash received from Mr. Cochrane, joint attorney to General Stuart — —	1,000	—	—
December 31.	By interest on the above, for 6 months and 4 days, at 10 per cent. per annum —	51	4	—
	By balance due to this day — —	3,830	7	38
	Star Pag ^s —	4,881	11	38

Fort St. George, 31st December 1785.

E. E. Per WILLIAM BALFOUR,
Executor to the Estate of
Major Lysaght.

N^o 19.

ABSTRACT of the preceding Accounts, and State of the Debit and Credit.

		Star Pagodas.
Sum of the charge made against Major General Stuart on account of the original price of the grain laid up in store at Pulicat — — —	—	14,719 44 55
Interest on this sum, from 31 st December 1782 to 7 th October 1783, at 12 per cent. per annum — —	—	1,359 7 —
Sum charged in the account of 7 th October 1783 —	—	16,079 9 55
Deduct 3,931 : 32 : 46, credited in the same account for cash received by the sale of 12 garce of rice taken from these stores by order of the Madras Government, and for parcels of the rice sold by Captain Smith — —	—	3,931 32 46
Balance remaining on 7 th October 1783 —	—	12,147 19 9

		Star Pagodas.
	Brought over	— 12,147 19 9
Interest on this sum, from 7th October 1783		
to 5th April 1785, at 10 per cent. per annum	1,849 4 57	
Interest on pagodas 4,558 : 21 : 38, as a balance of the preceding capital, from 15th April to 31st December 1785	— 322 32 —	
		<u>2,171 36 58.</u>
Sum of principal and interest charged on 31st December 1785	— — —	14,319 13 67

At the same time, credit is given to Major General Stuart for the three following sums, paid out of his effects to the executors of Major Lyfaght, viz.

1785.

February 23.	Cash paid by a bill on Bengal belonging to Major General Stuart	— — 3,078 5 10
March 4.	Cash paid by other two bills on Bengal belonging to him	— 6,236 36 58
June 27.	Cash paid by General Stuart's attorney at Madras	— 1,000 — —
	Sum of these	— 10,314 41 68
	Interest allowed on these several payments, from their respective dates to the 31st of December 1785	— — 176 6 40
	To be deducted	<u>— 10,491 6 28</u>
	Balance remaining due to Major Lyfaght's estate on 31st December 1785	— — 3,828 7 39

And interest thereof from that date, at 10 per cent. is claimed by Major Lyfaght's executors.

A P P E N D I X, N° I.

xxiii

Star Pagodas.

Brought over — 3,828 7 39

The claim, therefore, of Major General Stuart against the East India Company, consists of two articles—1st, Indemnification of the above balance of 3,828:7:39, and interest thereof from 31st December 1785, at ten *per cent.* claimed by Major Lysaght's heirs, and for which an action has been brought against Major General Stuart, now depending in King's Bench.

2dly, The other article of his claim arises from the sums which he has already actually paid to Major Lysaght's heirs to account of their demand, and which, as above stated, amount to the sum of 10,314:41:68 (exclusive of interest)

10,314 41 68

Sum of these, exclusive of interest claimed by Major Lysaght's heirs since 31st December 1785 —

14,143 7 27

But, on the other hand, Major General Stuart is to give credit to the East India Company for the produce of the sale of rice and grain at Pulicat, which, after the Madras Government had finally refused to take it on the public account, was, by Major General Stuart's directions, and at his risk, shipped from Pulicat, to places south of the Coleroon, where it might fetch the best price, and by good management was sold at a much higher rate than could reasonably have been expected at that period, when the prices of grain, after the war was over, had every where sunk so very considerably.

The produce of the rice and grain thus sold, *per* authenticated bill of sales, was — — —

Star Pagodas.

6,043 4 20

From which to be deducted, the charges attending the shipping of the grain, &c. *per* account and receipt —

662 0 0

Neat produce

5,381 4 20

N. B. It may here be observed in passing, that the price which that grain sold for, even after all the hazards and diminution of value to which it had been exposed by the conduct and delays of the Select Committee, must afford pretty convincing evidence, that if they had answered General Stuart's letters in the months of April and May 1783, all loss upon the Pulicat grain would have been avoided, by a sale of it during the time of the war, and when there would have been a great demand for it, for the use of the army at Cuddalore.

Carried over — 5,381 4 20

		Star Pagodas,
Brought over	—	5,381 4 20
Major General Stuart is further to give credit to the East India Company for a sum of Pag. 292:24, which by mistake was omitted out of Captain Smith's bill of sales, in Oct. 1783, which, instead of the sum of 1,429:11:30, already credited, should have been 1,721:35:30	— —	292 24 0
Sum of these	—	5,673 28 20

From these particulars it will be a very easy matter to strike the balance of Major General Stuart's claim, when once the principle of it is admitted.

The Directors of the East India Company have Agreed to Indemnify Major General Stuart; and thus have admitted the Principle of the preceding Statement.

The following Appendix N^o II. contains certain official and other Authentic Papers immediately connected with the State of The Carnatic, and of the Public Affairs at the time.

☞ The Remarks p. XXXIV-V. and all the Notes are added by M. Gen. Stuart since in England.



A P P E N D I X, N^o II.

C O N T A I N I N G

Proofs of the Distress felt in the Settlement of *Madras*, from the Scarcity of Rice and other Grain, in the Year 1782, when Major General STUART interposed his Credit for the Purpose of increasing the Quantity of Provisions in the Vicinity of *Madras* ;

A N D

The Correspondence, &c. relating to the Provisions thus acquired by his Means, tending to shew both the Motives which influenced his Conduct, and the Advantages to the Army and to the Public which resulted from it.

✍ This APPENDIX is referred to in the LETTER from Major General STUART to The Honourable the DIRECTORS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY, dated 3d July 1787.

A P P E N D I X, N^o II.

N^o I.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the President and Select Committee of Madras, to the Governor General and Council of Bengal.

Fort St. George, September 30, 1782.

WE beg leave, therefore, to submit to you, whether it may not be advisable to lay an embargo on all vessels, from the end of November to the beginning of February. But from this time to the former period, we earnestly request you will use every possible exertion to send us *supplies of provisions*.

Our distress is already such as will fully justify attempting it, without attending to any risk to be apprehended from the weather.

The streets in the Black Town, and the public roads, begin to be covered with dead bodies, of which the number is daily increasing.

This situation, we are confident, you will allow to be but too just an excuse for the resolution we are come to, of sending to you, as fast as opportunities offer, all our Dutch and French prisoners, &c.

N° 2.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the President and Select Committee of Madras to Vice-Admiral Sir EDWARD HUGHES, &c.

Fort St. George, October 7, 1782.

TO these consequences must be added, the danger of leaving on this side of the peninsula, an enemy's squadron, capable of keeping the seas and *intercepting the supplies*; without which, you know, the settlement of Fort St. George, and with it all the British possessions on the Coast of Coromandel, must soon fall an easy prey to the enemy. Few of our expected supplies are yet arrived from Bengal; nor can we depend upon receiving any from the hour you sail for Bombay, though you should leave frigates for the protection of our trade, &c. &c.

A very small part of their (the enemy's) squadron would, indeed, be able to block up this road effectually, if the enemy chuse to risk that small part during the monsoon, &c. &c.—a risk which the *certainty of reducing us by famine*, might very well induce the enemy to incur, &c. &c.

We declare to you our opinion, that the loss of Fort St. George, and consequently of the whole Coast of Coromandel, is among the probable consequences of your departure for Bombay before the *arrival and landing of our supplies*; and that such a conduct on your part, will be virtually to deliver the British possessions in India into the hands of the enemy, &c.*

* The long Letter from whence this extract is made (for the purpose merely of proving the fact of the distress of the settlement) was wrote and sent to the Admiral, while General Stuart was absent in camp; and as that Letter on your records contained many strictures and expressions to which Major General Stuart could not give his assent, it gave rise to the observations made by him, as expressed in the Consultations of 10th October, here inserted, No. 3.

N^o 3.

EXTRACT of PROCEEDINGS of the Select Committee, held on the 10th October 1782.

GENERAL STUART having been absent on service with the army, when the letter of the 7th inst. to Sir Edward Hughes was written, and the necessity of the case not admitting of any delay—it was, on his return, sent to him for his perusal; and the Committee *now* wish to know if General Stuart *approves* of that letter!—

GENERAL STUART answers, That he read the letter from the Committee to Sir Edward Hughes; and cannot help thinking that the most earnest wishes of the Government, in which he concurs with them, to derive all possible advantages from his Majesty's squadron, and likewise their reasons for pressing the business immediately upon the Admiral, might have been expressed in terms equally forcible, without entering into discussions on *sea-matters*, or bringing forward certain comparisons, which Sir Edward Hughes must doubtless feel *personal* to himself.

The Admiral deserves well of his country, and of the East India Company, in his (General Stuart's) opinion; and he (the Admiral) will doubtless give *his* reasons in explanation of every part of his conduct, when called upon by what he thinks *proper* authority. He has, on *four* different occasions, given manifest proofs of great professional abilities, and great readiness for action.

General Stuart wishes, with the Committee, that Sir Edward Hughes would do all that is wanted in our opinion; but it is, and ever must remain, with the Admiral *himself*, to judge whether it is *now* in his power to do all we wish; and if all *cannot* be done, to say *what part*; and General Stuart has the firmest confidence both in his conduct and his good intentions for the public service.

General Stuart, therefore, agrees with the Committee in wishing to derive every possible advantage from Sir Edward Hughes and his Majesty's squadron; but *cannot approve of the stile of the letter*.

A true Extract,

(Signed)

J. HUDLESTON, Secretary.

N° 4.

EXTRACT, LETTER from the President and Select Committee of Madras to the Select Committee of Bombay.

Fort St. George, October 10, 1782.

THE capture of Trincomalee by M. Suffrein, in the absence of our squadron, and the unfavourable turn which that event has given to our affairs, will probably be known to you before you receive this letter.

The loss of Trincomalee having destroyed all hope of the French fleet returning on the approach of the Monsoon, and this settlement having no dependance for the means of subsistence, but on supplies from Bengal, which are not yet arrived, nor expected in sufficient quantity to sustain us till the fleet would return from Bombay,—we found ourselves impelled by these considerations, to require the Admiral to remain with his Majesty's squadron on this side of the Peninsula, &c.

Sir Edward Hughes informed us, that he should proceed with the squadron to Bombay about the 15th of this month. Should he execute that determination, we shall have nothing less to apprehend than the loss of all the Company's possessions on this side of India.

This port will be immediately blocked up, and the vessels coming to it with provisions, either captured on the passage, or destroyed after their arrival, and before it can be possible to land any part of their cargoes.

From this melancholy view of our situation, you will plainly perceive that it is not in our power to afford you any hope of aiding your invasion of Hyder Ally's possessions on the Malabar Coast, by attacking him on *this* side.

On the contrary, we have every reason to fear, that we shall be driven to the necessity of *dividing, if not disbanding the army, and of confining our intentions and our hopes to the single object of keeping possession of this fortress.*

N° 5.

EXTRACT, MINUTE of the Commander in Chief, observing upon the preceding Letter to Bombay of the 10th October 1782.

Major General STUART.] **A**NOTHER part of this letter I think exceptionable, because, in my opinion, there is nothing even in the most dismal prospect, that can from probable incidents be pointed out at present, which in earnest *can justify the position of disbanding this army, and giving up every thing but Madras*; and as I think the case not probable, so I must confess that in my opinion, it does more harm than good to the cause to state it in such a point of view.

I agree in the necessity to press the Admiral to the utmost to remain beyond the 15th instant, and even to the last hour of fair weather, and I am persuaded he will stay.

I agree also that we cannot spare troops from hence more than are now on board the squadron, and yet I think it in the chapter of very possible events, to be able to act against Hyder from *this* side of India.

N° 6.

From Major General STUART's Aid-de-Camp, to Captain SMITH commanding at Pulicat.

Fort St. George, October 12, 1782.

IAM desired by the Commander in Chief, to tell you that he wishes to be informed, if the Pettah and neighbourhood of Pulicat will afford cover sufficient for two battalions of Sepoys; and whether you can in any way provide paddy or rice for that or any greater number of men to be cantoned there for three months. He desires you will give every encouragement to the boats coming with rice or paddy from the northward, because, if sufficient could be had, he would send a brigade to your District for three months. The General wishes to have an answer to this as soon as possible, for if the followers of the army could be supplied at Pulicat, the General would send
a very

a very large proportion thither during the Monsoon. *Whatever merchants or others chuse to undertake the bringing rice, paddy, or small grain to Pulicat, they should have every encouragement in your power to give, and you will have the General's support also.*

N° 7.

From Major General STUART to Captain SMITH, &c.

Fort St. George, October 13, 1783.

MY anxiety to establish a magazine of all sorts of grain at *Pulicat**, leads me to recommend to you very strongly the subject I wrote of yesterday, and in addition I am now to acquaint you, that I will take upon myself to be answerable to every black merchant, or others, who will bring grain to *Pulicat* for the next two months, that he shall have the highest price that is given here; and that I will do my utmost to get a premium of two rupees a bag from the Government of Bengal, over and above the highest price here. Send therefore for every body that you think can be of any use to us; and if you see it necessary to have recommendations to any of the subordinates in the Circars, for their people or their vessels, I will take care to procure them. The cantonment of the army will in a great measure turn upon your success in this undertaking. What need I say more?

* Such was the distress of the settlement at this period, that Major General Stuart received the following letter:

From Colonel RHEIMBOLD Commanding his Majesty's Hanoverian Regiments.

Fort St. George, October 13, 1782.

The Officers of his Majesty's 15th Hanoverian Regiment being very often without bread or biscuit for several days, and having never since our arrival here received one measure of rice for any money; I therefore beg Major General Stuart to have the favour to order for payment, the delivery of rice for the officers servants according to the rank of the officers.

(Signed) E. L. RHEIMBOLD, Colonel.

N° 8.

From Captain SMITH to Major General STUART's Aid-de-Camp.

Pulicat, October 14, 1782.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday.

In answer thereto, be pleased to inform the General, that I could, I believe, procure shelter for two battalions of Sepoys, by turning out the Bramins from their habitations; but the means of subsisting them *are not in my power by any exertions whatever.* The season being so far advanced renders it impracticable to procure rice from the northward in so short a time as it will be required. Had I had notice given me a month sooner, I could have supplied them without difficulty; as many merchants to the northward would have been glad to have sent their cargoes here. *There is one small vessel arrived here with rice,* which would not be more than sufficient to last two battalions one week. I should be very happy to contribute every thing in my power for the good of the service.

N° 9.

From Major General STUART's Aid-de-Camp to Captain SMITH, &c.

Fort St. George, October 14, 1782.

THE General thinks it is not now too late in the season to engage the black merchants to bring their rice to Pulicat coast-ways. He means at all events to send one battalion of sepoy, without their guns, to keep up the communication, and protect the poor people and others going to the northward. You will provide cover for them, or some place to encamp on, until cover can be had. They will bring twenty-six days rice with them, and by that time it is hoped you will be able to feed that battalion and more.

[b]

N° 10.

From Captain SMITH to Major General STUART's Aid-de-Camp.

Pulicat, October 15, 1782.

I CAN only assure the General, that nothing shall be wanting on my part to bring grain to this place; but there will be many other things wanted here besides rice, and I hope the battalion that is coming here will bring some of them, viz. gee, oil, and currystuff, for there is very little or none at all at this place. I shall find out a place for the battalion to encamp on, till I can procure shelter enough for them all.

N° 11.

From Captain SMITH to Major General STUART's Aid-de-Camp.

Pulicat, October 15, 1782.

I HAVE received your letter of yesterday, acquainting me that a battalion of sepoys was coming here.

Agreeable to the General's desire, I am to inform you, that there are but three Maffulah boats at this place, which with one or two more I should be able to land rice very fast from any vessel or vessels that may be sent here.

N° 12.

From Captain LYSAGHT to the Commander in Chief.

Ellore, October 18, 1782.

I HAVE this moment had the pleasure to receive your letter of , and shall lose no time in replying, according to the best of my judgment, to the queries which you have done me the honour to put to me, beginning with *Masulipatam*, and so proceeding south.

Was the whole army to the northward of, or near the banks of the *Kistna*, it could be plentifully supplied with all kinds of provisions from the Circars, but I should suppose that the distance from the presidency would be too great, particularly at this season of the year, when every little Nullah, of which there are great numbers on the road, is capable of impeding the march even of a small detachment for many days.

The country between the *Kistna* and *Ongole* is nearly depopulated, and scarce any cultivation has been carried on in it for two years past—of course, it would produce little or nothing for a detachment; possibly, the high price which provisions would fetch, might induce the people of the *Guntoor* Circar to furnish *junnaloo*, small grain and gram, which I believe are the only productions of the country; but nothing can be depended upon from that quarter, as an order from the *Subah* (of the *Deckan*) might put a stop to our receiving a single bullock load from thence.

The country about *Ongole* produces scarce any thing but *junnaloo* in the best of seasons, and I am told there has been a great want of rain during this last one, from which I conclude provisions of all kinds are far from being plenty with them; but Captain Edmonds, who is on the spot, will be better able to inform you of every thing relative to what may be expected from that country, as also from the *Guntoor* Circar.

Nellore has always been reckoned a plentiful country, but as they most likely have sent large supplies to *Madras*, the people on the spot can be the only judges of what remains. However, I should suppose, that a brigade at least might be plentifully supplied there from the country, and if the owners of vessels to the northward hear that there is a demand for rice, gram, ghee, &c. at the small ports and rivers near *Nellore* (such as *Vutcur*, *Gan-gaputnam*, *Kistnapatam*, &c.) you may depend on having large supplies in the course of next month, *for merchants will prefer stopping at those places, to pushing on to Madras—the risk from cruisers being less, and boats more readily to be had, if proper precautions are taken in time*—but a redoubt, or some kind of post, should, I think, be constructed at each of the places where it is determined to land grain, &c. to protect it from small parties of the enemies horse.

Pulicat would, I imagine, be also a good station for about a brigade—*forage for cattle, and small grains for the followers might be produced along, and by means of the lake, and rice from the sea.*

I have not an exact list of the rivers, but during the monsoon there are innumerable nullahs and inlets from the sea, which would impede the move-

ment of troops along the coast. You are not so liable to interruptions of this kind on the inland road; but there may be others of a different nature equally to be apprehended, unless the force is considerable.

N° 13.

From Major General STUART to his Excellency Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. Commander in Chief in India.

Fort St. George, October 21, 1782.

I DID myself the honour of informing you, how much I was alarmed with something more than appearances, that the direct consequence of opinions given, regarding the future disposition of this army, would tend to its dissolution—contrary, Sir, to your opinion so lately given upon that important point: I mean to say, that it is *in speculation* from a certain quarter, to bring forward a resolution to content ourselves merely with a garrison here, and to send off the rest of the army to shift for itself where it can.

Their apprehension, is the want of rice: and you may see, Sir, by my private letter to ———, that an ill-timed œconomy of money, which your Board has no objection to give, is the main obstacle to prevent any quantity of rice being thrown in for two months to come, either to *Pulicat* or *this place*.

The impolitic step which has been impending before the 15th, is now more likely to be brought forward by our misfortune in *losing about 30,000 bags of rice in the late storm*. I am, however, well informed, that the means is in store to maintain this army for four months at least; and at all events (without acts of very great violence to the station I have the honour to fill), this army, so far as it regards the *men at arms*, *shall not be separated, and in fact disbanded*, without your concurrence and that of the Supreme Board.

I have, *since the storm*, taken the trouble in person to examine all the indents for rice, in order to reduce things to the lowest quantity possible for the fighting men, and discharging or sending to *Nellore* the greater part of the followers of the army, bullock drivers, &c. &c.

This business, with infinite difficulty, has been gone through; and I have acquainted the gentlemen in Government, that instead of 500 bags (the usual allowance *per day*), 350, and even a smaller quantity, would do, by moving two battalions to *Nellore*; and under this escort, I proposed to send
a great

a great part of the followers. I shall then see what resolution they will come to; and shall endeavour to shew, with as much temper as I am master of, the absolute necessity there is at this crisis, that our enemies *should think* we are in condition to take the field with as much readiness as formerly.

The storm of the 15th at night, was so violent, that it shattered almost all the tents of the army. We had shifted ground the day before; and there fell so much rain, that I was under the necessity of putting the army into cantonments with all expedition. They are now disposed of pretty nearly as last year, with the difference of one battalion at *Pulicat*, and two at *Nellore*.

N° 14.

From Major General STUART to Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. &c. &c.

Fort St. George, October 23, 1782.

BELIEVING as I do, that whatever passes here in the Committee is communicated to your Board, it is needless for me to speak on these subjects. What I have now most earnestly to request of you, Sir, is to enforce with your influence the giving every encouragement to the people in Bengal and in the Circars, to import rice and small grain into *Pulicat** or *Madras* for the two ensuing months.

N° 15.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, October 27, 1782.

HAVING the honour to command his Majesty's troops here, during your absence, and knowing undoubtedly, as commanding the Company's troops, what I now address you upon, I officially acquaint you, that

* From the contents of this letter, and from various other proofs in this Appendix, it must be evident, that when Major General Stuart directed grain to be sent to *Pulicat* at his own risk, it was for the public benefit he acted, without any interested intentions or view to gain from monopoly, otherwise he would not have pressed, in the way he did, on all occasions, that grain should be sent from all quarters, either to *Pulicat* or *Madras*.

if some immediate remedy is not applied by authority from the Supreme Board of Bengal, such as to give me a latitude to judge of what proportion of the rice in store here is to be applied for the use of the army, and an official report made to me of what is really in store, and what is apparent from the *manifest* loaded in ships in the roads, and daily arriving, it will be impossible (as things are now managed) to prevent the most disagreeable consequences, which your Excellency, as a soldier, knows to result from a mutinous behaviour of the black troops, even though it should be quelled.

Your Excellency has been informed, that rather than consent to the army's being separated, *equal to the disbanding them*, I had engaged to reduce the daily consumption from 500 to 350 bags of rice. After I had from necessity proposed this diminution, and had, contrary to my own private feelings, made a reduction in the followers of the army, without being able to satisfy them for their arrears, or even for their sustenance in rice, the Government again told me, "*that instead of 350, they could only give me 250 bags; and that I must be answerable for the consequences, if any greater part of the army remains here than could be subsisted on that quantity.*" Foreseeing the consequences, I told them, that if they would set apart, under proper management, 31,000 bags of rice, at the rate of 250 bags *per* day, I would answer for keeping this army for *four months* to come, provided they gave me more as more arrived; but I told them, "*that they ought to give 300 pagodas the garce, instead of 150 or 200, for the two months to come; and that I would*, from my own private fortune, give 20 pagodas more for each garce than was given by their Government.*" I told them also, that I should write to a friend of mine in the Supreme Board in Bengal, to move in that Board, to give a premium of one or two rupees a bag for rice by land or sea, delivered at *Pulicat* or *Madras*, until the end of December.

The narrowed delivery of rice, which, in consequence of a degree of compulsion, I have been obliged to order respecting the native corps and their followers, has sown the seeds of discontent so deeply among them, that an *actual mutiny* took place in the 2d and 17th battalions of sepoy, on being ordered to march to Nellore; and this mutiny was quelled *only* by my presence among them. They are now gone on, taking under their escort *many* followers of the army, and *all the supernumerary gun bullocks*. Some of the regiments of Bengal sepoy were guilty of acts of mutiny—that, by management, has likewise subsided.

* It was the opposition I met with upon this and similar occasions, which led me to risk my private fortune in the manner I have done for the public service.

I tell,

I tell, once for all, to your Excellency, and I desire you will tell the Supreme Board of it in my name, that in the manner this Government is proceeding with *misplaced* œconomy of money, it will be impossible for me to keep this army in due subordination and discipline, *and much less to bring it forward into the field at the time when it may be the most wanted.*

This very day, in conversation upon the subject of my Minute, that when more rice was to come, more was to be delivered on account to the army, and that the number I meant to maintain upon *half* the usual quantity, was *exclusive* of the detachment of Europeans now landed, and having heard of above 6,000 bags of rice being arrived within these two days—I was answered, that no more than 250 bags a day would be given me, whatever was my Minute.

N° 16.

From Captain SMITH to the Commander in Chief.

Pulicat, October 24, 1782.

HAVING received a letter from the Adjutant General, informing me that you think the *servants and followers* of the 4th battalion of sepoys, on account of the distance from Madras, should be supplied with rice at Pulicat; I think it my duty to acquaint you, that I *cannot* possibly do it without distressing this garrison, the rice and paddy which I have collected from the inhabitants in consequence of your letter, not being sufficient for five days; and as that battalion will be in want of rice, as soon as the quantity they brought from Madras is expended, I hope you will take it into consideration to order a supply in time, as there is not a grain to be got in this place, and no probability of any arriving for some time to come.

N° 17.

From Captain LYSAGHT to the Commander in Chief.

Ellore, October 26, 1782.

OWING to the heavy rains which have fallen to the southward, your favour of the 15th did not reach me until the 26th, and the same tappal brought the melancholy accounts of *the dreadful effects of the late gale*. If exertions were necessary before that happened, they are become ten-fold so now, and you may rest assured, that every little influence I have among the northern merchants, shall be enforced, and my own credit stretched to the utmost to forward the scheme you have suggested.

Immediately on receipt of your favour, I wrote to my servant to the northward to hasten his business as much as possible. He had engaged thirteen vessels for rice, each of which, one with another, will carry 2,200 bags. Six of these vessels will be dispatched for certain within the course of next month for *Pulicat*, and about one-half of the remaining ones, will, I hope, be got off before Christmas. I have written to *every merchant* I know on the coast, to send supplies of every kind without loss of time, and pointed out to them the advantage that *Pulicat* will have over *Madras* in point of dispatch. With respect to the price offered, I think it fully sufficient to induce people to the risk; but, from the payments being to be made by bills on *the Government of Bengal*, will not be relished, the difficulty of getting money from thence being very great at present. If bills could be granted on any of the northern chiefships for part, to enable the merchants to go on with the business, it might do; but if the whole is to be paid in Bengal, they will be entirely at a stand for want of cash. The sending troops to the different places on the coast to which the grain vessels resort, will certainly be a very good measure; at present there are great numbers (equal to a lack [100,000] of bags at least) building and repairing in the different rivers in the *Chicacole* and *Ganjam* districts, for the protection of which there is not so much as a single guard of sepoy—of course a boat's crew may destroy the whole. The crop about here, owing to the want of rain, will be little more than sufficient for the consumption of the inhabitants; but, fortunately, as you go north it is better and better, and I am told, that from the *Chicacole*, *Kimmedy*, and *Ganjam* countries, they will be able to export large quantities. In a day or two I shall do myself the pleasure of addressing you again.

N° 18.

From Captain BISHOP (Commanding the Escort, having in Charge a Proportion of the Draft and Carriage Cattle, and Followers of the Army ordered to Nellore to be subsisted there during the Monsoon Season,) to the Commander in Chief.

*North Bank of the Pulicat River,
October 30, 1782.—6 A. M.*

I DID myself the honour to inform you of the detachment having crossed the *Cotelar* river, and I have now the pleasure to tell you that the whole of it passed this river last night and this morning. From Captain Smith's information respecting the *Cotapatam* river, we have little difficulty to apprehend in the crossing of it. In this case, Sir, I hope to execute your wishes in getting the detachment to Nellore in a few days.

Except a few bags, all the rice you sent from Madras after the detachment had marched, has been served out; the sepoy families became *so clamorous*, that I found it absolutely necessary to give them two seers each—this, with what they have been able to pick up *here*, will I hope carry them to Nellore. The fighting men have now seven days rice on their backs. I have had repeated applications from the officers of the detachment, for rice for their private followers; but situated as I was, with delays and difficulties in view, I did not hold it justifiable in serving out a single grain to any one but those absolutely necessary.

The public followers attached to the two battalions have had three days rice served to them this morning; what was ordered to them at Madras being out yesterday.

If any thing particular occurs on the march I will inform you of it.

[c]

N° 19.

From Captain LYSAGHT to Major General STUART.

Ellore, November 4, 1782. (received 12th.)

CAPTAIN SMITH writes me, that one of my vessels is arrived at *Pulicat*—she carries about 2000 bags, the whole of which he expected to have landed by the first instant. A doney with between four and five hundred bags must have sailed from *Coringha* ere now—she was ready three days ago. My servant at *Colingapatam* writes me, that he will certainly dispatch between nine and ten thousand bags from different places to the northward, within the course of next month, and I hope he will be able to get as much more away within the month of December. *Chocaput Chitty** has written to me, and communicated the substance of the message you gave him for me. You may rest assured that every exertion in my power shall be made, and I flatter myself that they will not be ineffectual.

N° 20.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE
COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, November 5, 1782.

THE quantity (of rice) lost in the storm of the 16th, has been supplied by ships now at anchor, but it is not yet landed. I have assurances of above 7000 bags of rice coming to *Pulicat* in ten days hence, *upon my private credit*, and assurances of 20 *per cent.* more than these œconomists of what does not belong to them now offer to the importers; and I trust *that you will not suffer me to be a loser by this necessary interference in this most important object of state at present.*

* This man is a very considerable Hindoo merchant, who was told by me to use every influence he possessed in the northern provinces, together with Captain Lysaght's servant, to encourage the sending grain from thence, immediately to *Pulicat*.

N° 21.

From the Commander in Chief's Aid-de-Camp to Captain
SMITH*, &c.

Fort St. George, November 7, 1782.

THE General desires me to acquaint you, that he has received assurances from the northward, of a very large quantity of rice being to be sent to Pulicat *upon the strength of his own credit*. He wishes you would take the trouble to collect and repair all the Maffulah boats you can, as quickly as possible, and also inform him of the proper store-houses or godowns where this rice and other grain may be put. He desires me to add, that you can do no greater service to the public, nor more agreeable to him, than by affording your utmost assistance on the present occasion.

N° 22.

From the Commander in Chief's Aid-de-Camp to Captain GEORGE
CAMPBELL Commanding at Nellore Serapilé.

Fort St. George, November 7, 1782.

HE (the General) desires that you will take occasion to acquaint the principal conicopies or servants belonging to the paymaster or to the agent, or the parks of artillery of Bengal or Madras establishment—in short, of all those that call themselves followers of this army *in the pay of the Company*, that you are ordered by him to make muster of the whole *in one day*, both of the number of persons, and of the number of bullocks, distinguishing the serviceable from the unserviceable. Captain Bishop or Lieutenant Smart

* The officer here named is at present a Lieutenant Colonel in the Company's Service, and was at this time the officer who commanded at Pulicat. From my knowledge of his regularity and good conduct, I confided the whole management of the grain magazine to him, together with the proportion reserved for public exigence, and for which I became answerable to Captain Lyfaght.

will give you the assistance you may want in the way that they know the army* was last mustered; and these returns you will send him as soon as possible.

N° 23.

The MINUTE of the General, in Committee, November 8, 1782.

GENERAL STUART assures the Committee, that there have been repeated applications made to him from separate corps, as if something of a mutinous disposition was to be apprehended, owing to the very great arrears of pay now due to the army, *but especially owing to the restrained delivery of rice, and the impossibility there is of purchasing it for money!* he begs the most serious attention of the Committee to this representation, and that one month's more pay, &c. may be issued, which will bring the army to *five* months arrears.

N° 24.

From WILLIAM TIERNAY, Esq; Secretary to his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, to Major General STUART.

Calcutta, October 23, 1782.

I AM particularly directed to express Sir Eyre Coote's solicitude to have the cavalry kept up. This he considers as a point of infinite importance; and is indeed convinced that you must yourself see it in the same light.—I hope, ere long, to have the happiness of informing you of the General's perfect recovery.

* This alludes to my plan of mustering the whole army and departments, which accordingly took place *in one* day October 12, 1782, as stated in the Company's records.

N° 25.

From Major General STUART to Sir EYRE COOTE.

Fort St. George, November 12, 1782.

UNLESS I am supported in the practical conduct of this army, and have your sanction to comply with their just and necessary demands, as far as Bengal rice and money will go, your Excellency must excuse me, if I hold the Board of Bengal and yourself responsible for the consequences.

N° 26.

From Captain SMITH to the Commander in Chief.

Pulicat, November 13, 1782.

I FLATTER myself you will be satisfied with me, when I assure you, that I have appropriated the greatest part of this cargo to the officers, sepoy, and followers of Captain Bishop's detachment, who were much distressed when they arrived here. I issued to them all about seven days rice, at the rate of six seers for the rupee; besides, I have supplied the wants of the officers and sepoy cantoned here, at the same rate. The rice expected from the northward, which you have been so good to write for, shall be regularly reported to you as it arrives, setting forth the quantity and quality in each vessel. I have the pleasure to inform you of the arrival of a small vessel of Captain Lysaght, with paddy and rice, as you see by the inclosed.

N° 27.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, November 14, 1782.

THE Crespigny, with 10,000 bags of rice, arrived this day; and we hourly expect to see Jamieson and Boswell. I pray you to send us all you can *, and at every risk, for eight weeks to come.

* A further proof of no rice job meant for Pulicat.

I have

I have received Mr. Tiernay's letter of the 23d ult. and hope to have one in a few days from yourself, to see your name, which will give me great satisfaction. The black cavalry shall not be let down—not a man of them! On Monday next the whole will be reviewed.

N° 28.

The MINUTE of the General, sent in circulation, November 16, 1782.

IT was also my duty, in every capacity, to represent the first beginnings of disagreeable feelings in the army, owing to their distress from arrears of pay, and *the confined delivery of rice, without the means of purchasing!*

If the funds can be found to pay off the arrears of five months to the officers, they will be enabled to discharge the balances due by them for rice received by their servants, and also to provide necessaries for the next campaign; and if two months are paid to the black troops, it will be very well for the present.

In regard to another part of the President's Minute, read in Committee the 14th (November), which throws on me the responsibility, if not the blame, if there are discontents in the army, arising from the narrowed delivery of rice, because, as the President says, *it is my fault* if the army is kept together in larger numbers than to be fed with 250 bags *per day*—I need only request the attention of the Committee to my Minute of the 22d ult. which is pretty full on that subject. It will there appear, that when it was stated that no more would be given than 250 bags, although I had reduced the consumption from 500 to 350 bags, and wished to keep it on this last quantity, I then said, that if the quantity 31,000 bags (250 *per day*) was set apart, I should answer for the subsistence of the army for four months, trusting that if more rice came, more would be allowed—I say so still: more has come; and, if I am well informed, above 60,000 bags more; and therefore I hope more will be allowed, *especially if there is no public bazar* for rice to be bought at.*

* This was the case at the Presidency at that time.

N° 29.

The MINUTE of the General, in Committee, November 23, 1782.

General STUART.] I HAVE the satisfaction to inform the Committee, that by the letters I have had the honour to receive from his Excellency the Commander in Chief, there is the most agreeable prospect of his being here in person to command this army the next campaign. The General mentions to me, that every exertion will be made to furnish money, provisions, and horses to mount the cavalry, sepoy, and lascars, draughts, field carriages, &c. He observes, that the safety of India depends on this army, and on its being immediately put in a state to secure their services in full force, preparatory to the expected fatigues of the ensuing campaign; and his Excellency desires me to represent to this Government, every thing that may occur for forwarding the service.

I have had the honour to write to the Right Honourable President since receiving Sir Eyre Coote's letters, on the subject of bullocks, draught and carriage; and I doubt not of every thing in that branch being got in readiness; so that there occurs to me nothing more *at present* to do, than to take care of the health, exercise, and discipline of this valuable army—upon the future operations of which so much seems to depend.

N° 30.

From Captain LYSAGHT to Major General STUART.

Ellore, November 23, 1782.

UNLESS I am permitted to dispose of a third, or a quarter of the cargo on ready money*, I shall be at a stand: I am therefore to request that you will be pleased to give instructions to Captain Smith accordingly.

* In consequence of Captain Lyfaght's former letter of 26th October, added to that of 23d November, I gave instructions to Captain Smith for only one-half of the rice and other grain to be reserved at *my risk* for the exigency of the public service; the other half was left free for sale, to produce ready money to Captain Lyfaght's agent.

N° 31.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE
COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, December 1, 1782.

I HAVE excused our black cavalry from every duty: the rains fell so heavy that their horses were reduced to skeletons. There is a great sickness among the black troopers, poor fellows, owing, as I believe, to the restrained delivery of rice, *and none to purchase* for their wives and children*, who live upon their pittance!—I am yet confined to 250 bags *per* day; but I have just now had accounts of a vessel expected at Pulicat, and shall then order a free market for every one to purchase. I wrote to your Excellency long ago on this. I trust it will be no extra expence; but if it should, and those here refuse to pay me, I hope you will see my bills paid; as in this way we can save the lives of these deserving men, and keep up the spirits and long bodies of the *starved* Bengal sepoys.

N° 32.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE
COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, December 6, 1782.

EVERY report we have through hircarrahs or sepoys, or from Vandewash, agree that Hyder has been very ill, and some say he is dead. *The weather here is wet, and the moisture and cold rawness in the air has encreased the sickness among the Europeans (even the old campaigners) very much indeed.* Doctor Davies tells me the fevers are slight, and they will recover with the dry weather. Our tents are in a bad state, and nothing sufficient come from the north. On my representing to the Committee that part of your Excellency's letter

* In those times of distress, I gave directions, through the military grain keeper, to supply the wants of the native cavalry and of the Bengal sepoys, who were unable to support themselves and families upon the single *seer*, or pint, of rice *per* man. They accordingly did receive that extra allowance, and settled for it with the military grain keeper. This constant additional supply was sent, until there was a public bazar or market established.

recommending the forwarding rice to Chingleput, the President stated the impossibility, from the inconsiderable quantity now in store, and the risk from M. Suffrein blocking up the roads, which will very possibly happen in ten or fifteen days hence.

N° 33.

From Captain LYSAGHT to Major General STUART.

Ellore, December 6, 1782.

WHAT I have now to request, is, that you will permit Captain Smith to dispose of the rice, &c. I am now sending him for ready money, instead of delivering it to the Company for bills drawn upon the Governor General and Council, and for him to pay the cash, as he receives it, into the Company's Treasury at Madras, for bills upon the Court of Directors, at the usual exchange. By this means you will serve me in a most essential point, and as Government is to receive the cash, it will be equally benefited.

I neither wish or desire to derive any advantage from an encrease of price upon the grain*, the prices you have fixed being in my opinion fully sufficient. All I want is, not to let so favourable a proposal slip, which must be the case if I am obliged to accept of bills payable in Bengal.

N° 34.

From Captain LYSAGHT to Major General STUART.

Ellore, December 10, 1782.

IHAD hopes that my influence with the black merchants and others near Chicacole, to whom I am known, would have been the means of a very considerable supply being sent ere now to Pulicat; for as I was not able to go

* Captain Lysaght having thus consented to pass from the twenty pagodas extra, besides the credit given for the remaining half of the grain for the public exigency, encreases the obligation on my part to prevent any real loss to his estate, arising from this transaction.

to the northward myself, I requested of Lieutenant Meath of my battalion to go along the coast, to recommend in my name the immediate dispatching of every vessel that could be got ready; but unfortunately, the want of sufficient depth of water in most of the northern rivers, occasioned by a failure last month of the usual rains, prevented a number of vessels from getting to sea, the owners of which had promised to dispatch them with all expedition.

My own agent expected to have had from ten to twelve thousand bags shipped off by the first of this month, but only four of his vessels having got out of the rivers, he has as yet not been able to dispatch more than about eight thousand bags to Pulicat, all of which is I hope safely arrived there ere now. He gives me hopes that he will be able to get nearly eight thousand bags more away by the 15th instant; and informs me that the only *additional* expence which will be incurred, is *half a rupee per bag*, given to the owners of such vessels as sail before the 20th of this month, it *not* being safe or usual for them to go to the southward before the beginning of January.

N° 35.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE
COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, December 12, 1782.

I AM happy to inform you, that the Latham, and the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Fullarton, arrived at Negapatam the 1st of December, in the morning; and I think the southern provinces are now secure. Every thing in army matters goes on, as far as I can on my own authority forward them—perfect obedience in the troops here. Rice is sent to Chingleput for the garrison; *but the President says, that none can be spared for field operations until more arrives here.*

N^o 36.

From Captain SMITH to Major General STUART.

Pulicat, December 14, 1782.

I DID myself the pleasure to write last night, and informed you of the arrival of a small cargo of rice from Captain Lysaght. I shall be glad to know if I may dispose of any of your part of it to those sepoy in the service, who may want a little rice* for the support of their families, and others who are passing and repassing on detachment, they paying for the same.

N^o 37.

EXTRACT from Major General STUART's REPORT in Committee, December 14, 1782 (on delivering the General Returns, together with the particular Mode in the execution of *his* Plan for mustering the Army, and every Department thereof, *in One Day*, so as to control the Expence in the Field, &c.).

General STUART.] HAVING once ascertained the mode of mustering, with the form of the return, every thing in point of expence, may soon be known. But I gained, besides, another principal point in coming at the knowledge of the real number of people who, under any description of general orders, were intitled to draw rice—a circumstance which gave me great relief of mind, when *I found myself charged with responsibility, if I kept the army nearer to Madras, in greater numbers than could be fed upon little more than half the usual quantity of rice formerly drawn.*

In the expectation I had of a certain resource, *upon my own credit from another quarter*, which I do not even now despair of, it has been so managed for these six or seven weeks past, that this army, with the public and private followers, have been supplied from the 250 bags daily allowance. All the fighting men and officers servants have been furnished from this stock,

* Captain Smith had my directions to assist these poor people to the utmost of his power.

excepting those of two battalions of sepoy's gone to Nellore, who carried with them rice for three weeks, and excepting about 4,000 of the public followers, who have been reduced: but I must fairly confess, that it has taken up so much of my time and attention, to examine and mark the returns before the rice is issued, that I cannot much longer continue it, now the season of action is coming on.

There being no rice for sale in the bazar, and the wives and families of the native troops therefore much distressed, it well deserves the attention of Government to increase the quantity for the use of the army, or to find a way to maintain their families, because these poor people living upon the pittance of the *native soldier*, especially those of the better *casts* of the cavalry and Bengal sepoy's, the men are so debilitated for want of sufficient nourishment, that it has been reported to me *as the chief cause of the very great sickness prevailing amongst them.* On this account, I have found a way to send some rice to the followers of the Bengal regiments, and to the corps of cavalry, but in no shape adequate to the wants of their families;—it is indeed out of my power to apply a sufficient remedy from the allowance of 250 bags a day.

Although these personal attentions to the delivery of rice, are out of the line of my duty, yet at this particular *crisis* I feel an extreme satisfaction in having been in any respect assisting *to preserve this valuable army in the most proper situation for the public service*, and at the same time in striking off every unnecessary expenditure of (rice) that most valuable article.

I have thought proper to present this Report to the Committee, together with the four last returns, comprehending every description and class of people and departments, not inserted in the returns from the Adjutant General. There is also an extract of the general orders connected with control; one in particular from his Excellency Sir Eyre Coote, which gives the clearest proof of his attention to prevent all improper waste or loss of stores or provisions in the field; and this single order of itself, if properly attended to by those in charge of provisions, &c. might have the most salutary effect possible.

If what has been done in this business can be of public benefit, every purpose in my view is answered.

(Signed)

JAM^s STUART.

N° 38.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE
COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, December 14, 1782.

I SEND a transcript of our latest intelligence—*Hyder, as I hear, has been officially reported dead!*

I have heard by Sir John Burgoyne, that your Excellency has taken ships to send horses for his regiment. I have given official notice *to provide gram for them, and for the cavalry during the next campaign.* Still I beg leave to recommend the sending of proper large gram from Bengal in large quantities.

N° 39.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant Cox, commanding at
Trivatore.

Fort St. George, December 15, 1782.

YOU will proceed, with the battalion under your command, to *Pulicat*, and from thence take with you the 4th battalion, and march with both battalions towards Nellore, in proper stages, according to the information which you will receive from Captain Smith, commanding at *Pulicat*, and Captain Campbell at Nellore. The object of this detachment is to take the draught and carriage cattle, and followers of the army, under your cover from thence to the army.

N° 40.

From Major General STUART to the President (Lord MACARTNEY).

[*Separate Communication, N° 1.*]*Fort St. George, December 15, 1782.*

THE cavalry cannot possibly keep together for duty in camp without gram—it is *theory* to think so; and therefore not only as to the present cavalry, but also for the horses expected from Bengal, the most certain ruin will befall them, if gram of one sort and another is not provided *from the northward*, and from Bengal, and even large quantities of paddy, to supply the place of gram when none can be had. This memorandum of *gram*, I desire may be taken notice of; for, without it, we shall lose, in one month, the service of all this excellent corps of *native* cavalry. It may come by *boats of every sort*; and the large pea, or northern gram, will do as well as any thing.

N° 41.

From Captain SMITH to the Commander in Chief.

Pulicat, December 18, 1782.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, that Mr. Cox, with the battalion under his command, arrived here this morning, and he has informed me, that all the rice sent to Mr. Dawes will be only sufficient for twelve days for the fighting men; and observes, that the followers, lascars, and bullock drivers, will want rice for that number of days; for as it is uncertain how long they may be on the road, he cannot conveniently spare any to them of that stock, and has indented to me for the number of seers necessary for the march, which I shall deliver to him, in order that he may not be retarded, *out of your rice* which is landed here, though I ought to have received your orders first, *as they have no money to pay for it*. I shall be glad to know how I am to account for such issues, and how it is to be paid for.

Mr.

Mr. Dawes will be obliged to leave a number of sick, and all the families of his sepoy's behind, whom I shall supply with your rice at the rate of six feer for the rupee. I have the pleasure to acquaint you that there are two more small vessels of Captain Lyfaght's arrived with rice and some gram, which makes in all *five* vessels in the road.

N° 42.

From Captain SMITH to Major General STUART.

Pulicat, December 19, 1782.

I HAVE now the pleasure to tell you that there is about *ninety-eight* Madras garce of rice now in the road and on shore; there is a sufficient quantity landed to answer the demands of the followers, or who else you may please to give chitts to for rice at six feers for the rupee, and will take care that half of the rice (which will be forty-nine garce) shall be delivered at that rate, and the other half shall be disposed of for Captain Lyfaght.

N° 43.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, December 19, 1782.

MY situation is most disagreeable to me, and there is nothing but the necessity of the public service, and the point of honour, would make me continue an hour longer here.

The march of the French troops from Cuddalore towards Arcot, confirmed from several quarters, seems to me also to confirm the certainty of that event (*Hyder's death*). I have ordered the bullocks and the followers from Nellore; they will leave that place the 19th, escorted by half the garrison. The 4th and 16th battalions leave *Pulicat* the same day, to meet them half way, and to escort

escort them to the army. To-morrow I shall put in general orders—" *the army to be in readiness to encamp at the shortest notice.*"

There are several thousand bags of rice arrived at Pulicat upon my own private credit for the army, in case I see it necessary to assist the public stores, and that this Government will not give me any assistance.

P. S. The President talks of our cavalry doing duty in the field upon grafs with *half gram*, and perhaps *none*. I have told him that it is *theory*—he has wrote for gram; but for the fake of your favourite cavalry, send us from Bengal at least 400 garce as soon as possible.

N° 44.

From Major General STUART to Mr. Secretary HUDDLESTON.

Fort St. George, December 22, 1782.

THIS day an office peon brought me a paper to read, of certain regulations concerning the importation of grain after the 20th of December—it was said to be on the part of Government. I am a member of Government, and were it not that I see evident detriment to the service on which our existence depends, I should not trouble you with my interference, or to shew that it is an unnatural supposition, *that the Commander in Chief should be excluded from any consultation.*

Without entering into the small grain business, I have only to state, that the reservation of *gram* in the disposal of Government, *seems*, nay I venture to say, *is* the surest way to prevent the importation. If gram is allowed to be imported *free* as the small grain, every one will be tempted to send it—the gentlemen in the civil line keeping horses will pay the market price—the gentlemen in the military line, and, above all, the commanding officers of cavalry having contracts must buy it, or give up their contracts—the officers on the staff from their allowances must buy it; and with *no* restraint on the market, every importer will push for this port. I desire, therefore, that you will, in circulation, acquaint the Right Honourable President and Select Committee, and enter the same next Committee, *that, in my opinion, the regulations in council will defeat the very purpose meant, and that gram ought to*

be fully as free as the small grain mentioned in the paper I by chance saw this morning; and also, that after the most extraordinary expence which the public have been at to keep up the *native cavalry*, this Government, whether as a council from which I am at present excluded, or as a *Select Committee*, of which I am a member, without knowing any thing *officially* of revenue or stores of any kind, whether rice or provisions, will in fact be instrumental in depriving the public of the service of that very valuable corps of cavalry recommended in every letter of his Excellency the Commander in Chief to me, to be kept up; because, without full gram, the horses must perish in less than five weeks from the opening of next campaign! and because, next to rice for this army, gram for the horses is the consideration.

N° 45.

From Major General STUART to the President (Lord MACARTNEY).

[*Separate Communication*, N° 2.]

Fort St. George, December 22, 1782. 1 P. M.

THE *narrowed* delivery of rice has obliged most of the officers to send their coolies to Nellore, and many have died or left the settlement. The late orders for the army to encamp at the shortest notice will, as I hope, put the officers in the way of procuring coolies—at present they are not half provided.

I guess the bullocks and followers from Nellore will be with us on the 27th or 28th instant; and much about the same time I shall order the army into the field. Meanwhile the *general orders* of the 20th will have had almost the same effect as if we were actually in the tents; but I could wish the present cold dampness in the air pass off as much as possible before the Europeans lay on the ground.

[e]

N° 46.

From Lieutenant Cox (Commanding the Escort from Nellore) to
Major General STUART.

Durassapatam, in Camp, December 24, 1782.

RETURN of the gun, draught, and carriage cattle, their drivers, keepers, conicopies, &c. belonging to the different departments of the main army, on their return from Nellore.

DEPARTMENTS.

	Elephants.	Ditto keepers.	Draft bullocks.	Master drivers.	Drivers.	Carriage bullocks.	Master drivers.	Drivers.	Conicopies.
Commiffary of stores, — serviceable			950	19	458	535	11	178	
Mr. Kenworthy, D. army agent, ditto	3	14	453	12	216	601	11	170	2
Bengal agent, — ditto			209	15	132	263	11	174	5
Total	3	14	1,612	46	806	1,399	33	522	7

N. B. A certain proportion of the army gun-bullocks remained to the northward, to be employed by Captain Edmonds, in case of need, at Cummum.

REMARKS by General STUART.

THUS, happily, 3,000 relief cattle were brought safe back to the army from Nellore, where (owing to the five weeks feed) they had been kept alive for the public service; and without which draught and carriage cattle, we could not have remained in the field, at any, even the smallest distance from Madras; much less could we have obliged the *joint* force of the French and

Tippoo

Tippoo to turn their backs, as happened the 13th February 1783 at *Nedingul*, while we dismantled Vandewash and Carangooly; on the contrary, they might have got a footing in both those places, and made it difficult to dislodge them, after M. Buffy's arrival in the following month of March! The natural consequence whereof, in bringing the seat of war close to the Presidency, might have led to our being obliged to keep on the *defensive*, which would have lost in the ensuing season, both the *southern provinces and Vellore*, instead of our carrying on the subsequent *offensive* war, which we were thus enabled to pursue.

Upon such circumstances, though to appearance trivial, did the probable events of the greatest national importance at the time depend! *and it was in this view that I then saw those objects*, as appears both from my conduct in the command of the army, and in the official papers given for record, to which I now appeal.

N° 47.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. &c.

Fort St. George, January 1, 1783.

I HAVE just time to send you (inclosed) the latest intelligence from Captain Flint. I have had other notes from him of preparations; and signals are to be made from Vandewash hill, to be seen from Carangooly and Chingleput, the instant the French approach.

The whole army will be encamped to-morrow. I shall, mean while, send another convoy to Chingleput, and embrace every opportunity of sending rice onwards, until there is a necessity to march, and we have more carriage to do business at Arnee effectually, or until we are happy enough to see your Excellency by the return of the Medea frigate. We have letters here of the 14th ult. which assures us of this being your intention, but I have none later than the 1st ult. and to say truth, I have not had an hour to myself to answer it; but your Excellency may be assured that nothing of what you recommend shall be forgotten.

With all this parade of treasury, the army is this day *six* months in arrear of pay and batta—the black troops *five*; but there is no murmur or discontent

tent—and I am assured we shall have a month's pay in a day or two, and every thing is as you would wish it.

P. S. Hyder is beyond doubt gone to his own place, and the guns on the arrival of Tippoo have been heard all around.

N^o 48.

From Major General STUART to the President (Lord MACARTNEY).

[*Separate Communication, N^o 4.*]

Fort St. George, January 2, 1783.

THE army is now in the field, together with the *old stock* of carriage and gun bullocks from Nellore, with every other means of service within the compass of my power, and I venture to add, with unparalleled expedition, from the date of entering the cantonments, and from the 16th of last month (December) the *first* day that the season began to open for the field service. But it is not enough to be in the field, we must have the *means* of moving to some essential purpose.

My plan for the present therefore is, to fill Chingleput with rice as much as can be, and perhaps in some proportion Tripasore, so as to give means for a certainty of supply of three days march from the Presidency, and in every probable direction of the army's movement—at Chingleput for the coast or the French—at Tripasore, towards Vellore, &c.

But the greatest object of all our present preparations or future exertions, as I have already had the honour to observe, is to drive the French from every place on the coast which they can possibly occupy for any purpose of commerce, or assistance to their sea force, and perhaps to demolish such places as *Cuddalore* or *Porto Novo*; and if the French take refuge in *Arnee*, or any other inland place, we must follow them, and take both them and the place.

N° 49.

From Lieutenant General Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. &c. to Major
General STUART.

Ghyretty, December 28, 1782.

WHEN I wrote you about throwing a stock of provisions into Chingleput, I was fully aware that it was a business not to be entered upon, if the stores at Madras were not sufficiently ample to admit of it; but I should imagine, that the addition which has been made to them, by the safe arrival of the large supplies gone from hence, must long ere now have removed every objection; and I trust that I shall soon have the pleasure of being informed of your having already entered upon that most necessary and important operation.

I cannot reconcile to myself your consenting so repeatedly to the Committee's requests for detaching from your European force; and it is with concern I observe your having parted with so many of these veterans, who were inured to the climate, and who had so ably and cheerfully gone through the harassing service of two years fatiguing campaigns.—*I must now desire that you do not detach another man of the King's troops from those still remaining at and in the neighbourhood of Fort St. George, without my express orders, or in any shape diminish your European strength, until we are better able to ascertain the force and intentions of the enemy.*

Several of the Articles which follow in this Part of the Appendix, relate to the Operations of the French in January 1783, and the Intelligence received of their Scheme of effecting a Landing to the North of Madras and Maffulipatam.

N° 50.

From Captain BRIDGES, commanding in the Ganjam District, to Lieutenant Colonel MALCOLM, Adjutant General.

Ganjam, January 13, 1783.

I SHALL be obliged to you to inform the Commander in Chief, that the French fleet are still at anchor in these roads. The cruizers came in this evening, and the whole fleet collected—ten sail of the line, and two frigates*. They have taken a store-sloop from Bengal to this place: she had eleven eighteen-pounders on board. The enemy have not yet made any attempt to land.

* Thus M. Suffrein and the French squadron took post to the north both of Madras and of Maffulipatam, in order to favour the *original* plan of M. Bussy, to effect a landing in those parts. The plan for the defence of the northern circars was adopted; and the position of our main army at the time would have rendered the enemy's schemes abortive, had the attempt been made to carry the seat of war to the northward.

N° 51.

From Captain BRIDGES to Lieutenant Colonel MALCOLM, Adjutant General.

Ganjam, January 15, 1783.

YOU will be pleased to inform the Commander in Chief, that the French, after lying at anchor in these roads for seven days, failed this morning for the northward. They destroyed all the small craft that fell into their hands, but never attempted any in this river.

Five French deserters, who say they were on board the Blandford Indianman, on their way from Madras to Bengal, inform me, that she was taken a few days ago, and that they escaped from the frigate which took possession of her, and came on shore here yesterday.

By the enemy's not making any attempt to land, I conclude their intentions thus far in the way, is to intercept all ships, &c. to distress Madras; and I am afraid they will do great mischief along the coast. Ten line of battle ships, two frigates, and another three-masted vessel, were the whole fleet that failed this morning.

N° 52.

From Mr. KINGSCOTTE, Deputy Military Secretary, to the Commander in Chief.

Fort St. George, January 20, 1783.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable President and Select Committee, to send you a letter from Mr. Stone, and two from Captain Bridges, advising of a French fleet being to the northward. This is the only intelligence which has yet been received. Major Sydenham has been directed to establish signals with the mount, to be communicated to camp without delay, to announce the appearance of an enemy's fleet, and other circumstances that may be necessary, for your immediately being informed of.

N° 53.

From the Commander in Chief's Aid-de-Camp to Mr. KINGSCOTTE.

Camp near Vellout, January 20, 1783.

THE General desires me to acknowledge the receipt of those letters, for the information of the Right Honourable the President and Select Committee; and that if the ships and small craft are brought under the cover of the sea-line as much as possible, this army is ready to answer every other purpose.

N° 54.

From the President (Lord MACARTNEY) to Major General STUART.

Fort St. George, January 21, 1783.

CAPTAIN GOWER is this moment arrived in the Medea, accompanied by the Chacer, whom he took about five days ago. Inclosed is a copy of the written intelligence he has delivered to me.

You will probably concur in the propriety of sending the two battalions lately arrived at Ongole, to Massulipatam, for the purpose of being in readiness to defend that chief post of the circars. The Committee wish to have your sentiments upon it.

INTELLIGENCE referred to in the preceding Letter.

AT Ganjam, 10th January, nine sail of the line and two frigates.—Report of the prisoners taken in the Chacer, which their log-book corresponds with, That the Chacer left the Mauritius the 4th of November, and arrived at Acheen the 29th December. Admiral Suffrein had left Acheen eight days before the arrival of the Chacer. This sloop staid there six days, and sailed on the 4th January, in company with the Fortune sloop; which sloop parted company with them the 7th, and went to the Nicobar Islands. I believe, that is to be a place of rendezvous.—One of the prisoners declared to me, *that all our settlements to the northward of Pulicat were to be attacked*; and that he believed M. Buffy's troops were to be landed at Massulipatam. There is one French 74 cruising in the Streights of Malacca.

N° 55.

INTELLIGENCE collected from Letters (dated at the Mauritius in November 1782.)

IN a month, or thereabouts, there will sail from hence three sail of men of war and a large frigate, with a convoy of thirty sail, to join you. This reinforcement will arrive sooner than last year, and put your squadron far above want. M. Peinier comes with this convoy. M. Le Marquis de Buffy will go with M. Peinier.—The Naiade sailed from the Mauritius some time before; and that the Chacer announces the departure of the convoy the 1st December*.

N° 56.

From Major General STUART to the President (Lord MACARTNEY).

Camp at Vellout, January 22, 1783.

Half-past Eight, A. M.

I HAVE the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 21st, and the accounts of the Medea's arrival with her prize *the Chacer*; also the written intelligence therein inclosed:—from all which, I have not the least difficulty in giving my opinion, that the two battalions at Ongole (which lately made part of this army) should be without delay ordered to Maffulipatam—and I add, also the detachment of his Majesty's troops under Lieutenant Colonel Jones from Ellore. On other particulars, I hope to have the honour of meeting your Lordship to-morrow in Committee.—I wait only for the return of the detachment from Tripasore, which I hear has safely delivered all the rice there, and returns with some slaughter-cattle for the army.

* N. B. The articles here inserted, N° 54 and 55, are only extracts of the intelligence received; and it is to be observed in general, that though the word "EXTRACT" is not repeated at each Number in the Appendix, yet most of the articles are only extracts of the letters and papers referred to, the greatest part of which are on the Company's records at full length; and as to any papers or letters not on the records, they are ready to be produced for the purpose of authenticating the extracts.

N° 57.

From Major General STUART to the Select Committee.

Camp at Vellout, January 22, 1783.

Half-past Eleven, A. M.

I DID myself the honour to acquaint Lord Macartney this morning, that I intended to be in the fort this night, in expectation of attending a Committee to-morrow, *upon the present most important crisis*, in consequence of the latest intelligence from Ganjam, and by the Chacer prize. I take occasion to inform your Lordship, &c. that I have ordered one company from the park of artillery to be in readiness to march to Madras at an hour's notice, in case of necessity.

N° 58.

INTELLIGENCE received by the Commander in Chief, January 24, 1783, and communicated to Government.

CHOUREE MOOTHOO, deserter from the enemy, being interrogated, says, That he has served for many years past as serjeant in John's reffalah, composed of Europeans and natives: That he left Tippoo's encampment three days ago at Penampawk (near Muslewauk), his army having the day before marched from the neighbourhood of Arcot to its present ground, with the view of being conveniently situated to oppose the English army, in case it should attempt to throw provisions into Vellore: That, seven days after Tippoo returned from the Malabar coast, the French force from Gingee joined his encampment, and are now situated on the left of his line, Lallé with his party being attached to them: That the army consists of nearly the same number that it did *in Hyder's time*, before Tippoo was detached to the southward.

N^o 59.

From Major General STUART to Lieutenant General Sir EYRE
COOTE, K. B. &c.

Camp at Taumarum, February 3, 1783.

I HAVE for some considerable time past, sent under cover to ———, such intelligence as I thought might be interesting, doubtful whether you might not at the time be on your way here. Mr. ——— would send whatever I had to say to your Excellency, and I beg leave to refer to it.

The appearance of M. Suffrein off Ganjam must have been known at Calcutta the 15th (ultimo), and consequently an embargo would take place. This I am sorry to think will prevent your Excellency joining us by sea; but I shall hope and request you to come by land, and I am informed, without much inconvenience it may be done in thirty days.

The accounts intercepted in the Chacer, will shew your Excellency what I believe is M. de Buffy's plan of descent in or near the Circars; but if your Excellency sets out immediately, I hope you will be with us before he can get landed. Every thing is done that you could wish, to be prepared for him; Masulipatam and Ganjam are alone to be looked to—Jones and Lysaght, as first and second, command in the Circars, and the guns and stores at Vizagapatam are to be divided betwixt those two places, and your two Carnatic battalions are by my plan ordered to Masulipatam. In short, in this emergency, and to avoid mistakes, I thought myself called upon at full length to give in a plan of defence and operations, in a minute or memorial of the 26th ultimo; which, relative to the Circars, has been adopted. This paper I shall endeavour to furnish to your Excellency by some safe conveyance, so soon as I know for certain what you are pleased to determine upon in your own movements.

In consequence of this plan, and the latest intelligence of the French designs, and after having supplied Tripasore with a sufficiency in deposit, for a future convoy to Vellore, I am now to move the army towards Carangooly and Vandewash*, to demolish those places, and retire the garrisons; and in

* See on record the journal of the movements of the army in the demolition of these two places in fight of the enemy's combined force, Mysoreans and French; also the affair at Nedingul, February 13, 1783.

doing this, I shall not be surpris'd, *if Tippoo with his French general tries our metal*—we are prepared for it, under your auspices.

The army marches to-morrow; though I have not yet been encreased five hundred bullocks in carriage, yet by the convoys sent to Chingleput, and three days to Carangooly, I hope to make it out. I carry six battering guns and one-third proportion of stores; *the enemy's utmost force is within three days march, and all the French collected*—it is precisely what in the general line is to be wished for.

I have been so pointedly attacked for my conduct on the score of *inaction, or counteraction*, by this President, in an elaborate minute of the 18th ultimo, that though I can scarce find time to do myself fully justice, by reason of other more immediate employment, yet I have not altogether failed in that object, as I hope in your Excellency's, and in the opinion of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, when they see my answer presented to the Committee* held the 1st instant.

N° 60.

From the President Lord MACARTNEY to the Honourable BASIL COCHRANE at *Negapatam*.

S I R,

Fort St. George, March 23, 1783.

THIS moment the Danish Indiaman Frederick Nagore is arrived here from Tranquebar with Colonel Nixon and Captain Hallam, who bring an account that they were detained in the road of Cuddalore for the space of three days. The French had there seven line of battle ships, five frigates, and ten transports, and that Monsieur de Buffly was landed there with 2,200 European troops, and 1,000 Caffries. The French fleet was to have got under way early this morning from Cuddalore, in order, as was understood, to return to Trincomalee. I am sorry to inform you, that Sir Edward Hughes was not expected to leave Bombay before the 20th.

(Signed) MACARTNEY.

* Extracts from Lord Macartney's minute of the 18th January, and Major General Stuart's answer of 1st February, 1783, referred to in the above letter, are inserted in a separate Appendix, described, Appendix N° III.

N° 61.

From Lord MACARTNEY to Mr. COCHRANE.

Fort St. George, March 25, 1783.

Half-past nine, A. M.

ABOUT an hour ago, four ships appeared in sight to the southward of this road—two of them seem line of battle ships—they have not answered the Medea's signals, and have fired at a small vessel coming into the roads; the Medea is under way, and we have no doubt will escape.

(Signed) MACARTNEY.

P. S. The French ships are gone to the northward—pray forward the intelligence to Anjengo and Bombay.

N° 62.

The President Lord MACARTNEY's Minute in Committee,
24th March, 1783.

THE President informs the Committee, that notwithstanding the meeting of yesterday, he thought it his duty to request their attendance thus soon again, on account of the intelligence received last night of the arrival of the armament under M. de Buffy on this coast, and of the continuance of his Majesty's Squadron at Bombay—the junction of the naval forces of the enemy—the absence of the naval force intended to oppose them—the interruption of supplies from Bengal—the scantiness of the resources of the Presidency—the attempts to counteract the operations of the Nabob's assignment, which furnishes a considerable part of them—the demands of General Mathews, that Tippoo should be prevented from attacking him with such a force as he might not be able to resist—the advantage, the necessity of preventing, if possible, such an attack, by causing a diversion in different parts of Tippoo's extensive territories—the proximity of Colonel Lang's army to Tippoo's southern

southern dominions—the situation and disposition of Colonel Jones's force to the northward—all these circumstances will be, and, as far as could have been foreseen, have already, no doubt, been objects of the consideration of every Member of the Committee—the difficulties of the present scene, and of resolving on the fittest measures, increase upon the Committee by the uncertainty of a Marattah peace, and of the intentions of the Court of Poonah, consequent upon the death of Hyder—whether leading to assistance or resistance to General Mathews—the utter ignorance in which the Presidency is held by the superintending power of Bengal, either as to the present state of their negotiations with that power, or with the *Nizam* in relation to the Guntoor Circar (forming a part of this Presidency), or with any other power, however necessary to be known by this Committee—their persisting silence in relation to their sentiments (long since demanded, and which by act of parliament they are required to give) upon the terms of a proposal to accommodation either with Hyder or his successor, or upon the treaty proffered by the Ranah of Mysore, as well as indeed upon almost every material subject upon which letters have been written to them by this Committee—it remains only for this Committee to make the most of the scanty resources, and few lights of which they are possessed.

N° 63.

Major General STUART'S MINUTE, in Committee, March 24, 1783.

I HAVE attended to the Right Honourable President's enumeration of (as I believe) fifteen articles of political business, which, he thinks, call for the immediate attention of the Committee, since the news of M. de Buffy's arrival.

Upon the whole of those articles, which might perhaps have been comprehended under fewer heads, I am of opinion, humbly differing from the President; *that the difficulties of the present scene, and of resolving on the fittest measures, do not, from the last news, increase upon the Committee; but, on the contrary, that they are greatly lessened, if not entirely done away.*

And, in particular, I take this occasion to express my firm confidence and belief, that Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes will be able to give the most

satisfactory reasons for his conduct in remaining till now on the other side of India, and that those reasons will greatly outweigh the short interruption of our intercourse, or of supplies by sea from Bengal or elsewhere.

I have the same confidence in the wisdom and prudence of the Governor General and Council of Bengal; and I believe, that if they have been silent on certain points alluded to in the President's Minute, they have had reasons to justify their conduct in any appeal to the authority competent to decide*.

* The Letters and Minutes, N° 60, 61, 62, and 63, are the proofs referred to in page 22 of the Letter from Major General Stuart to the Directors of the East India Company, dated July 3, 1787.

END OF THE APPENDIX, N° II.

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Washington, D. C.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. and in reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY



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I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

The following Appendix N^o III. is of
Essential use to ascertain with precision
the real Sentiments and Merits of The
President and of The General at Fort
St George relative to The Public Service,
at the times alluded to in their Minutes
January 18th and February 1st 1783.

§ The Object of the Appendices N^o II. and III.
p. XXV. to XXVIII. and all the Notes are added
by M^r General Stuart.



A P P E N D I X, N° III.

C O N T A I N I N G

Extracts of the President Lord MACARTNEY'S
MINUTE of 18th January, and of the
Commander in Chief Major General
STUART'S MINUTE of 1st February, 1783,
&c.

✍ *This APPENDIX is connected with the LETTER from Major General STUART to
The Honourable the DIRECTORS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY, dated 3d
July 1787; and the Two MINUTES above mentioned are referred to at the
Bottom of Page xliv. of the APPENDIX, N° II.*

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A P P E N D I X, N^o III.

N^o 1.

MINUTE of the President (Lord MACARTNEY)*, in Committee.

(E X T R A C T.)

Fort St. George, January 18, 1783.

THE President has the honour to observe to the Committee, that the territories belonging to, or dependent upon, this Presidency, may, with respect to the present war, be divided into the Northern Provinces, or northward of the Pinnar river, which have been threatened, but have

* Upon the 18th of January, I came from camp to the Fort, and was present in Select Committee when Lord Macartney (without previous notice to me) gave in a very long prepared Minute (from which this extract is made), full of the most hostile strictures pointed at my conduct, as the General commanding the army. Being obliged immediately to return to camp, I took notice of it the next day in a postscript of my letter to the Committee, in the following words:

“ Camp near Vellout, January 19, 1783. Two P. M.

“ P. S.—I cannot help acquainting your Lordship, &c. that I wait with some impatience for the “ copy of the Right Honourable President’s Minute, read yesterday in Committee, while I have any “ leisure time to do myself justice in what is so pointedly directed to me in that performance; and I “ trust that *it will not go unanswered.*”

But although I was more than once at Madras in the interval, and had repeatedly requested to have a copy, yet I never had it until the evening of the 24th.—My duty then called me to camp.—The records will shew the interruptions and other difficulties I had to surmount, before I could obtain that opening to do myself justice, which took place in the Committee held 1st of February 1783, when my Minute in answer to that of Lord Macartney of 18th January was read for the *first* time.

In the extract inserted in this Appendix, nothing is omitted which relates to Lord Macartney’s opinions, either of the state of the Carnatic, or of the past or future mode of carrying on the war there; and the whole of his Lordship’s strictures upon my own particular conduct, as stated in that Minute, is here laid open to view.

JAM^s STUART.

The following references in the margin are taken from Lord Macartney's original Minute of 18th January 1783.

¹ Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to Select Committee, November 20, 1781.

² Return of jaghire by the Aumildar Mr. A. de Souza.

³ Sir Eyre Coote's Letters to Select Committee, 19th and 29th October 1781.

hitherto suffered little, by the enemy; the Southern Provinces, or southward of the Coleroon, which had been left open to occasional incursions; and the Middle Provinces, between those rivers, or peculiarly the Carnatic—of which countries, Sir Eyre Coote, who had the best opportunities of knowing, declared already, in 1781, that it was laid waste, and so deserted, that ten years of peace and tranquillity, together with the most indulgent lenity towards the then, but few, wretched inhabitants, would not be sufficient to restore it even to that ability (oppressed as it was by the Nabob's government) which it possessed before the war. Of the justness of this declaration, there cannot be a stronger confirmation, than the statement of the Company's jaghire immediately surrounding Fort St. George, and which had the best chance of, as well as the best right to, the protection of the Company's army. By this statement, made in 1782, it appears, that of 2,265 villages, of which the jaghire consisted before the war, upwards of 2,000² were totally destroyed and deserted; and of the remainder, few were in good order, or well inhabited.

The Carnatic, in such a state of desolation, could afford but little chance of any subsistence or supply, even to a victorious army. The opposite armies have³ indeed subsisted chiefly by resources drawn from a considerable distance, that of the Company by sea, and that of Hyder from the dominions possessed by him beyond the hills which separate the eastern from the western side of the Peninsula. Rice, the chief food of the native troops, is said to have frequently sold, at an average rate, as high in the enemy's camp as at Madras, where the retail price has been known to be multiplied many folds beyond what it had borne in times of peace. But the same means of carriage which conveyed to the enemy that food through the passes between those hills, carried it to the camp wherever it was situated. The supplies for the Company's forces landed at Madras, had still another difficulty to surmount before they could reach the army, if distant, or accompany it to a distance; the difficulty of collecting carriage cattle from a country, where man and beast had been equally and successfully the object of destruction, or of capture. With attention, perseverance, and expence, the number of cattle for the use of the army was brought to equal or approach the number of fighting men; thus, however, creating a new want of provender for them, and provision for their conductors, and on a march occupying more space, and requiring more management than the army they attended.

This army, composed almost entirely of infantry, might be often fully occupied, and scarcely equal to defend such a cumbrous convoy against the enemy's numerous, irregular, and plundering horse; and yet this conveyance

ance was still insufficient for the artillery, the ammunition, the baggage, and especially for so much provisions for the army, together with its many followers, as would enable it to continue for any considerable time at a distance from Madras.

“The forces of the enemy, consisting chiefly of cavalry, were always ready to watch and take advantage of position, of disorder, or of accident. They advanced, retreated, harassed, without much difficulty or danger to themselves. Of four victories, gained against Hyder Ally in two campaigns, no one effect except the reputation of victory was obtained. Sir Eyre Coote, with all the advantages of fame, experience, personal bravery, and activity, obtained possession only of the field of battle, not thinking it prudent or practicable to pursue the victory, or the enemy, in whose camp the defeat is said to have sometimes had but little more than the appearance of changing ground.”

“The army of Hyder besides its multitudes of cavalry, had too many advantages, in being supported and fed by a country behind it, fertile, and cultivated, under a steady, vigorous, though despotic government, to suffer much in a contest with a body of mere infantry, which, passing necessarily through a desert, was at the same time insupportably burdened and insufficiently provided. The horse of Hyder can easily be supposed, and are actually known, to have made marches to double the distance of the Company's foot; it was not by any increase of bullocks loaded with provisions, that such horse could be overtaken or overcome.

“It would certainly be an object worthy any confederacy of European and Indian enemies, to attempt the siege of Fort St. George as the only strong hold remaining upon this part of the coast, and which must command the interior country, when, after an interval of peace, it will again return to be valuable, though, during the present war, it is not likely to be capable of affording any material supply of provisions or of money—*while in such a situation, the possession of it must be burthensome and precarious. Little remains in it, indeed, now, for an army to protect; and the Company's forces cannot there be rendered capable of pursuit, nor consequently of conquest. They may suffer in it by defeat, but cannot gain materially by victory.*

If in an action with the *joined strength** of the French and Mysoreans, the English army should happen to be worsted, it must take refuge with its

* The perusal of the separate journal of the movements of the army in February 1783 is here requested to be attended to, in order to know what did really happen when that army was in fight of the *joined strength* of the French and Mysoreans, headed by Tippoo and Brigadier General De Haulville in person.

four-fold followers into Fort St. George, where, beyond a chosen and sufficient garrison, numbers might serve only to accelerate the chief danger, to which a strong and well defended fortress can be exposed, that of a dearth of provisions, in case of the interception of fresh supplies.

After every precaution taken for the perfect security of Fort St. George, the attention of the Committee is due *to the recovery of the southern and the preservation of the northern provinces from the ravages of war.* The former injured, but not destroyed; the latter, little, as yet, affected by the present troubles, might afford temptations to Indian or European foes—they are worth being invaded, and deserve being protected—they can supply the subsistence and defray the expences of their protectors—they are on a medium hundreds of miles distant from the center of the Carnatic; too distant to be certain of being relieved by the march of any army from thence, or of being relieved in time. Not only Ganjam or Palamcotah, but Masulipatam or Tanjore, weakly garrisoned, might pass into the hands of an invader, before the account of an invasion had reached Madras. The cruel fate of the Carnatic*, which is attributed to the want of foresight and preparation, would leave without pardon or excuse the repetition of such neglect, as to the other dependencies of the Presidency.

* President's Minute, October 20, 1782.

These several considerations had strongly influenced the President⁴ upon the expected arrival of the reinforcement under Sir Richard Bickerton†, to propose

* The cruel fate of the Carnatic was, in the first instance, owing to the want of proper *cabinet* intelligence of the late Hyder's hostile designs; or, if known or suspected, the not being prepared for the events.

The military history of that war at the beginning sufficiently evinces the fatality of subdividing or detaching the forces at any distance, when unsupported by magazines, or by the main body of the army, or by the shipping, after the enemy, with their numerous horse, became masters of the open country. In order to prevent repetition of similar disasters (after providing sufficiently the northern and southern provinces for a defensive state of war), I was always of opinion with Sir Eyre Coote, to preserve the Carnatic main army in the most proper position near to the Presidency, ready and able to take the field at the proper season for action, prepared for every real exigence of public service, which might be expected to take place at the great crisis when I succeeded to the command of the army. It was this consideration, and this alone, that steadily influenced my conduct; and neither the separate opinions or strictures of Lord Macartney concerning his ideas of separate expeditions or excursions for inferior purposes, did ever divert me from that direct line of conduct, while I had the honour to be employed in the most important and responsible station of public service.

† It is upon the Company's records (although I do not recollect the particulars to have been agitated in my presence in Committee), that Lord Macartney's reason for keeping the King's troops which came under convoy of Sir Richard Bickerton so long on board ship, were, in the first place, to employ them in an expedition to retake Trincomalee; or, if that could not succeed, to carry a certain part of them directly to Bombay, to operate on that side of India; and with this view it was, that nearly the whole of the very considerable reinforcement which came with Sir John Bur-

propose sending troops to assist in effectuating an attack against the dominions of Hyder, on the coast of Malabar, and some troops to the northern and some to the southern provinces of the Company, on the coast of Coromandel, for the * double purpose of securing those provinces against invasion, and annoying the neighbouring territories in the possession of the enemy.

The prospect of a famine in the Carnatic, consequent upon the departure of the Squadron which might have protected its supplies; the actual famine, accelerated by the loss of grain and tonnage in the storm of October†, added necessity to the expediency of those measures. The Committee, forced to restrain the quantity of rice for the Madras army to 250 bags, or 20,000 rations per day, left, in deference to Major General Stuart, who had succeeded to the command of the army, to him to make such an arrangement on this occasion, that the troops he should retain here, and those he should order to the

goyne were kept *seven* days on board ship in Madras road, after undergoing a long sea-voyage from England and the Brazils. The plan of Lord Macartney for retaking Trincomalee, was projected to take place in the very height of the monsoon season. The paper was conveyed to Sir Richard Bickerton, then in the road of Madras. It is stated on the Company's records as "An Extract of "Fort St. George Consultations," dated the 20th of October 1782; but it is in form of a letter to Sir Richard Bickerton, of that date, as follows:

(E X T R A C T.)

"If, after conferring with you, Sir Edward Hughes should still think *as I do*, that Trincomalee ought to be attacked, I am persuaded that this Presidency will not hesitate in consenting that the Indiamen, *with all the troops on board*, together with every assistance that can be given from the shore, shall immediately accompany you; and it is, that not a moment (which, at this advanced season, is precious) should be lost, *that no part of the troops has yet been landed.* The harbour of Trincomalee is of such eminent importance, &c. that the advantage will warrant the risk which may be incurred in endeavouring to obtain it.

"If, contrary to all expectation, Sir Edward Hughes should, after his junction with you, persist in going with his fleet to Bombay, or should desire that the ships under your command should go there, without any previous attempt on Trincomalee, it is, *I believe*, the wish of this Presidency, that a certain proportion of the troops which came under your convoy, should go with some of the Indiamen to Bombay, &c. The Company's ships, whatever may have been their original destination, are necessarily at the disposal of the Presidency on their arrival."

(The letter was signed) "MACARTNEY."

* Lord Macartney's different proposals to subdivide and separate the army, for double purposes, were steadily opposed in every stage, and for the reasons repeatedly stated.

† It was this prospect that induced me to press the Committee so earnestly to increase that bounty and encouragement to the free importation of grain. When I failed of success in that public solicitation, my zeal for the service prompted me to risk my own credit in bringing rice to Pulicat, in the manner as has been already related.

northward,

northward, might be so accompanied and provided as to be respectively fit and ready for service when required.

⁵ President's Minute, Nov. 14, 1782.

⁶ Consultations Select Committee, Nov. 17, 1782.

In this confidence the President⁵, when some of Hyder's dominions were about to be attacked, proposed that the army here should move^{*}, in order at least to alarm and distract the enemy's attention.—General Stuart declared⁶, *that when the object should deserve it*, the army should be put in motion, but expressed himself at a loss to know what were the specific operations to which it might give effect.—When he was reminded of the troops acting under Colonel Humberstone, those under Colonel Lang, and those ready to the northward, he surprised the Committee by saying that the situation of his army did not admit of a movement at that time. The Committee immediately *resolved*, that the army in the present establishment ought to be at all times ready to move; and the General then assured the members, that, *upon any real emergency*, the army might and must move, and would be ready to co-operate.—That resolution was made, and those assurances given, on the 17th of November.

⁷ President's Minute, Dec. 14, 1782.

In the beginning of the following month that emergency, to which † they related, actually took place by the death of Hyder Ally.—It was obvious that every motive urged to an exertion of the Company's forces to take advantage of so favourable a circumstance.—It was observed⁷, that the principal men under the dominion and in the service of Hyder would, on his decease, be apt to look to that disturbance in the succession which follows frequently the death of an usurper. They might have been apt to waver in their obedience and attachment to the successor of his appointment, then absent from the army, and might form expectations of advantage from a transfer of their allegiance; but that if an interval of tranquillity was suffered to intervene, it was very possible, and it would be the natural consequence, that the men the most restless and desirous of new things, would sink into their former habits of prudential submission, while the youthful and spirited heir of Hyder, without the odium of his father's vices, or of his tyranny, might succeed to that power, and that ambition, which had proved so prejudicial to the Company's welfare.—The moment was therefore critical, and the General was therefore urged to endeavour to determine such a crisis in favour of the Company; a circumstance which certainly could be effected

* See the answer to all the reasoning of the following pages, in my Minute of February 1.

† There was no particular relation or reference to Hyder's death in November.—That event was not known and believed at Madras until near the middle of December 1782.

only by an instantaneous march of the army, or even of a part of it; but the General chose to⁸ disbelieve the death of Hyder; and when that event could no longer be disallowed, he then declared that the army which he had a month before assured the Committee might and must move, and be ready to co-operate on any real emergency, was not even then ready to move or co-operate on this most real and most important emergency. Its importance indeed was acknowledged by the General, who found the reasoning of the President on this subject so just as to declare it to be in common observation. The observations indeed were not made for their novelty or brilliancy, but to induce to those exertions which they proved to be necessary.

⁸ General Stuart's Minute, December 16, 1782.

However, for those exertions the General was not ready; for neither the President's exhortations the month before, or the Committee's resolution made in the General's presence, and for his government, that the army ought to be always ready to move, had had the effect of inducing him to give those orders, or take those steps, without which he knew it could not move.—He knew it could not move without cattle to carry rice, without their drivers, or without Lascars to attend the artillery and baggage.—When, in the time of famine, the Committee was forced to limit the consumption of rice for the use of the army*, to a *sufficiency for 20,000 men*, the General did not retain in the arrangement entrusted to him† a due proportion of those necessary followers, which would have diminished the number of troops under his immediate command, but preferred commanding a larger army deprived of the means of motion, rather than a smaller provided with them, and keeping a surplus of troops to no purpose here, instead of sending them to the northward, where they might have been advantageously employed, in giving security to the dependent provinces of the Company, or in annoying those of the enemy.

From the 14th of November, when the General was warned to have the army in readiness, to the 14th of December, when it ought to have been perfectly ready to take the field, it does not appear that any steps were taken

* The copy of Lord Macartney's Minute of November 14. (N° 2.) has been refused to me by the Court of Directors. It is with infinite regret that I am obliged only to refer to it in general, in support of the propriety of my military conduct, opposed to Lord Macartney's reasoning, and plans of military *diversion* at that crisis!

† The army in cantonments near the Presidency, was accompanied with a due proportion of draught and carriage cattle, with the drivers and necessary followers suited to every useful purpose, or probable contingency at that season of the year, as evidently appears from the returns and muster rolls upon the Company's records. It was in general the spare or relief cattle, &c. which were sent to Nellore for subsistence.

⁹ President's Minute, December 14, 1782.

¹⁰ General Stuart's Minute, December 15, 1782.

¹¹ General Stuart's Minute, December 16, 1782.

by him to demand or order from Nellore * the bullocks and the mestries he might want to accompany his army, although the country was then fully as practicable as when they went there. Even at this later period it was necessary for the President to urge in Committee⁹ the assemblage of the necessary followers of the army.

On the 15th of December¹⁰, in the General's separate Minute to the President, he allows that the first step he is to take is to give the necessary orders for the security and convoy of the bullocks from Nellore, and yet the very next day he assures the Committee in his General Minute¹¹, that nothing but want of rice, emphatically underlined, could be in the way of the army's movements *upon any well-directed plan of operations, as if there had been any stoppage † or refusal of the stated and sufficient allowance of that article*, or that he had provided the means within his reach for carrying that rice to subsist the army in those movements.

The army was at length so far in its progress towards an effectual march as to quit its cantonments, and to encamp in the beginning of this month. But the moment that was critical had not been seized, and was already past. The interval of tranquillity was suffered to intervene ‡. The agitations, the apprehensions, the confusion, the mistrust that must have been produced by Hyder's death, and which, by the rapid approach of the Company's army, or even of a detachment of it, might have broken out into open contest or total separation, ceased, or were silenced by the want of such support. Hyder's successor has had leisure from the coast of Malabar to join his father's army in the Carnatic.—The French forces have moved to meet him; order reigns in his camp; and the Company may have changed only for a more formidable opponent.

Not to have been prepared, as was directed, for giving a different and more favourable turn to public events, not to have been ready as was promised for emergencies, may be considered, if it happened without design, as an instance of that in-

* Lord Macartney gave in a Minute the 14th of December, which contained no other specific object but only to get the army into the field with expedition—in which there was no difference of opinion; and if, in his quality of President, he took the lead or first word as to bullocks, and every talk on military matters, it was not in my power to prevent his writing what he thought proper. What I did and said, stands on record the 15th and 16th of December.

† I have, on every proper occasion, repeatedly said, and marked emphatically, that the want of rice was ever the greatest cause both of distress and of disappointment, in every military object which might otherwise have been attainable by the army in the Carnatic; and on the occasion here alluded to, it will be found, that Lord Macartney did object to allowing rice from the stores of Madras, for the purpose of any expedition at a distance from thence.

‡ In answer to all these suppositions, it is requested that attention may be given to my Minute, read in Committee the 1st of February.

action, or if designedly of that counteraction, of which the mention in the President's Minute seemed to have given offence to the General, but of which the present state of things has justified the apprehension.*

The first and great object for marching the army having thus been missed, it remains only to consider whether and what other objects may be yet within its reach, and to form, if practicable, a plan for the operations of the campaign.

For this purpose the President proposed, on the 30th of last month, that the Committee should be made acquainted with the plans and prospects on this occasion of Major General Stuart, whose present station at the head of the army, and seat in the Committee, as well as his professional knowledge, rendered such an application and communication equally proper. It was not to be supposed that the General, knowing the entire concurrence of the other members in this proposal of the President, would require the formal resolution of the Committee to be forced to be explicit on the subject of the military operations in the Carnatic, as he had formerly delivered his sentiments on distant military operations, upon the express ground of not appearing totally ignorant and inadequate to the duties of his station: That the thoughts which the General had formerly delivered to the Committee, had not been found to have given all the information that was wished to be received, the subsequent application to him for more sufficiently testified. The General, however, referring to those thoughts which he expressed at a time when he declared also that he knew of no object deserving that this army should be put in motion, and before he had any thoughts of assembling it, as well as to what he added when he gave in the plan of the line of battle, declined any further communication as unnecessary and imprudent.

“ But the General seems to have adopted the idea of suffering both the northern and southern provinces to remain unable to defend themselves effectually¹² †, in order to wait until after the arrival of Monsieur de Buffly's reinforce-

¹² General Stuart's Minute, November 17, 1782.

* In the Petition which, through the Secretary of State, I had the honour to present to his Majesty, dated 26th July 1785, earnestly requesting that a Court of Inquiry or a Court Martial might be appointed for the trial of my military conduct, I took occasion to insert a literal copy of the whole of this paragraph of Lord Macartney's Minute of 18th January 1783, observing that it contained a direct accusation or charge affecting the military character or conduct of a General Officer commanding at the time his Majesty's troops jointly with those of the Company. On this subject, see further the observations at the close of this Appendix, page xxv.

† The very position of the army at Vellout, the 18th January, the day Lord Macartney gave his Minute for record, effectually covered and preserved the Presidency, and every thing to the north of it; and the places of strength in the southern provinces were sufficiently garrisoned and provided for every defensive purpose. It is well deserving of notice, that on the day following those strictures of

reinforcement, the plan of the French operations shall be known, that then the Carnatic army might move, if possible, bodily to counteract them.

To assert that this army, which could not protect Cuddalore from the few French forces already arrived, that could not move effectually to the preservation of Permacoill, both within the limits of the Carnatic, and taken without the assistance of Hyder, should suddenly be able, in despite of the combined obstructions and resistance of Indians and Europeans, *to stride to the Circars, or to Tanjore*, to prevent the effects of an invasion there, is to suppose that the history of the invasion of the Carnatic already is forgotten, and that the march of an army may, to imitate an expression of the General's, be as quick in practice as in a minute concerning it.

To wait, as proposed in that minute of the General's, in the vain idea of the moving afterwards in the manner he describes, *or after the return of the Squadron* * to move against the French already here, is, however, the whole and only plan or explanation of operations as to this army, contained or even mentioned in that minute to which a reference was thus made by him, and the Committee's attention gravely called to it.

Whatever might be deficient in this plan of present suspense and future activity, was, by the General's reference of 31st December, to be supplied by what he communicated to the Committee, when he laid before them the line of battle, chiefly shewing the corps that were now to be employed in field service. What he communicated on that subject, as appears by the consultations of that date, was solely, that it was possible the principal operations of the army might be directed to places of strength, where French troops might be in garrison, or which contain the enemy's principal magazines. Such preliminary communication was sufficient to lead to a demand of a battering train and an Engineer. It denotes what may be the general aim, but cannot be admitted to contain a plan of operations, which implies not only the specification of the several particular objects, thought eventually practicable and expedient to be attempted, but of the means by which some or all of them are most likely to be attained.

the 18th January 1783, intelligence was received both of M. de Suffrein's position at sea, off *Ganjam*, and of the original plan of M. de Bussy's land operations; and had we been gifted with the most precise foreknowledge of events, we could not possibly have placed the main army of the Carnatic in a more proper situation to counteract the enemy's designs, than that very one where it was posted on the day of receiving the intelligence by the *Chacer*.

* I ever maintained, that we could at any time *bodily* move to the *northward*, and drive any body of French and Mysoreans from thence, even when the French were the masters at sea; but, on the contrary, that it would require the *co-operation* of our Squadron, to succeed in any effectual expedition to the *southward*.

The

The Committee, or executive government, to whom on this coast the direction of all military operations is confided, to approve of a plan, must be enabled to examine and judge of all its parts. The instructions of the Committee to the Commander in Chief of the army, must include this plan, of which the responsibility rests with them, as with him that of the execution. The superintending and controlling Presidency of Bengal, who have lately required from this Government a communication of its plan of operations or defence, may not be satisfied with defective, loose, or vague information; but General Stuart, called upon again on this occasion, determined not to hazard in these times a precise or positive opinion, refers anew to the objects of his former reference¹³; and to that minute, which in this respect, contains only the expression of that reference.

¹³ Consultations,
January 4, 1783.

The President therefore, whose apology on a former occasion for the discussion, though in the discharge of his duty, of subjects which bore relation to military operations, did not save him from the expression of the ironical, or the opposition of the real jealousy of General Stuart, is reluctantly impelled to offer heads of a plan to the consideration of the Committee, and of the Commander in Chief, wishing rather to have had the opportunity of approving those which the General had been solicited to suggest.

The President, however, builds his opinions on the General's authority, in relation to the powers of the army, which he has declared¹⁴ *to be equal to any thing* that can possibly at any one time, or in any one body, be reasonably expected to come against it. Since that declaration, the army has suffered no sensible diminution, except by the detachment of 300 Europeans to the southward, under Colonel Forbes, which still leaves the army stronger in Europeans, than when Sir Eyre Coote gained his victories. The enemy has not in that interval received the encrease reasonably to be expected, or any exercise of its force. Of the actual good condition of the army, or of its sufficient equipment, nothing could give more strong conviction to the Committee, than the General's demand¹⁵ of a battering train, implying the capacity of using it, and a use which implies a conscious superiority over the enemy. But the forts of Vandewash and Carangooly, in the present state of things, serve only to multiply expence, to keep troops from the field, to diminish the stock of grain in store, to employ carriage necessary elsewhere for conveying it, as well as escorts for defending it, and to distract the attention of the whole army whenever either of those posts are threatened or approached by the enemy.

¹⁴ General Stuart's
Minute, November
17, 1782.

¹⁵ Consultation,
December 27, 1782.

If any attack should happen to be made upon either of those forts, while the Company's troops are employed in any military operation at a distance from

from them, or should be on a march to relieve or provide Vellore; either such operation must be suspended, or those forts will change their masters. The present Commander in Chief, who has declared that he attributes no other importance to *Vandewasb and Carangooly*, except the appearance of things in the eyes of the powers of India, will therefore, it is hoped, have as little an objection to direct those works to be demolished as he would have a great one to see them taken by the enemy.

The President, therefore, is of opinion, that it should be proposed to General Stuart, to march with the army as soon as may be practicable and expedient*, to the neighbourhood of those fortresses; for the purpose, if it can be compassed, of withdrawing the garrisons, and as much of the stores and provisions as may be possible to be carried from thence, and of destroying the remainder, together with the works of the same, as effectually as circumstances may admit.

That if either of those places should be besieged before the above service could be effected, the General might, if practicable, force such siege to be raised, or otherwise endeavour that such service be completed.

That if either Tripasore or Ponamellee should be attacked, the preservation of those places should be preferred to the demolition of the others.

That the General should undertake no siege without information to the Committee, with the motives for the undertaking and the prospect of success, or advantage that might attend it.

That as in the event of an engagement with the enemy, the decisive experience in the battles won by Sir Eyre Coote, evinces, that victory cannot, in the present state of things, be pursued, by a body of mere infantry, or any advantage beside fame acquired; and that the superiority of the British arms, honourably maintained in the late campaigns, might materially suffer by any check, the General should repress his ardour for action in the field in any situation or circumstance which might render doubtful the event.

That he should at all times, and preferably to all other objects or prospects of advantage, be careful to maintain his communication with, and the practicability of returning to Fort St. George. If, or when it shall be necessary to relieve or provide Vellore, *when the return of the Squadron shall facilitate an attack on Cuddalore, or other places along the coast*, when other events shall arise

* I opposed the demolition of *Vandewasb and Carangooly*, at a time when there was no immediate need for it, and because there was grain sufficient to maintain those garrisons, without bearing on the stores at Madras; but the case became altogether different soon after, especially on receiving the news by the *Chacer*; accordingly, it will be found that I then sent orders to the commanding officers at those places to prepare the mines for the demolition.

calling for new measures, or as occasion shall offer in the course of the campaign, other ideas may be proposed; those suggested by the President are only for the present moment. The other Members may think of more and better. They are requested to examine these with strictness. The President offers them with reluctance*, and with the diffidence which becomes him, as well as with the regret of observing, that there does not appear to be really now any adequate ground or solid object attainable for the army in the Carnatic, though there

* It is worth notice, that Lord Macartney, who, towards the end of this Minute, says, he offers his military ideas with reluctance and diffidence, would have it understood that it was owing to my declining to give in any plan. This was said by his Lordship on the 18th of January; but it will be found, that on the 2d of the same month, I had presented to him a separate address, where every essential article in his Lordship's plan of service had been already in contemplation, as will appear by the following extract:

“ From Major General STUART to the President (Lord MACARTNEY).

“ (Separate Communication, N° 4.)

“ Fort St. George, January 2, 1783.

1. “ The army is now in the field, together with the old stock of carriage and gun bullocks from Nellore, with every other means of service within the compass of my power; and I venture to add, with unparalleled expedition, from the date of entering the cantonments, and from the 16th of last month (December), the first day that the season began to open for the field service. But it is not enough to be in the field; we must have the means of moving to some essential purpose.
5. “ I calculate that, after furnishing carriage bullocks for the 1,000 additional of his Majesty's troops, which must be taken from the agent's department of grain carriage, there will not be carriage bullocks for more than seven days rice to the fighting men, if so much.
8. “ By this able officer (C. Flint's) latest intelligence, the French were pointing at an attempt against Vandewash, and the army under Curreem Sahib had made some marches towards a junction. I had long since told Captain Flint the precise day we should be in the field; therefore, if no regular approaches were made in a certain time, he had only to guard against surprise. He has now established signals on Vandewash hill, to be seen from Carangooly and Chingleput; so that we shall instantly know the certainty.
9. “ The latest intelligence from Captain Flint is of the 29th ultimo; and he says, that the firing of that day (heard all over our cantonments) was on Tippoo Sahib's arrival, and that several French officers had gone to pay their respects to him, which he supposed might delay the French operations against Vandewash, even though that plan might be agreeable to Hyder's successor, which was yet doubtful, from the report prevailing in the enemy's garrisons.
10. “ My plan for the present, therefore, is, to fill Chingleput with rice as much as can be; and perhaps, in some proportion Trippassore, so as to give means for a certainty of supply of three days march from the Presidency, and in every probable direction of the army's movement; at Chingleput for the coast, or the French; at Trippassore towards Vellore, &c.
14. “ In this way, I say, we may from management proceed; and if in the meanwhile, the French and Tippoo attempt any enterprise, whether against Vandewash, or any other place within the reach of our provisions, I shall certainly be of opinion to march towards them to prevent it, not on account of the importance either of Vandewash or Carangooly, but for the appearance of things in the eyes of the powers in India!”

might


might elsewhere, as it can here be little more in the present state of things than an army of observation and defence.*

* It will not escape the observation of those who read this Minute of Lord Macartney's, and who compare the contents of it with those of the *desponding* Letters from the President and Select Committee to the Governments of Bengal and Bombay, and to Sir Edward Hughes (inserted in Appendix II. from No. 1. to No. 5.), that there is some degree of inconsistency between the ideas entertained or declared at these periods.

In the Letter to Bombay of the 10th October 1782, the President and Select Committee express themselves thus: "From this melancholy view of our situation, you will plainly perceive that it is not in our power to afford you any hope of aiding your invasion of Hyder Ally's possessions on the Malabar coast by attacking him on *this* side: on the contrary, we have every reason to fear that we shall be driven to the necessity of *dividing, if not disbanding the army, and of confining our intentions and our hopes to the single object of keeping possession of this fortress.*"—But in the months of December and January immediately following, the great object seems to have been to impute blame to me for not performing wonders even by *detachments* from that army, under all the difficulties of the situation at the time.

In the conclusion, however, of the President's Minute of 18th January, his Lordship discloses an opinion that the Carnatic army in the present state of things, could be little more than an army of observation and defence.—My notions of the utility of the Carnatic army, and of the great importance of keeping our main force together, happened to differ very widely from those of the President.—I thought it my indispensable duty to state and maintain my own opinions by reasoning freely on these subjects, when fully convinced that the military plans proposed by the President, were upon some occasions founded on principles too narrow and desponding, and upon other occasions were subject to the objection of suggesting *impracticable plans of service.*—Whether the freedom I thus took, whenever the occasion seemed to require it, contributed in any measure to the strictures and marked hostility against me so apparent in every part of the President's Minute of 18th January, must be left to the judgment of others to decide.

Had we followed the President's plans of *dividing or separating* the army—or, by inland expeditions, either committed the reputation of considerable detachments, which in any event could not have rejoined from the southward, to be of seasonable use—or finally, had we contented ourselves solely with a garrison at *Madras*—nay, if we had not adopted a precise different conduct, in keeping our *main force together*, in condition to avail ourselves of the suitable occasion, as at *Nedingul* before his Majesty's Squadron returned to the coast, and acting with a view to subsequent operations which might be necessary towards *Cuddalore* after the return of Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes; I verily believe the Company's possessions on that side of India would have been lost to this country, by the countenance and support which the French would have been enabled to give to *Tippoo's* hostile designs against the English, in pursuance of his father's *original* plans.



N° 2.

The MINUTE of Major General STUART, presented and read in Committee, February 1, 1783.

(E X T R A C T.)

ON the 24th (January) I was first possessed of the Right Honourable President's minute, read in Committee the 18th (January), since which time, I beg leave to appeal to my employment with the army, and to the correspondence from thence, upon immediate business with the Committee, to shew the reason why I could not attend to that minute sooner than at present. In fact, I never looked into it until I came to the fort from camp, (29th January).

In so far as that minute has any retrospect to my conduct*, I cannot help considering it as bordering upon general invective, which, I hope, without taking up much of the time of the Committee, to prove, from facts and dates, to be devoid of foundation.

It is, indeed, a sort of *commentary on conduct*, not singularly applied to me, from a certain quarter. It appears from record, that I go in very good company. His Excellency Sir Eyre Coote, and Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, the Commanders in Chief by land and sea, have had *their* share too; without mentioning the Governor General and Council of Bengal.

I shall therefore, neither in my own opinion, nor, as I hope, *in the opinion of my sovereign*, nor in that of my Honourable Employers, the East India Company, neither with the candid public in general, suffer in the smallest degree by this or any other performance of the Right Honourable President. With the utmost tranquillity, therefore, on that head, and to take notice only here of that part where there is an imputation of *inaction or counteraction* to what the Right Honourable President *would wish* to make believe was public service, and which, upon a more minute canvas, will be found to be little else than his own *ideal*, and, as I take leave to say, *impracticable plans of service*, I shall, for that end, premise with the following general position, to be established by reasonable proof: Namely—

That as to the application or employment of any force of this army, capable to make an impression even upon the minds of the enemy in their weakest

* This paper was presented, and for the first time read in Committee, held Saturday the 1st of February 1783. It is chiefly meant as an answer to Lord Macartney's strictures on my conduct. I see, by some mistake, it is cited in Lord Macartney's minute of 25th June 1783 (*when I was absent on service*), as of date the 29th of January 1783.

condition, considering the actual state of this army at the times alluded to, the season of the year, the then distance of the enemy from us, I make bold to say, that no man of practical knowledge or experience would have entertained the idea of a movement of this army, such as to have expected any salutary purpose from it; but, on the contrary, from practical professional knowledge, there is every reason to believe, that a movement by detachment (as it must have been) of Europeans and native cavalry, and sepoy, to the greatest extent possible at the time, on any march or expedition that the Right Honourable President could have *planned in his closet*, fitted out to the utmost power of the Presidency at the time, would have been *liable to insult*; and, independent of that, could not, in the first instance, possibly have reached within *five* days march of Hyder's army, then near *Chittoor*, without necessarily returning to the Presidency for rice. And if the allusion is to any movement immediately after Hyder's death was known *and believed* in this settlement, the detachment (for such it still would have been) must have marched with half the number of Europeans, artillery-men, and infantry, and with not half the proportion of artillery and of native cavalry, with about 3000 sepoy; this too, at the precise time when the French, in nearly* equal numbers as to Europeans, with a very considerable train of artillery, were actually on their march from Cuddalore, with a view of effecting a junction with the army then under *Cherim Sabib*; I say, that our detachment of *all* the Europeans fit for duty, not half provided in any respect, could not have proceeded *five* days without meeting the French regulars in their fullest force, joined to the other army. I venture to maintain, that in the state of the sick and convalescents, particularly of the European artillery-men and native troopers, from the peculiar inclemency of the monsoon, with the epidemical distemper which did then affect nearly one half of this army, *and which is not yet wore out*, I say, that had any detachment of force been made at the times alluded to, the public *real* service, in all its train and consequences, must have been deeply affected, and this army could not have encamped in force, as at present, so soon by one month at least. I am even doubtful if we could have formed an army at all, such as now, to bid defiance to the present combined force of the enemy.

At the time the Right Honourable President brought forward his minute of the 14th November, in general proposing expeditions and diversions; the face of the country was covered with water; the army was in a manner totally unprovided with tents; there were upwards of *three thousand* carriage and draught bullocks, from necessity and want of subsistence to the cattle and drivers, at above one hundred and twenty miles distance; the artillery, carriages, and tumbrils, were in the act of repairing; and supposing we had had

* See Notes, p. xxii.

carriage,

carriage, there was *no rice* to send forward in the direction of any march towards the enemy; the followers of the army were dying by hundreds daily, owing to the *narrowed* delivery of rice at the Presidency; I say, that at this time, when the President was urging some movement of this army (though he could not tell where), I did myself the honour to present a minute in answer, dated November 17th. I beg leave to refer to that minute *entire*, without troubling the Committee with any partial extract, such as the Right Honourable President has thought proper to insert in his minute of the 18th (January).

What I therein state to the Committee, besides what appears thus marked by the President, was the most comprehensive view in my power to give, of the real position of our affairs, and the proper practical and practicable application of our force; I have since the time, more than once, recurred to what I *then* said, particularly since the last news from Lieutenant Colonel M^cLeod, from Colonel Lang, and from the northward, concerning the French squadron, and the expectation of M. Bussy landing in that quarter; and if I had at the time been certain of the events that have since happened, I do not see any alteration necessary.

I repeat and request therefore, that when the imputations concerning me or my conduct, contained in several parts of the Right Honourable President's minute of the 18th (January), or *any where else*, are read by those who have the best right to judge of my conduct, they will not do it by extracts or citations, but, on the contrary, do me the justice at the same time, to view the whole scope and tendency of what I said on the 17th of November, and on the 16th of December, and also what I now say upon the present occasion.

I shall now proceed to establish what I have said, by facts and dates.

Upon the 15th day of October the army shifted ground; and they had scarce time to pitch their tents (then in very bad condition), when they had the misfortune to be assailed by the same storm that did so much damage to the shipping in the roads here.—By the report made to me, the cover of the army was almost entirely lost or torn to pieces:—On the 19th following, they were from necessity cantoned in the neighbourhood of the Presidency.

The consultations in Select Committee held on *the 17th of October*, and subsequent meetings, to which I beg leave to refer, will evince at this period, and for weeks thereafter, the constant struggle I had in combating with *my own private opinion*, the arguments of the Right Honourable President, &c. which went to the removing of this army at a distance from Madras; a step which at that time I took occasion to say, would, in effect, be equal to disbanding it. The prevailing notion with the Right Honourable President was, if I rightly

recollect, to consider the army as good for little more than the garrison of this place, and that no field army was needed.

The impression was then, and still is so strong on my mind, that unless this army can be kept together, to oppose the enemy in the field, every province, and every garrison and place of strength remaining, would most undoubtedly, in a short time, be attacked and carried; and seeing that the keeping together the fighting part of the army at least, *with the followers absolutely necessary*, turned upon the management of rice, I therefore thought it a duty incumbent to give up almost the whole of my attention during the cantonment, with the most minute exactness, to control and regulate the distribution of a certain quantity of rice, which I was, in express terms, told in Committee “was all that would be given for the use of the army; and if “more were kept together than could be fed on that quantity, or that any “discontents or mutinous behaviour followed, I must be answerable for the “consequences.”

The records, I am sorry to say, are but too full on such subjects. It is no fault of mine; I was on the defence in my profession, and in my place.

On the 24th of October, two battalions from this army, together with more than 3000 draught and carriage bullocks, with all the public and private followers that could not get subsistence here, left the cantonments on their way to Nellore; the cattle were in general in very low condition, and the country and rivers so full of water, that the battalions did not reach *Pulicat* in less than six days; they had, upon the whole, with their escort, to march 120 miles to Nellore-Serapilé.

About *nine days* after this principal part of the whole carriage of the army had got there, the Right Honourable President's minute of the 14th November, for *action* and *enterprise*, was produced; but whether for Cummum or Cuddapah, or some where else, I do not know.—He wished, as I recollect, at one time, that some more battalions should go from hence to the *north*, and that point not being carried, the two Carnatic battalions before mentioned were ordered from Nellore to Ongole upon some general plan of *diversion*; there they remained until of late, when, on the belief of M. Buffy being expected to make a descent to the northward, chiefly with a view to *Masulipatam*, I was clearly of opinion that the service required their moving immediately towards that important place.

I repeat again that it would, in effect, have retarded any *real* operation of this army, had the small number of troops fit for duty, unprovided as they must have been with sufficient cover during the most inclement monsoon in the memory of man, with the few guns that we then could have dragged, without rice, followers, or carriage cattle sufficient for any march of *seven*

days, it would have been, I say, *ruinous in the extreme* for the troops to have taken the field by *detachment* at that time.—We could not possibly even for three weeks after the President's minute of the 14th of November (from the obstacle of the *season* alone), have marched to the *Poney river* towards Hyder, and consequently no movement could have in *that way* operated to *prevent* whatever was Tippoo's original design to the southward.

Tippoo marched from the Carroor district towards Lieutenant Colonel Humberstone in the *second week of November*; and experience has since shewn that he waited to dart at Lieut. Col. Humberstone's detachment so soon as he could get him at a certain distance from the coast.—It has been our singular good fortune, that the enemy on this occasion pursued too far, and that Lieut. Col. Macleod availed himself so ably of his advantage ground, and was so well seconded by Lieut. Col. Humberstone and the brave fellows under his command.—The action at *Paniany* deserves indeed every praise that can be given.

In my minute of the 17th November, I stated what we were then employed about, in order to bring the army into the field properly equipped, *so soon as the season for action would admit of it*. In the second week of December I took measures, with dispatch and secrecy, for the escort of the draught and carriage bullocks returning safe back from Nellore to the army.—They had not recovered from their low condition sooner than about that time; and much about that time it will be found *there were objections in the Committee to the sending rice forward to the out garrisons from the stores here in any line of direction that the army would have marched*.—On the 29th of December all the cattle above mentioned came safe; and on Thursday the 2d of January, *the whole army*, in full force, from every cantonment and quarter, and with the whole field artillery, encamped at the Mount.

The death of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, the epoque which the Right Honourable President alludes to, when action and movements would have done wonders, and upon which he is pleased to dwell in his minute of the 14th December, happened in the first week of that month, near to *Chittoor*;—it was not known and believed here till about the 12th or 13th.—The distance of Chittoor from hence, by any route that the army could have taken at that time of the year, would have at least required *a march of thirteen days*; and from the rainy season, very probably, it would have been impossible to have advanced half way;—we could not have put *a thousand Europeans* in the field, with not more than *three hundred native cavalry*, and about *three thousand sepoys*.

At this precise time, had we made a move of four or five days, we most probably, in this unprovided state, must have met with the French from Cuddalore, joined to the force of *Curraem Sabib's army*, which, notwithstanding all the vague accounts from the Durbar and elsewhere, yet from Captain Flint and
 Captain

Captain Cuppage's intelligence, and by every account that I can depend upon, continued most firmly attached to Hyder's cause; and a proof of it, equal to demonstration, is, *that not a man or horse* to my knowledge has come in from the time of Hyder's death to the present hour.

Hyder's death, as before said, was not believed here till the 13th of December; the same intelligence had come to the Nabob on the 11th—The French regular troops from Cuddalore, to the number of at least *nine hundred*, with one hundred and fifty artillery-men of all casts, and two thousand sepoy's disciplined by the French, with a train and ordnance (as in the note *), had advanced on the 16th (December), and were at *Fatteh-Pett*, near *Gingee*, a few days after. This body of troops when in communication with the enemy's main army, both could have joined in *two days* in any central situation applicable to our movement, if it had been made at the time, and under the circumstances alluded to †.

I shall now leave it to *speculatists* on general reasoning, of supposed disaffection or treachery, or the love of change, or the hope of gain, or any other motive whatever, *probably* actuating the leaders of the enemy's army after Hyder's death;—let them draw consequences from such suppositions,—as from the reasoning of the President's minute of the 14th of November, or of the 14th of December, because I was *not* of opinion, and saw *no* reason to move this army into the field circumstanced as above;—they may give what epithet they please to my conduct, whether calling it criminal *inaction* or

These two notes were in the original minute given for record February 1, 1783.

* Besides the body of French troops here mentioned to have joined from Cuddalore in December, there are with the enemy the piquets of two hundred sent by M. *Duchemin* soon after his arrival; also *Lallé's* old corps.—The train of artillery, which, by the exact intelligence, is known to be with the body of the French last joined, consists of two twenty-four pounders, four eighteen ditto, four six ditto, four howitzers.

† See intelligence from the Honourable Basil Cochrane, communicated January 10, 1783. Also see intelligence from the President's information (Medea's cutting out the prize from Cuddalore), 31st January 1783.

Extract from Mr. Cochrane's Intelligence (acting Resident in the Districts of Negapatam, Nagore, and Karical), above alluded to.

“The French camp marched from Cuddalore *December 12, 1782*, consisting of *nine hundred Europeans*, one hundred and fifty caffries, one hundred topasses, and about two thousand sepoy's, two twenty-four pounders, four eighteen pounders, six twelve pounders, six six pounders, four howitzers; leaving behind them as a garrison, fifty Europeans, fifty topasses and caffries, fifty artillery-men, about five hundred sepoy's, *Dutch* and French, and two thousand of Hyder's sepoy's encamped within the bounds. This step they took with the permission of Hyder, after their repeated requests for that purpose. On their arrival at *Velomalpetty* the 16th December, they received accounts of Hyder Ally Cawn having *died the 7th December*; they remained there, and on the they received a letter from Cherim Sahib, desiring them not to proceed any further, but to return immediately to Cuddalore, as the English were preparing to retake that place. After two days they proceeded, and arrived at *Fattepet* on the 22d, two coss from *Gingee*.”

counter-

counteraction, or even disaffection; it gives me little concern, when I am at liberty, as at present, to appeal to the candid unprejudiced judgment of the most respectable authority as above mentioned, *whether, according to every rule which in prudence or propriety ought to guide the plans and movements of this main army, on which so much depends—their health—their reputation—and their future consequence—were to be risked and sported with at the periods alluded to, and on plans of speculative reasoning, to give them the mildest epithet that now occurs to me?*

Tippoo Sahib returned from the southward, and joined his army* in the last week of December; and if, from his own experience, or the advice of the French now encamped at a few miles distance from him, he has made some new arrangements in his army, such reforms could not have been prevented by any movement on our part *at the times* alluded to.—But, even with all their improvements, I maintain that this army has nothing to apprehend from their united efforts; this however might not have been the case, if detachments had been sent, for purposes of *speculation* as above stated.

Situated as at present, and encamped in full force, it becomes, in my humble opinion, the most fortunate position that we possibly could have expected to find the enemy, in their full force, *Europeans and natives*, opposed to this army. The southern provinces are freed thereby, and Colonel Lang will avail himself, doubtless, of his situation; the operations on the other side of India, where Hyder's successor is chiefly vulnerable, are also unembarrassed. If the French land, as expected, under Monsieur Buffy, there is force, I hope, in the Circars, assembled centrically, to run him down, even if they should land; and if the enemy's united force moves to the northward, we shall likewise move with this army to impede the junction; *and we are equal to it.*

As to all these points now immediately touched upon, I have had the honour to lay before the Committee my sentiments at some length, in a minute sent from camp the 26th (January); I will not therefore now trouble the Committee with going over the same ground again. What I have had the honour to offer to the Committee, on the subject of the Right Honourable President's minute, where my conduct is pointedly attacked, will, as I hope, suffice for my vindication, judging, as I trust they will, from a plain narrative of facts.

As to the events and intelligence that have come to the knowledge of Government since the 18th (January), and communicated to me, I trust likewise that the Committee will do me the justice to observe, that I have not lost a moment, either in the operations immediately necessary, nor have I been backward in giving my opinion concerning the plans and measures suited to the events and the intelligence; I refer to my Letter in corre-

* It is on record (General Letter, Fort St. George, 29th January 1783), that Tippoo was in the Carnatic the 18th December 1782.

spondence with the Committee the 26th (January), and to other Letters since the army moved from the Mount.

“ I conclude all that I have now said, by assuring the Right Honourable President and Committee, that, notwithstanding any reason I have had, or yet may have, to offer my opinion, differing from the majority, yet, whatever any particular member may *separately* state or insinuate regarding *inaction or counteraction* on my part, they, *as Government*, shall find, from proof positive, my most hearty and ready assistance and co-operation in carrying *their* orders into execution, to the utmost of my power and abilities upon every occasion, and most particularly upon the present most critical situation of public affairs *.

(Signed)

J A M^s S T U A R T.

P. S. The Papers in consultation or communication with the Select Committee, on my part alluded or referred to in the preceding Minute, are,

October	1st, 1782,	Letter
November	4th, —,	Minute
November	17th, —,	No. II. Minute
December	16th, —,	Minute
December	15th, —,	No. I.
December	22d, —,	No. II. and return of the sick.
December	24th, —,	No. III.
January	2d, 1783,	No. IV. Letter
January	18th, —,	Minute
January	26th, —,	Letter


(Signed)

J. S. February 1, 1783.

* As Lord Macartney's minute of the 18th January was given in to the Select Committee without any previous notice to me, and as no copy was given to me of that minute till the evening of the 24th, it was the 1st of February before I had any opportunity of presenting to the Select Committee my minute which contained the answer to that of the President, and it was not without considerable difficulty that I obtained that meeting of the Select Committee on the 1st of February.

It appears from the Company's records, that on the 29th of January 1783, a General Letter to the Court of Directors was sent from the President and Select Committee of Madras, which letter I presume was either accompanied with the President's minute of 18th January, or contained paragraphs in which there were strictures upon my conduct, but the dispatch to the Court of Directors dated the 29th of January, could not contain any part of the answers in justification of my conduct which were inserted in the minute on my part, as these answers were not read in Committee till the 1st of February,—Intimation, however, was given to them on the 19th January, “ that I trusted the President's minute of 18th January would not go *unanswered*.”

If it so happened that the Court of Directors received the President's minute of 18th January, containing the strictures against me, without at the same time receiving my answers to them, it is hoped that the particulars contained in this note will account for that circumstance.



OBSERVATIONS for explaining the Object and Tendency of these APPENDIXES.

IN the Letter to the Honourable the Directors of the East India Company, prefixed to these Appendixes, I have acknowledged that
 “ I was happy to embrace the natural opportunity afforded me, of
 “ submitting to the strictest examination, the particulars of my con-
 “ duct during the period alluded to in the course of that Letter;
 “ from which they might be able to judge whether it was such as
 “ became a faithful and zealous servant of the East India Company;
 “ and, with that view, the Appendixes annexed to the Letter,
 “ contained not only those proofs which have been specially referred
 “ to in the course of the Letter, as relating to the rice and grain pro-
 “ vided by my means for the public service, but likewise the copies of
 “ some official minutes and papers, which might incidentally throw
 “ light upon the principles of my general conduct at that critical period
 “ of their affairs.”

The Minute of the President, Lord Macartney, of 18th January, and my Minute in answer of the 1st February 1783, which compose this Appendix, N^o III. fall precisely within the above description, both on account of the period at which they were framed, and on account of the occurrences and plans of conduct to which they relate.

Amongst other things, these Minutes give a strong representation of the distress which the army and the country in general suffered in the beginning of the year 1783, as well as before that time, from the scarcity of rice, &c.; in which respect, they are connected with my claim of indemnification, in relation to the rice transaction, because they strengthen and confirm the various other proofs in support of

the necessity or utility of the measures taken by me for increasing the quantity of provisions in the vicinity of Madras.

But a strong additional motive for my bringing the contents of these Minutes under the view of the Court of Directors, arises from the very peculiar situation in which I have been placed, in consequence of the charges or attacks made upon my conduct by the President and Select Committee of Madras.

The charges were contained in Minutes or Letters sent home by them to the Directors of the East India Company; and as the contents of these papers could not fail to create impressions unfavourable to me, I became extremely desirous, upon my arrival in this country in the year 1784, to have every charge or attack upon my conduct discussed and examined in the strictest manner; for which purpose, earnest applications were made by me to the Honourable the Directors of the East India Company; which, however, did not at that time procure to me the opportunity I wished of justifying my conduct.

In the month of July 1785, I applied by petition to his Majesty, that he might be graciously pleased "to order the strictest investigation of my military conduct while in India, either by the means of a Court of Enquiry, or of a Court Martial, or in such other manner as to his Majesty should seem most proper."

In that petition I was at pains to collect, from the various official papers on record, and to state, in the *strongest terms against myself*, every charge or imputation that carried with it any appearance of weight; but I abstained from stating any of my answers to these charges, because I did not wish at that time to diminish the apparent magnitude or importance of these charges, presuming that by these means I should be the more likely to obtain the trial or enquiry so much wished for on my part; and I trusted that an opportunity would be afforded me of stating my answers and defence completely, and with effect, to the Court of Enquiry, or the Court Martial, which I then flattered myself with the hopes of obtaining.

But

But I have now waited nearly two years in vain, without obtaining that public opportunity so earnestly solicited for doing justice to my conduct in India; and therefore it will not be thought improper that I should avail myself of such opportunities as naturally present themselves, for bringing under the view of those in whose service I have had the honour to be employed, some part, at least, of the answers I am in condition to give to the attacks made upon my conduct by the President and Select Committee of Madras.

The petition which I had the honour to address to his Majesty on the 26th day of July 1785, was, on the 4th day of October following, transmitted by his Majesty's Secretary of State, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; and it will appear, from the perusal of that petition, that all the various attacks or imputations made upon my conduct, were carefully collected and classed under four separate branches or articles of charge, in each of which care was taken to collect the substance, and to represent the strongest parts of the accusations, without losing any of their force.

The first of the four articles thus stated in the Petition related to the charge of INACTION or COUNTERACTION imputed to me in the President's Minute of 18th January 1783, and was founded entirely upon that Minute*; it has therefore been thought proper to insert in this Appendix a full Extract of every part of that Minute of 18th January respecting my conduct, and at the same time an Extract of my Minute of the 1st of February 1783 in answer to it, more especially as in my Petition to his Majesty, which was transmitted to the India House by his Majesty's Secretary of State, I had, for the reasons already given, purposely abstained from any defence or justification of myself against the charge of *inaction* or *counteraction*, or against any of the other charges therein stated.

* See the note at the bottom of page xi. of Appendix No. III. and the paragraph of Lord Macartney's Minute there referred to.

From the contents of some parts of the prefixed Letter of 3d July 1787, now presented to the Court of Directors, and more particularly from my Minute of the 1st February 1783, and the various other official Papers and Proofs inserted in the Appendixes N° II. and N° III. I flatter myself it must appear that the first article of charge above alluded to, founded upon a supposed blameable *inaction* or *counteraction*, has been sufficiently refuted; and that the perusal of the Papers thus referred to, independent of others in my power to produce, will show that my conduct has been the reverse of what was imputed to me under the first article of charge.

If I am not deceived in this expectation, I may be allowed to hope, that from the specimen given of proofs in refutation of the first article of charge, some degree of temporary credit will be given to me for the proofs in my power to produce for refuting the three other articles of charge specified in my Petition to his Majesty, communicated to the Court of Directors.

I shall only beg leave to add, that I have abstained at present from producing these proofs for two reasons; the one is, that they would have added too much to the length of these Appendixes: the second is, that the three other articles of charge, thus alluded to, did not either in point of time, or in their nature, bear the same relation to the subject matter of the claim stated in the prefixed Letter to the Court of Directors, as the first article of charge does; but if the Court of Directors shall at any time be pleased to signify any wish or disposition to know my answers to the three articles of charge not now entered upon, and to institute an enquiry into the merits or demerits of my conduct, the opportunity will be embraced by me with much satisfaction, and with a grateful sense of the obligation.

JAM^s STUART.

